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Martin Gorsky, Margarita Vilar-Rodríguez  
and Jerònia Pons-Pons
Hospitals are at once the site of the clinical encounter, the locus of 
medical teaching and research, and a cornerstone of health insurance 
and the welfare state. For medical historians, then, the study of the 
hospital must be multi-faceted, and in this book our perspective is that 
of political economy. Our starting point is the transformation undergone 
by health services during the twentieth century into one of the fastest 
growing economic sectors. While the level of health expenditures in rich 
countries was probably about 1% of GDP in 1900, it had risen (accord-
ing to OECD statistics) to 4-6% in 1970 and to 10% or more by 2015.2 
Emerging economies have recently followed the trend, with, for example, 
health expenditures between 1995 and 2014 rising from 4% to 6% of GDP 
in China and 4% to 5% in India.
Much of these rising costs were consumed by the hospital service, 
with all its demanding requirements. Some were material and institutional, 
with heavily capitalised infrastructure, cutting-edge technologies, and 
highly trained professionals. Some were social and symbolic, in the costs 
of delivering health security and meeting political promises of access 
and provision. Hence the hospital’s historical importance lay partly in 
its capacity to promote different economic activities and employment, 
not just medical care, but also the construction industry and the myriad 
administrative and ancillary services. And it lay partly in the policy arena, 
in which the relationship of competition and cooperation between public 
and private constituted an ongoing focus of political debate.
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Despite their importance, and notwithstanding many single-institution 
histories, there are few historical studies that analyse the growth of hospital 
systems in major countries, their characteristics and their role within larger 
health care and welfare states. Lack of sources, complexity, and heterogene-
ity in their creation may partly explain this relative scarcity. The focus so far 
has been largely on Europe, with the German3 and French cases4 especially 
noteworthy, while the peculiarities of the British voluntary hospital have 
been much explored.5 Outside Europe there are classic studies from the 
United States6 and more recent contributions on the hospital system in 
Japan7, China8 and Sub-Saharan Africa.9 
Such studies have laid the groundwork for conceptualising emergent 
hospital systems in ways that transcend national stories. Different forms 
took precedence depending on time and place, but broadly a mixed econo-
my of health care was initially prevalent, with some combination of charity, 
state action and private payment. In Western Europe, the Anglosphere 
and Latin America, there seems to have been a mix of philanthropy and 
tax funding for public hospitals, and increasingly various types of mutual 
sickness insurance concerned with income replacement and primary care. 
Some countries had more comprehensive social health insurance of the 
type pioneered in Germany from 1883, including hospital cover. In colo-
nial settings, the mixed economy could combine missionary medicine, 
private facilities for industrial workers, and state hospitals that addressed 
the needs, or fears, of European populations. For non-Western countries 
with indigenous medical practices, the growth of the public hospital was 
also shaped by the encounter with biomedicine, and the decisions taken 
about how this episteme should be incorporated with existing traditions. 
By the mid-twentieth century, these diverse hospital trajectories were 
transformed into more integrated and regulated systems. Different factors 
combined to bring this about: the unprecedented levels of wealth now 
available to finance social costs in the advanced economies; the universalist 
political doctrines of socialism and liberal democracy; the imperative of 
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‘development’ that infused West/South relations in the late-colonial and 
early Independence era; and the broad authority attributed to biomedicine 
and its technologies over other modes of healing. In the rich countries there 
was a transition either to tax-based national health services, first piloted 
in New Zealand from 1938, or to one of two basic models of health insur-
ance, the state social insurance arrangements mostly prevailing in Western 
Europe, or the private/non-profit approaches that took precedence in the 
United States.10 Henceforth, European hospital systems would be heavily 
determined by the prevailing modes of coverage, the balance of insurance 
or tax-funding, and the mix of public and private ownership.11 Meanwhile, 
in the United States, with private insurance much more prominent and 
commercial interest groups highly influential, the hospital system grew 
progressively more costly, while remaining less inclusive.12
In some poorer nations, development funding began to build 
hospital provision and to establish local training capacity, though in 
many places the legacy of colonial geographies meant institutional 
concentration in urban centres.13 Yet while the high-income countries 
now drove towards universalism and planned hospital systems, 
in much of the world expansion was elusive. The economic take-off on 
which self-sustaining social expenditure was premised proved hard 
to achieve, as relationships of underdevelopment reasserted them-
selves. Improvement to hospital systems therefore took second place 
to infectious disease programmes or improving access to selective 
aspects of primary care.14
By the end of the twentieth century access to hospitals in most 
European Union countries was through a universal compulsory 
health insurance scheme within a broader social protection system. 
However, private health insurance had become increasingly impor-
tant, either complementing or supplementing state packages.15 The 
context was one of neo-liberal philosophies, waves of privatisations, 
retrenchment and the ongoing fiscal crisis of welfare states: all have 
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been bitterly contested in the arena of health politics. Thus, while 
the foothold of private insurance in the hospital market is com-
mon across OECD countries, this varied (2002) from 92% popula-
tion coverage in the Netherlands (where it was highly regulated), 
to 13% in Spain and 10% in the UK. In the United States the eventual 
expansion of health cover under social security, through Medicare 
and Medicaid for older and poorer populations, had not resolved 
inequities of hospital access, and recurrent reform efforts were polit-
ically inflammatory.16 In China, the unleashing of private enterprise 
after Mao’s death saw increasing commercialisation of the hospital, 
and earlier social protection systems undermined, especially for rural 
populations.17 The dominance of the World Bank over development 
policies in low-income countries anxious for debt relief imposed the 
‘Washington consensus’: that purely statist welfare models were dys-
functional and that plural forms hospital provision, financed more 
extensively from user fees were the way forward.18 For such places 
the century closed with fierce debate on whether this ‘structural ad-
justment’ had brought negative effects, and with the grail of universal 
health coverage still far off. 
In sum, then, the work of medical and welfare historians has 
provided a broad chronological and conceptual framework within 
which to write the history of hospital systems. The aim of this book is 
to interrogate this framework further, through a series of studies that 
range over time and space. Specifically, we are interested in the varia-
tions between places in the structure and organisation of hospital sys-
tems, the balance between public and private sectors, and the politics 
attending this. These problems break down into subsidiary objectives, 
which the authors tackle. From a public and private perspective, why 
and how were medicine, health and hospitals transformed? To what 
extent were the different national trajectories of the twentieth century 
determined by earlier configurations of funding and ownership? Why 
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did a hospital model based on private institutions gain ascendency in 
some countries while state-built hospitals took precedence in others? 
What was the historical relationship between public and private hospi-
tals over time: did they collaborate or compete? To what extent was the 
development of hospital systems conditioned by economic and 
political factors?
Analysis of the financing and administration of different hospital 
systems raises a conceptual challenge. How exactly should hospital 
scholars seeking a shared language for comparative discussion de-
lineate ‘public’ and ‘private’? Our cases show that ‘public’ hospitals 
could have non-statutory income sources, and that ‘private’ hos-
pitals ranged from commercial to non-profit, with many different 
shades between. Here we begin with a definition of public hospitals 
as being the property of the central, regional or local state. We also 
distinguish between private hospitals created as profit-making com-
panies and those constituted as charitable institutions financed by 
private foundations. The chapters will bring into view the nation-
al variants and consider how far they acted in a complementary 
or a competitive fashion.
With respect to timeframe, our initial suggestion that authors 
began their accounts in the late-1800s proved both helpful and mis-
leading. Clearly the hospital underwent ‘medicalisation’ at some 
point, transforming it from an institution with limited therapeutic 
efficacy that sheltered the terminally ill, sustained the poor, and gave 
spiritual aid, into something else. For some, the later nineteenth 
century seems the moment that the modern hospital emerged, albeit 
retaining the tradition of refuge offering bed rest and nursing, but 
now also a diagnostic centre exploiting observational and laboratory 
techniques, locus of new therapies, grounded in biomedical sciences, 
and all staffed by medical professionals and qualified auxiliaries.19 
Others though have found in histories of case selection, of record 
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keeping, and of the language and gaze of the physician, evidence 
of much earlier beginnings.20 Alongside these narratives of Western 
modernity, as we will see, run others from across the globe, which 
observed their own chronologies. For example, the interplay between 
a biomedical profession in the making, a hospital sector combining 
healing, proselytising and social control, and the needs of the state, 
could shape such factors as the balance of primary or institutional 
care, or the persistence of charitable status across several centuries. 
Today’s health care debates and the present economic uncertain-
ties make this a salient moment to consider from a historical perspec-
tive the hospital networks constructed by different states. To date we 
do not have a historical analysis that provides an overall explanation 
of their geographical development, their capacity of coverage, their 
singularities in international terms and their main deficiencies. Thus, 
in general terms, all the chapters include the following aspects: 
a first part establishing the historical hospital inheritance at least from 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and in some cases 
significantly earlier; followed by explanation of the different stages of 
growth in the twentieth century, with emphasis on models, financing, 
construction and institutional aspects that conditioned pathways 
of hospital development, on its journey to become a necessary part 
of the twentieth-century welfare state.
 
Composition of the book
Our historical case studies begin with Spain and Brazil, to observe 
hospital models rooted in early modern charitable practices, where 
politics and pace of economic development forestalled moves to uni-
versalism until quite late in the twentieth century.
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The Spanish case analysed by Vilar-Rodríguez and Pons-Pons ini-
tially bore similarities to other European countries, with limited systems 
inherited from Ancien Régime charity and then perpetuated by liberal 
governments. This comprised a public hospital sector that combined 
charity and limited state budgets, as well as institutions linked to mu-
nicipal and provincial councils, and a private realm of hospitals and 
asylums run as charitable foundations. Obsolete in terms of fabric and 
equipment, this only began to change from the 1920s with the emer-
gence of hospitals founded by industrial businesses, friendly societies 
and insurance companies, as well as clinics and polyclinics created by 
entrepreneurial doctors for the middle class. Spain’s Civil War (1936-9) 
and subsequent Franco dictatorship (1939-75), meant its path diverged 
somewhat from Northern Europe, where integrated social security 
systems meant a move towards universal coverage. While the fascists 
introduced compulsory sickness insurance (1942) and a Health Care 
Facilities Plan, which led to the creation of an expensive new system, 
these moves were not responses to demand or redistributive equity. 
Instead they served propaganda purposes and compensated the groups 
and regions that had supported the regime. Meanwhile insufficiency 
of public beds favoured the private system, which collaborated in the 
management of the state health insurance. By the late 1960s, pressure 
from urbanisation and population growth on the fragmented, under-
staffed and technologically backward hospital network was stalled by 
lack of funding and political paralysis: Spain did not even have a Min-
istry of Health until 1977. With the transition to democracy health care 
coverage became a right under the 1978 Constitution, and in 1986 the 
country’s health care and hospital model was redefined after decades 
of underinvestment and uneven growth.
Nemi’s study of Brazil, a Portuguese colony until 1822, similarly 
reveals long-term processes shaping the configuration of its hospital 
system. Despite the creation of a national health service by legislation 
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
810.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
in 1988, these survivals make aspects of the Brazilian model more 
similar to the United States, with private hospitals claiming public 
funds, tax exemption privileges, and organisational autonomy. This 
trajectory, Nemi shows, dates to the colonial era when the misericordia 
organised health care through voluntary donations and enjoyed privi-
leges granted by the Portuguese Crown. These structuring foundations 
substantially persisted after Brazilian independence in 1822, as the 
experience of the Hospital of the São Paulo Holy House of Mercy demon-
strates. Such institutions, and similar philanthropic hospitals in the later 
nineteenth century, negotiated tax exemption rates for providing free 
health care to the poor, combining private charity with public resources 
from municipal councils. Behind this public/private interplay lay the 
interest of local elites – initially landowning but increasingly business 
and medical – to maintain a field of economic and social power that 
allowed them to shape urban development. Moving into the twentieth 
century, Nemi takes the teaching hospital of the São Paulo School of 
Medicine as emblematic. The enduring integration of public and pri-
vate/philanthropic sectors persisted into the era of social insurance, 
and beyond to the 1988 Constitution which permitted such hospitals to 
enter service provision contracts with the public health service. Couched 
within neoliberal discourse about the inefficiency of the public sector 
these have remained a vehicle for the persistence of private medicine, 
the undermining of universalism, and the diversion of public funds and 
resources to support patients with private health insurance. 
Next we move to Germany, where the archetypal form of social 
health insurance was pioneered, and to Central Europe, where the 
successor states created after the First World War saw hospital policy 
as an aspect of nation-building. 
Hüntelmann begins by noting the chorus of concern in 
Germany since the 1960s about the deficiencies of hospital financing, 
which have inflicted a near-perpetual reign of cost-containment reforms. 
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Although such debates appear relatively new, they are, he contends, only 
the latest iteration of a discourse originating in the early nineteenth cen-
tury when the hospital became ‘modern’. After tracing these beginnings, 
he sets out the impact of Germany’s statutory health insurance system 
from the 1880s, then describes how hospital finance changed over the 
twentieth century. The interrelationship between health insurance and 
hospital funding has wrought significant changes in the character of the 
hospital. Most fundamental were the transition from a charitable to a 
medical and public institution at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
that from welfare institution to public enterprise in the last decades of 
the twentieth. This has shifted the role of the hospital, he argues, from an 
institution primarily responsible to the community, into a profit-orientat-
ed enterprise, in which health has too often been reduced to a cost-factor 
in debates about ailing public finances. 
A narrower chronology is taken by Doyle, Grombir, 
Hibbard & Szelinger, who explore the creation of hospital systems 
in interwar Central Europe. Their interest is the new nations which 
emerged following the collapse amidst revolution and defeat in 1918 
of the three multinational empires that had hitherto dominated this 
region. Concentrating on Poland, Czechoslovakia and a much-trun-
cated Hungary, they show how they sought to utilise health care, and 
especially hospital provision, as evidence of their progressivism and 
modernity, and as a symbol of nationhood. Yet their intentions were 
constrained by a complex health inheritance, persistent financial crises 
and significant health challenges, especially in their poverty-stricken 
eastern regions. Blending research in national archives with international 
perspectives from the League of Nations and the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, they examine the provision and extent of institutional care, how 
its institutions and patients were financed, and how the multi-ethnic 
character of these nations impacted on hospital policy and its role in 
nation building. While each country put considerable effort, resource 
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and political will into creating national health care systems, financial 
weakness, ethnic conflict and urban rural divisions limited their choic-
es and curtailed expansion and modernization. This analysis, Doyle, 
Grombir, Hibbard & Szelinger argue, contrasts revealingly with the 
rather teleological ‘road to the welfare state’ narratives which mark 
Western hospital histories of this same period.
Studies of the Anglophone countries, Britain and the United 
States then follow, their systems apparently not dissimilar at the end 
of the nineteenth century, but subsequently diverging dramatically. 
The well-researched British case has long been a historiograph-
ical reference for the hospital in a system that culminated in the 
post-war welfare state. Gorsky utilises this familiar framework in 
a new way, to interrogate the proposition from welfare economics 
that the market, the state and the voluntary sector each have demon-
strable virtues and limitations as providers of social goods. Can the 
dynamics of ‘market failure’, ‘state failure’ and ‘voluntary failure’ 
explain changing preferences for modes of hospital provision through 
time? Taking a long-run view, he addresses four key questions. First 
how do we explain the pattern of growth of the hospital up to the 
mid-twentieth century, with its distribution between private, public 
and voluntary sectors? The private hospital sector seems always 
to have been small, and through the nineteenth century the state 
emerged as the dominant provider thanks to its default role in man-
aging populations that fell outside the labour market; the smaller 
voluntary sector meanwhile circumvented the stigmatising aspects 
of state provision for the respectable poor, while also serving a social 
function for donors. Second he examines the major system reform 
c.1942-48, when the National Health Service brought hospitals un-
der the central state. Voluntary failures and the inequities of local 
government partly account for this, but explanation also includes 
the displacement effect of war, the role of the labour movement, 
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the capacity of the British state, and path dependent processes. 
Third he accounts for the late twentieth century decline of the hospital, 
and its changing distribution between public and private sectors. State 
failure does not adequately explain these changes: deinstitutionali-
sation of psychiatric care was also driven by changing therapeutic 
management, while the rise of the private hospital followed deliberate 
and contingent political decisions. Finally, he appraises the emergence 
of an active policy of management of the state hospital sector from 
the 1960s, arguing that evidence for failure lay not with the intrin-
sic nature of public administration, but with the periodic tendency 
towards underfunding.
The different path taken across the Atlantic is revealed in Hoffman’s 
discussion of the United States, whose hospital system trajectory was 
unlike other Western nations. While it has both public and private 
hospitals, the latter are supported with extensive public subsidies 
while maintaining an ideology of private control and rejection of ‘gov-
ernment interference’. The consequent implications for access to care, 
public accountability, and patient voice have created what Rosemary 
Stevens called the ‘essential historical dilemma’ of American hospital 
politics. Hoffmann examines this interleaving of public and private, 
first sketching the blurred distinction between public and private 
sectors after government subsidies rescued private hospitals during 
the Great Depression. A massive increase in federal funding of private 
hospital construction following World War Two, and the establishment 
of the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in 1965, further increased 
the scale of taxpayer subsidies to the private hospitals, whose insist-
ence on autonomy from government control was mostly accepted by 
Congress. This process, Hoffmann shows, created serious obstacles to 
access, for example through the funding for segregated hospitals in 
the U.S. South that allocated services based on race. It also contributed 
to inefficiency, inequity and massive cost inflation, notably through 
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the Medicare programme, which until the 1980s allowed private hos-
pitals to set their own fees. Yet she also finds examples of citizens 
utilizing federal programmes to demand greater access to care: the 
medical civil rights movement’s protest at segregated hospitals in 
the 1960s; Medicaid recipients’ law suits against hospitals that refused 
to accept poor patients in the 1970s; and the establishment of a right to 
emergency care in 1986. The chapter concludes with the impact of the 
2010 Affordable Care Act (‘Obamacare’) which provides federal sub-
sidies to the private health insurance industry and expands Medicaid 
coverage for low-income people, bringing hospitals millions of newly 
insured patients. It thus embodies the same public-private paradox. 
The book closes with China, whose case demonstrates the adoption 
of the biomedical hospital in a great power undergoing rapid modern-
isation, in conditions of intense political upheaval. Xu and Mills begin 
by pointing out that although China was once considered an interna-
tional model for low-cost rural primary health care, this reputation was 
founded on a short-lived combination of factors. Over the long term, 
China has instead suffered from chronic concentration of high-quality 
resources in its hospitals, despite recurrent efforts to strengthen primary 
care. Their chapter analyses the historical evolution of both hospitals 
and primary care in China from the perspective of financing, in a 
study covering the period 1835-2018. It shows that the developmental 
trajectories for earlier models of hospital and primary care diverged 
between 1835 and 1949, with low-cost primary care emerging only after 
the establishment of relatively elitist hospitals. The divergence was 
consolidated, they argue, between 1949 and 1978, giving rise to two 
different models with contrasting fiscal space, service-finance methods 
and administrative policies. After 1978, market-based financing mech-
anisms brought direct competition for patients and resources between 
hospitals and primary care providers, and exposed the weakness of the 
latter. Pharmaceuticals and technologies became critical vehicles for 
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hospitals’ revenue generation. Increasingly, available resources were 
absorbed primarily by hospitals, while primary care continued to be 
under-resourced. Overall, the study sheds light on how historical health 
financing influences in China have shaped contemporary challenges in 
finding the appropriate balance of care to serve the population.
Together, the chapters enable us to advance the historical world 
map of the construction of the different hospital models. While our 
authors do not make specific use of path dependence theory, they do 
emphasise the impact of diverse institutional frameworks in defining 
national health systems, and the long-term reach of these influences. 
Their comparative perspective advances understanding of the complex-
ities involved in each country, and each branch of the hospital system 
and brings new evidence to the current debate on health care models, 
financing and health reforms. This book, with the encouragement it 
gives to comparative and cooperative research, aims to allow us to find 
better answers to that deceptively simple, and engrossingly complex 
question: what is the hospital?
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
1410.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
1. Margarita Vilar-Rodríguez and Jerònia 
Pons gratefully acknowledge financial 
support from the European Union, the 
European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), and Spain’s Ministry of Sci-
ence, Innovation and Universities for 
the project entitled “The historical keys 
of hospital development in Spain and its 
international comparison during the twen-
tieth century”, ref. RTI2018-094676-B-I00 
2. Pierre-Yves Donzé and Paloma Fernán-
dez, ‘Health Industries in the Twentieth 
Century. Introduction’, Business Histo-
ry, Special Issue, 61, 3 (2019), 385-403. 
3. Sussane Hilger, ‘Welfare Policy in Ger-
man Big Business after the First World 
War: Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, 1926-
33’, Business History, 40, I (1998), 50-76. 
Axel C. Hüntelmann, ‘The Birth of the 
Patient as a cost- and benefit-factor. 
Funding and Management of Hospitals 
in Germany in the 20th century’, I Inter-
national Workshop, The Construction, 
funding and management of the public 
and private hospital systems of devel-
oped countries (Seville, November, 2017). 
4. Jean-Paul Domin, Une histoire économ-
ique de l’hôpital (XIXe-XXe siècles). Une 
analyse rétrospective du développement hos-
pitalier, Tome I (1803-1945) (Paris: Comité 
d’histoire de la Sécurité Sociale, 2008); 
Christian Chevandier, L’hôpital dans la 
France du XXe siècle (Paris: Perrin, 2009) 
5. Steven Cherry, ‘Before the National 
Health Service: Financing the Volun-
tary Hospitals, 1900-1939’, The Economic 
History Review, 50 (1997), 305-26; Martin 
Gorsky, John Mohan and Martin Pow-
ell, ‘The Financial Health of Voluntary 
Hospitals in Interwar Britain’, Economic 
History Review, 55 (2002), 533-57; Bar-
ry Doyle, The Politics of Hospital Provi-
sion in Early Twentieth-Century Britain 
(London: Pickering and Chatto, 2014). 
6. Charles Rosenberg, The Care of 
Strangers. The Rise of America’s Hospital 
System (New York: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1987). Rosemary Stevens, 
In Sickness and in Wealth. American Hos-
pitals in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
7. Pierre-Yves Donzé, ‘Architects and 
knowledge transfer in hospital systems: 
The introduction of Western hospital 
designs in Japan (1918–1970)’, Business 
History, Special Issue, 61, 3 (2019), 538-57. 
8. Michelle Renshaw, ‘The Evolution of 
the Hospital in Twentieth-Century Chi-
na’, in Bridie Andrews and Mary Brown 
Bullock (eds), Medical Transitions in 
Twentieth-Century China (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2014), 317-35. 
9. Barbara McPake, ‘Hospital Policy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Post-Coloni-
al Development Impasse’, Social His-
tory of Medicine, 22, 2 (2009), 341–60. 
10. Bernard Harris and Paul Bridgen (eds), 
Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and North 
America since 1800 (New York: Routledge, 
2007); Marcel Van der Linden (ed), Social 
Security Mutualism: The comparative History 
of Mutual Benefit Societies (Bern: Peter Lang, 
1996); Martin Gorsky, ‘The Growth and 
Distribution of English Friendly Societies in 
the Early Nineteenth Century’, The Econom-
Introduction
15 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
ic History Review, 51, 3 (1998), 489-511; Da-
vid T. Beito, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare 
State. Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 
1890-1967 (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000); Brian J. Glenn, 
‘Understanding mutual Benefit societies, 
1860-1960’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law, 26 (2001), 638-51; Bernard Har-
ris, The Origins of the British Welfare State: 
Social Welfare in England and Wales, 1800-
1945 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004); John E. Murray, Origins of American 
Health Insurance. A History of Industrial 
Sickness Funds (New Haven-London: Yale 
University Press, 2007); Michel Dreyfus, 
Les assurances socials en Europe (Rennes: 
Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009). 
11. Melissa A. Thomasson, ‘From Sickness 
to Health: The Twentieth-Century Develop-
ment of the Demand for Health Insurance’, 
The Journal of Economic History, 60, 2 (2000), 
504-08. Harris and Bridgen, op. cit. (note 9); 
John Henderson, Peregrine Horden and 
Alessandro Pastore, ‘Introduction. The 
World of the Hospital: Comparisons and 
Continuities’, in John Henderson, Peregrine 
Horden and Alessandro Pastore (eds), The 
impact of Hospitals 300-2000 (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2007), 15-57; Dreyfus, op. cit. (note 10). 
12. Murray, op. cit. (note 9); Thomasson, 
op. cit. (note 10); Christy F. Chapin, ‘The 
American Medical Association, Health 
Insurance Association of America, and 
Creation of the Corporate Health Care 
System’, Studies in American Political De-
velopment, 24, October (2010), 143–67; 
Christy F. Chapin, Ensuring America’s 
Health: The Public Creation of the Cor-
porate Health Care System (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
13. Vicente Navarro, Medicine Under 
Capitalism (London: Croom Helm, 1976). 
14. Randall M. Packard, A History of 
Global Health: Interventions into the 
Lives of Other People (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2016). 
15. Elias Mossialos, Anna Dixon, Josep 
Figueras and Joe Kutzin (eds), Fund-
ing health care: options for Europe (Buck-
ingham: Open University Press, 2002). 
16. Paul Starr, Remedy and Reac-
tion: The Peculiar American Struggle 
Over Health Care Reform (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
17. Jane Duckett, The Chinese State’s Re-
treat from Health: Policy and the Politics of 
Retrenchment (London: Routledge, 2011). 
18. David de Ferranti, ‘Paying for Health 
Services in Developing Countries: An 
Overview’, World Bank Staff Working Pa-
pers (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1985). 
19. Ole P. Grell, Andrew Cunningham and 
Robert Jütte (eds), Healthcare and Poor Relief 
in 18th and 19th Century Northern Europe 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). Henderson, 
Horden and Pastore (eds), op. cit. (note 11).
20. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: 
an archaeology of medical perception (New 
York: Vintage, 1975). Laurence Brockliss 
and Colin Jones, The Medical World of Early 
Modern France, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004, 677, 689-700; Caroline Hannaway and 
Anne La Berge, Paris Medicine: Perspectives 
past and present (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998).
1610.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
Hospital System in Spain
17 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
Chapter 1 
The Historical Creation of the Hospital System in 
Spain: Private Hospital Sector Strategies in Relation  
to the Development of the Public System.1
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The available historiography has shown how the so-called mixed 
economy of welfare (co-existence of forms of solidarity, state action 
and private companies) was a preliminary step towards the creation 
of two basic models of health insurance in the mid-twentieth century: 
state insurance schemes prevailed in Western Europe, while private 
insurance companies predominated in the United States.2 Thus, from 
a historical point of view, public health care systems that progressed 
towards universal coverage were prevalent in Western Europe, which 
prompted the construction of a solid network of publicly owned 
hospital infrastructure. 
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In particular, some studies have analysed the historical creation 
of public hospital systems in certain countries in Western Europe, 
driven by the passage of compulsory social insurance legislation and 
increasing state participation, and coinciding with a parallel decline 
in philanthropy and charity in the Western world.3 Significant differ-
ences between countries are to be found within this general model, 
both in ways of funding and managing the system and in the histor-
ical configuration of the hospital map, depending on whether or not 
hospitals of different origin and specialisations were incorporated into 
the public network. On the other hand, there is the US model, where 
health and hospital care have historically been covered by private 
insurance companies. This has been explained in terms of a complex 
set of factors, especially the lobbying power of the private interest 
groups involved in this process in combination with other political 
interests and the preferences of professional doctors. Other factors 
include the increase in family income, the development of medical 
technology and government policies that consolidated private sector 
predominance through measures such as tax incentives.4 In this respect, 
R. Stevens concludes that as a result of this historical evolution, the 
US hospital system has become unique: a combination of public and 
private institutions that are at once charities and businesses, social 
welfare institutions and icons of the country’s science, wealth, and 
technical achievements.5 Despite the cuts in public health systems in 
recent years, it seems to be beyond all doubt that the US model is a 
more expensive system in the long run, and less successful in meeting 
the needs of the chronically ill and the socially disadvantaged.6
Overall, the available literature on the creation of hospital sys-
tems in an international context provides us with three key lessons.7 
First, the danger of over-simplifying when classifying countries into 
the two large typical models related to Western Europe and the Unit-
ed States. It seems clear that the global scene is in fact much more 
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complex, and even within Western Europe each country must essen-
tially be considered as a unique case. Second, the importance of the 
public and private approach to analysing the historical development of 
hospital systems and the important implications in terms of efficiency, 
coverage and equity. Third, the relevance of the historical perspective, 
as different forms of hospital coverage had priority in each country 
according to the period and the adopted model. Here, factors such 
as expeditiousness in implementing state insurance schemes, social 
spending performance and the more recent initiation of privatisation 
processes within public health systems in some countries have led to 
changes to the original models and have produced a different histor-
ical fit, or correlation, between public and private hospital coverage, 
depending on the period analysed. 
The case of Spain provides an excellent example for substantiating 
these three points. This country was one of the last in Western Europe 
to pass its first state sickness insurance (1942); it belatedly consolidat-
ed a universal public health system with the law of 1986; and it is an 
interesting case study of how a private hospital sector was capable of 
developing strategies in each historical stage to maintain (and expand) 
its market niche during the development of the public system. From 
the last third of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth 
century, the modern Spanish hospital system was fashioned over the 
course of different historical stages that may be examined by focusing 
on the interaction (whether collaborative or competitive) between 
public and private sectors. In this respect, the private hospital sec-
tor increased the private provision of hospital beds as a reaction to 
different factors. One was the emerging demand of the middle and 
working classes who were not covered by the country’s public health 
institutions (including those run by municipal councils and provincial 
authorities known as diputaciones).8 Others were the obligations imposed 
on employers due to the approval of regulations or social insurance 
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schemes, and increasing medicalisation together with new medical 
or pharmacological techniques that were not provided by the public 
health system. Consequently, and for other reasons that are ana-
lysed in this chapter, during some periods the private hospital sector 
substituted for the public sector, in others complemented it, and at 
times both sectors were in competition with one another. As a result, 
a complex relationship between both sectors evolved that vacillated 
between necessary cooperation and logical competition.
With respect to the hospital classification criterion, due to historical 
tradition and the (not very abundant) sources available, the Spanish 
historiography has been based on whether hospitals were publicly 
or privately owned in order to analyse the long-term development of 
the hospital system.9 This article follows this tradition, categorising 
hospitals as being under public or private ownership. In this case, 
hospitals built and financed by public institutions are included in the 
public sector. On the other hand, privately owned hospitals include 
those of the Church, the Spanish Red Cross (Cruz Roja), private char-
itable institutions—similar to the British voluntary hospitals—and 
private profit-seeking hospitals. This classification according to type 
of ownership remained essentially unchanged until 1986. Although 
property ownership is quite clear, the type of funding and the groups 
of patients admitted by each type of hospital are much less obvi-
ous. In particular, it is difficult to distinguish between the charitable 
foundations of privately-owned hospitals, which in theory covered 
poor patients, and the private profit-orientated hospitals which were 
based on business and market criteria and treated paying patients. 
This difficulty is rooted in the fact that, over time, the private charity 
hospitals increased the number of beds dedicated to paying patients, 
while a similar process also occurred with the hospitals belonging to 
the Church and the Red Cross. Meanwhile, some private profit-seek-
ing hospitals dedicated a few working hours a week to treating poor 
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patients, on the grounds of Christian charity. Owing to these blurred 
distinctions, we feel that property ownership is a much clearer guide-




The creation of the hospital system before the passage  
of state insurance (1880-1936)
Between 1880 and 1936, the public/charitable hospital network 
in Spain remained antiquated and tied to the limited state, provincial, 
and municipal budgets and only treated the population classified as 
poor. These institutions had limited therapeutic efficacy and their 
main aim was to provide shelter for the sick poor, most of them chron-
ically or terminally ill, who did not have the support of a family care 
network.10 It must be borne in mind that the welfare system of the 
Ancien Régime in Spain, based on religious charity, was transformed 
in the nineteenth century by means of the disentailment laws, which 
liquidated a large part of Church property and transferred the man-
agement of many of its hospital establishments to state, provincial 
and municipal authorities (General Charity Law of 20 June 1849).11 
However, provincial and local charity had sparse resources during 
this period. Thus, their main efforts were concentrated on providing 
food, clothing and hospital attention for the poorest families, and on 
the confinement of the old, vagrants and foundlings in hospices and 
children’s homes.12 On the other hand, general charity establishments 
under state management were few in number, funded by small items 
in the general state budget, alms and royal subsidies, and most of 
them were located in the capital, Madrid.
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Table 1.1: General charity hospitals existing on 30 March 1886
Provincial authorities, however, were obliged by the Charity Law 
of 1822/36 (the first law regulating this area in Spain) to establish 
four charitable establishments in each province: a Casa de Maternidad 
y Expósitos (maternity and foundling home), a Casa de Socorro (emer-
gency medical and surgical treatment), a Casa de Misericordia (home for 
children and the elderly) and a public hospital (in most cases treating 
infectious patients).13 In fact, hospitals exercised a crucial police function 
for the maintenance of public order; that is to say, to remove children, 
vagrants and old people from the streets by means of confinement 
in hospices, asylums and refuges. Moreover, as noted above, provincial 
councils inherited some of the disentailed hospitals. In 1909, official 
figures registered 183 provincial charitable establishments operating 
throughout the country.14 As for town and city councils, they managed 
Name
Hospital de la Princesa
Hospital de Jesús 
Nazareno








Purpose of the institution
For the sick of both sexes with 
acute non-infectious disorders*
To house disabled and 
incurable women
To house disabled and 
incurable men
To house the decrepit and 






Source: Statistical Yearbook of Spain (Anuario Estadístico de España), Reseña geográfica y 
estadística de España, 1888, 1030-1.
* Note: On one hand, an acute patient would be a patient at risk of death, who needed 
urgent treatment and, in some cases, an urgent surgical operation. On the other hand, a 
chronic patient would be a patient who needed lifelong treatment, in some cases with 
hospital admission. 
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an old network, part of it of medieval origin and the rest inherited from 
the disentailment of ecclesiastical property, comprising modest estab-
lishments of charitable aid.15 Many of these establishments disappeared 
in the second half of the nineteenth century due to a lack of resources. 
Sources accounted for 363 charitable institutions run by municipal 
authorities to treat the sick in 1909.16
Altogether, the charitable establishments of the provincial and 
municipal councils provided a total of 66,014 beds in Spain in 1909, 
which was equivalent to a ratio of 3.3 beds per thousand inhabitants.17 
Most of these beds were used for asylum purposes and not for surgi-
cal treatment or medical care; in fact, a significant part of the funds of 
these institutions was used for providing food for the sick rather than 
for curing them. The population with an official certificate of poverty 
(which identified a person without minimal resources or the capacity 
to obtain them) had priority to be treated in these institutions free of 
charge.18 In 1909, the census of poor families in Spain showed the fig-
ure of 813,815 (around 3.25 million inhabitants if we take into account 
an average of approximately four members per family). Meanwhile, 
there was a total of 7,769 doctors in charitable establishments in 1909, 
which was equivalent to a ratio of 418 poor people per practitioner.19 
However, they were unequally distributed geographically and thus, 
in rural areas and in the smaller municipalities, infectious or more 
seriously ill patients were sent to hospital in the provincial capital. 
The cost of a poor sick person’s stay was covered by the municipality 
where he or she was registered, which at times led to non-payment or 
disputes between the provincial commission and municipal councils.20
There were also hospitals classified as private charity (which be-
longed to the Church because they had not been disentailed or were 
privately owned) existing alongside this precarious network of public 
charity. These hospitals received private funds from their founders (in-
come, public debt, urban and rural real estate), and they were managed 
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by their patrons as foundations (voluntary hospitals). Private charity 
had its own legislative framework.21 According to official statistics, there 
were 337 private charitable hospitals in Spain in 1886, concentrated above 
all in three provinces: Barcelona (41), Navarre (36) and Cordoba (33).
Table 1.2: Charitable Establishments financed with private  
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The territorial distribution of these hospitals did not correspond to 
demographic criteria; the most populated provinces of the country did 
not have more establishments. Consequently, there were considerable 
territorial inequalities. We do not have data available on what kind 
of sick people were admitted, how many combined charitable care 
with paying patients, or how many focused exclusively on providing 
refuge for children, the elderly and the chronically and incurably sick. 
However, most of them were run by trusts comprised of members of 
the medical class and the urban patriciate.
The patrons defended the classification of their hospitals as private 
charity, and themselves as benefactors, in order to obtain more freedom 
in their management, but also to take advantage of tax exemptions and 
other benefits. One of the most paradigmatic cases is that of Hospital 
de Santa Creu in Barcelona, which was the city’s only hospital for more 
than five hundred years and a benchmark scientific institution in the 
country. An order of 15 September 1853 declared it a public and provin-
cial establishment. Nevertheless, in the following decades the managers 
who ran the hospital fought to convert it into a private charity hospital 
and thereby prevent Barcelona’s financial authorities from carrying 





































Source: For hospitals see Reseña geográfica y estadística de España, 1888, 52, 1030-31. For 
population see Statistical Yearbook of Spain (Anuario Estadístico de España), 1866-1867, 
53. *Inhabitants in December 1867.
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the Directorate General for Charity, Health and Penitentiary Estab-
lishments (Dirección General de Beneficencia, Sanidad y Establecimientos 
Penitenciarios) revoked the public classification and declared Hospital 
de Santa Creu a private charity establishment.22 This reclassification 
enabled the hospital’s patrons to regularly apply for exemption from 
paying the taxes levied on the assets of legal persons, which contributed 
to the preservation of its considerable assets, beyond the control of the 
public authorities.23 These assets were further increased by means of 
bequests and raffles.24 Over time, these institutions, without losing the 
charitable category that benefited them fiscally, increased their supply 
of pay beds and, in future stages, especially from 1942, participated in 
economic agreements with public institutions to cover the demand for 
beds in the public hospital system. 
This public and private hospital network proved to be increasing-
ly insufficient in the light of Spain’s economic, urban and industrial 
development from the late nineteenth century, within a framework 
of growing social demands, notable among which were calls for the 
extension and improvement of health coverage for the population as a 
whole.25 This process was accompanied by advances in bacteriological 
research, especially from the 1870s onwards, which opened the way to 
significant progress in the care and treatment of transmissible diseases 
(tuberculosis, cholera, diphtheria and malaria). This in turn led to the 
need to create new facilities such as laboratories and diagnostic devices. 
Within this context, the function of hospitals changed, and Spain was 
no exception. Some of the old hospitals, now obsolete, were demolished 
(Hospital de San Juan de Dios in 1897), others were renovated (Hospital 
Provincial de Madrid) and, in some cases, transferred to new locations 
(Hospital del Buen Suceso was founded in 1583 and transferred to a new 
site in 1885, and Hospital de los Franceses was created in 1615 and 
relocated in 1881). This process of change also included the creation of 
clinical hospitals with a heavy focus on teaching and research linked 
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to universities and training. Thus, Hospital Clínico de Madrid (founded 
by the central state) became a university hospital in the first decades 
of the twentieth century and the clinical hospital in Barcelona, work 
on which had commenced in 1881, was opened in 1906. Meanwhile, 
as regards public hospitals, despite limited resources and within a 
system that was archaic in terms of both management and materials, 
a number of important research and teaching initiatives led by prom-
inent specialists emerged in diverse surgical specialities. This was the 
case, for example, of the Instituto de Terapéutica Operatoria, founded 
in 1880 by the surgeon Federico Rubio y Galí as a department—with 
two wards of twenty beds for men and women—within the obsolete 
Hospital de la Princesa in Madrid.26 This institute played a key role 
in the training of doctors and nurses during the 1880s in a context 
of high mortality, especially infant mortality, in Spain as a whole, 
but also in Madrid.27
However, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, the 
main problem relating to hospital coverage in Spain lay in the high 
percentage of the population that was not officially registered poor 
(pobre de solemnidad) but also could not afford to pay for health care 
services. This was the case of two large segments of the population: 
the growing mass of urban labourers along with the urban middle 
class, and the vast population engaged in agriculture (around half 
of the active population). The latter group had to make do with the 
archaic system of coverage provided by rural municipal hospitals or 
provincial hospitals. Consequently, workers who were not treated by 
these hospitals turned to friendly societies to seek medical attention, 
even though this usually entailed no more than primary medical care 
due to the limited resources of most of these institutions. There were 
exceptions, however, such as the dense network of Catalan friendly 
societies that was able to create a small hospital network. In 1939, 
the Federación de Mutualidades de Cataluña (Federation of 
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Mutual Benefit Societies in Catalonia) encompassed 1,023 
affiliated mutual societies with a total of 334,881 members.28 Some of 
these (La Quinta de Salud La Alianza, Mutual Salus, Clínic Rabasa and 
Alianza Mataronense, among others) provided clinic and hospital 
services without a time limit for patients’ stays.29 
Industrial employers, for their part, obliged by law to treat employ-
ees injured in accidents as from 1900, promoted small clinics providing 
trauma surgery and associated specialties by means of mutualism or 
insurance contracts. Large companies in sectors with significant accident 
rates—mining and the railways—acted more directly by establishing 
and financing their own hospital systems through foundations or lo-
cal institutions. This was the case of the hospital in Riotinto, Huelva, 
and the Triano mining hospitals (Gallarta, Matamoros and El Cerco) 
in Biscay province.30 Finally, doctors who worked in public or private 
charitable hospitals frequently funded small, specialised clinics to 
meet a growing demand for new varieties of surgical coverage from 
the middle classes and insurance companies and mutuals. The increase 
in small clinics was especially significant in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country—the most industrialised regions and with a greater per-
centage of urban population—founded by urologists, gynaecologists 
and other specialists. These clinics incorporated diagnostic advances 
such as laboratories and X-rays and further improvements including 
electric lighting in operating theatres, ventilation and aseptic wards. 
Clinics and polyclinics offered modernisation in comparison with the 
outdated public hospitals and attracted the middle and upper classes. 
Examples of this process include Clínica San Ignacio in Guipúzcoa (1906), 
and Clínica Corachán (1921), Clínica Platón, Clínica San Jorge and Clínica 
Bretón (1925) in Barcelona. In this way, private professional initiatives 
increased the supply of private beds as opposed to the public sector 
apathy during the period of Primo de Rivera´s Dictatorship (1923/30) 
rooted in charity and incapable of establishing a public health system 
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similar to other Western European countries.31 Political apathy, a lack 
of state resources due to an obsolete tax system, and opposition from 
the medical profession and private insurance companies delayed the 
introduction of a sickness insurance system that required new infra-
structure and a substantial budget.32 This led to better hospital coverage 
and more beds available in industrial regions, which in the long term 
created territorial inequalities in health care coverage.
The hospital system in Spain after the passage of  
compulsory public sickness insurance (1936/63)
The trend described above for the creation of the hospital map in 
Spain during the first decades of the twentieth century was interrupted 
by the Spanish Civil War (1936/9), which affected the medical class pro-
foundly. An important element had to go into exile, thereby interrupting 
some clinical projects; others saw how their hospitals were destroyed 
or seriously damaged during the conflict that led to the establishment 
of the Franco Dictatorship (1939/75).33 Under these circumstances, new 
political and propaganda propositions linked to National Catholicism 
(an ideology represented by the Falange, the single party of the fascist 
dictatorship) had a significant impact on the gestation process of the 
hospital system in Spain.34 The Falangists maintained control of the 
Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo), also responsible for social 
and family policies, and which entailed control of the National Welfare 
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión; hereinafter INP), the managing 
body of the social insurance schemes. Using paternalistic language and 
intense propaganda, the Falange sought to win over the masses to its 
cause, proposing measures to protect the traditional Catholic family, 
through subsidies, birth rate and marriage prizes, and large-scale 
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social projects, championed by the introduction of compulsory sickness 
insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad, hereinafter SOE). This form 
of insurance was one of the most desired by the population in the long, 
tough post-war period in Spain and it was the only social insurance 
that had not been legislated for before the Spanish Civil War, which 
added further value to the Falange’s social project. 
Figure 1.1: Interior view of one of the many buildings that were 
adapted as “blood hospitals” during the Spanish Civil War.
The urgency of implementing this insurance scheme led to it being 
passed quickly in 1942. However, this was without an accompanying 
financial plan or sufficient infrastructure for its application.35 Spain’s 
Source: Biblioteca Nacional de España, ref. GC-CAJA/114/14
Hospital System in Spain
31 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
precarious economic situation, characterised by autarky and the post-
war economic crisis, obliged two important decisions to be taken. First, 
from the outset the insurance scheme was severely limited in terms of 
coverage of the population (it was initially only for the lowest-paid 
industrial workers in a country with a predominance of agricultural 
labourers)36 and provisions (initially only general practitioners, with 
no specialities or hospital services apart from emergency surgery). 
In any case, insurance opened the door to a new form of health cov-
erage for part of the population, unconnected with traditional charity 
(for the poor) and private health care (for those who could afford to 
pay for it). Second, in view of the lack of resources, senior figures at 
the Ministry of Labour decided to hand over management of the new 
health insurance to the private sector (including both private for-profit 
and non-profit mutuals) for over a decade. In return, the private sector 
provided the administration, medical staff and infrastructure (clinics 
and hospitals) required to cater for insured workers. In 1945, the col-
laborating bodies covered 55% of the companies affiliated to the SOE, 
comprising 77% of the insured. In 1955, coverage was still 40% and 64% 
respectively.37 These management agreements were by no means free 
of tension between the private sector and Falange leaders who, from 
1963, with an incipient but insufficient public hospital network, recov-
ered public management of compulsory sickness insurance through 
the Basic Law of Social Security. 
In order to achieve this control and consolidate its social project, 
in the 1950s the INP tried to implement its own National Healthcare 
Facilities Plan (Plan Nacional de Instalaciones Sanitarias). This plan en-
visaged the construction of a network of primary health care centres 
(outpatient clinics) and above all large hospitals (known as ‘residencias 
sanitarias’) throughout the country. Public hospitals surviving in the 
post-war period (state, provincial and municipal) were not used for 
the SOE or the Facilities Plan. This was a consequence of the power 
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struggle between the INP—under the control of the Ministry of Labour, 
which was in the hands of Falange—and the Directorate General for 
Health (Dirección General de Sanidad, hereinafter DGS)—under the con-
trol of the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio de Gobernación)—which 
was in the hands of the Catholic branch of the dictatorship’s power 
groups. Many of these old hospitals continued, although with obsolete 
infrastructure, to provide charitable functions as refuges, under the 
control of the DGS, which was basically responsible for public hygiene 
and control of epidemics. This body was also charged with meeting 
the basic health care needs of rural Spain, beyond the scope of the 
INP’s ambitious projects. In this way, the rural population was doubly 
marginalised by the dictatorship in terms of health care, as it was left 
on the side-lines with regard to both the coverage of the SOE and the 
construction of basic care facilities. This was especially significant if we 
bear in mind that Spain was predominantly an agrarian society in its 
production structure and distribution of employment until the 1960s. 
The objectives of the Facilities Plan had to be reduced on sever-
al occasions due to the lack of material and financial resources in a 
country still hit by shortages and harsh living conditions. The large 
and spacious INP hospitals were built slowly, and many remained 
underused once the work was finished, due to a lack of human and 
material resources. Official sources show sixty-three residencias san-
itarias built throughout Spanish territory with a capacity of almost 
12,000 beds in a country with a population of 30.6 million; although 
probably in many cases the building work had still not been complet-
ed and others that were finished had not started functioning. Some 
reports from this time reveal that most of the hospitals built remained 
underused; some did not even have permanent staff or the organised 
provision of integrated services and specialities.38 Furthermore, the 
administrative and executive management of health care facilities, 
including hospitals, under the umbrella of the INP was concentrated 
Hospital System in Spain
33 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
in a single body dependent on the Institute’s provincial authority 
(delegado provincial). This arrangement gave preference to the political 
control of functions and relegated good resource management and 
the quality of services to second place. Moreover, the vast majority of 
directors or managers responsible for public health centres were ‘health 
inspectors politically connected to the governing regime, or persons 
linked to the regime who always had the approval of the civil governor 
who was, at the same time, the Provincial Head of the Movement’.39 
 
Table 1.3: ‘Residencias Sanitarias’of the National Welfare  
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In general terms, the place and the programme to build each Resi-
dencia Sanitaria were decided according to political criteria based on the 
power and contacts of each provincial governor. These criteria resulted 
in territorial inequalities between population and beds (Table 1.3). All in 
all, bureaucratic management, scarce resources and precarious care pro-
vision converted each of these ‘residencias sanitarias’ into a kind of large, 
underused polyclinic that performed its function inadequately. Basically, 
at the start of the 1960s, those affiliated to the SOE attended these hospi-
tals for surgery, but for little else.40 Consequently, the agreements with 
the private sector continued in force.
In any case, and in spite of the slow progress, the INP’s ‘residencias 
sanitarias’ gradually gained weight in Spain’s hospital system and were 
treating a growing number of people, as the percentage of the population 
covered and the provisions offered by the SOE increased (Table 1.4). 
The number of public hospitals diminished compared with 1949 (1949: 
737 and 1963: 589), but the number of beds increased (1949: 89,079 and 
Source: BOE, no. 140, 13 June 1966, 7389-427; Population from Statistical Yearbook of Spain 
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1963: 100,782). The drop in the number of hospitals was due, above 
all, to the closure of old hospitals of municipal and provincial charity. 
The increased number of beds was mainly due to the construction of large 
‘residencias sanitarias’ located in provincial capitals and other cities of high 
demographic concentration. Meanwhile, the state had also increased the 
number of hospitals for treating tuberculosis and other infectious diseases 
and mental hospitals under the direction of the DGS. The ‘state’ group 
also included hospitals attached to the Ministry of Education, which 
were, essentially, the clinical hospitals of the Faculties of Medicine, 
and prison health care institutions attached to the Ministry of Justice.41 
On top of these must be added the 48 military hospitals operating in 
Spain in 1963, created to treat troops and officers during times of peace 
and in wartime.42 Finally, the number of hospitals under the control of the 
Secretaría General del Movimiento (SGM) of the Falange, which basically 
treated party members in the absence of other infrastructure, remained 
almost unchanged between 1943 (41) and 1963 (43).
With regard to the private hospital system from 1949 to 1963, 
the number of establishments increased between 1949 (885) and 1963 
(1,037) along with the number of available beds, 38,264 and 52,109 
respectively (Table 4). Altogether, the group of private hospitals accounted 
for almost sixty-six per cent of the total number existing in Spain in 1963. 
This group had a very diverse composition, and included clinics and hos-
pitals founded by the Church (93), the Spanish Red Cross (Cruz Roja) (38), 
private benefactors (105), and two more that are difficult to categorise.43 
However, the most heterogeneous group of private hospitals in 1963 
comprised those classified as ‘privately owned’ and which amounted 
to a total of 799 centres in this year. This increase was largely due to the 
converging interests of the government and the private sector. The devel-
opment of maternity clinics was especially noteworthy within this group 
at a time when Spain initiated a historic ‘baby boom’ and the SOE did 
not have sufficient facilities to provide this service. Only one maternity 
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hospital of the SOE appeared in the 1963 catalogue, managed by the INP 
and located in Madrid. Meanwhile, there were around thirty maternity 
centres under the control of municipal and provincial authorities (some 
of them successors to the old charitable maternity homes founded in the 
nineteenth century) and 107 private clinics specialised in maternity care. 
Meanwhile, the DGS, outside the Falange’s control, catered to the needs of 
the rural population through the so-called Centros Maternales de Urgencia 
(emergency maternity centres), located in small municipalities or district 
centres. For any other type of medical care, the rural population had to 
travel to the nearest charitable provincial and/or municipal hospitals 
or otherwise pay for the services of a private clinic.
Table 1.4: Transformations of the public and private hospital  
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Overall, the hospital map in Spain from 1949 to 1963 shows three 
relevant trends. First, as regards publicly owned hospitals, there was a 
very significant fall in the number of old charitable hospitals managed 
by municipal and provincial institutions, an increase in the number 
of large hospitals and bed capacity of the INP (under the Facilities 
Plan) and a more modest growth in the number of hospitals under 
the DGS, specialising above all in treating infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis, which had a great impact on Spain in the post-Civil War 
period. Finally, the number of military hospitals and the number of 
beds they provided fell around 30 per cent between 1949 and 1963. 
Second, with regard to privately owned hospitals, the Church reduced 
the number of hospitals it had operating (most dedicated to chari-
table functions and serving as refuges), while the number of private 
hospitals increased, driven by market opportunities and agreements 
signed with the SOE. Generally speaking, the hospitals providing 
shelter and charity lost weight in circumstances where some of their 
users were able to receive care or treatment under the SOE. Third, and 
paradoxically, the implementation of the sickness insurance scheme 
led to a fall in the number of public hospitals compared with private 
Notes: 1. Number of establishments; 2. Number of beds. *It refers to inpatient units.
Source 1949: Statistical Yearbook of Spain (Anuario Estadístico de España), 1951, 684; Source 
1963: Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official State Gazette) 13 June 1966, no. 140, 7389-427. In 
the 1963 catalogue hospital infrastructure in the colonies is also recorded: (Fernando Po (4), Río 
Muni (11) and Spanish Sahara (5); all under the presidency of the Government). This source also 
includes the hospitals of the Secretaría General del Movimiento (S.G.M.) and the Patronato Na-
cional Antituberculoso y de las Enfermedades del Tórax (P.N.A. y E.T.); Source 1981: Statistical 
Yearbook of Spain (Anuario Estadístico de España), 1985, 709.
A in total (%)
B in total (%)
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hospitals, although there was a more comparable trend for both types 
in terms of the number of beds, due to the large capacity of the new 
hospitals built by the INP.
The 1960s saw some significant changes in the dictatorship’s 
policies. The Falangists lost political power at the highest levels, and 
their capacity to mobilise the masses was diminished. The so-called 
technocrats took over most of the ministerial posts and the regime 
initiated the path laid down by the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, a plan 
Figure 1.2: Illustrated scale model of the Residencia Francisco  
Franco (Barcelona), the first “Residencia Sanitaria” (large hospital)  
inaugurated by the Franco dictatorship in 1955.
Source: Catálogo Plan de Instalaciones del Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad. 
Huarte y Cía, S.L. constructor.
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dictated and financed to a large extent by the International Mone-
tary Fund. In any event, health coverage was a goal to be achieved. 
Two decades after its introduction, there were now five million 
insured under the SOE, and around 7.5 million beneficiaries between 
direct insurance and the collaborating entities, which altogether 
accounted for thirty-nine per cent of the total population. During 
this initial period the limited public hospital network provided the 
private sector with a market niche, either by covering the population 
without any right to coverage, or through the signing of agreements 
by means of which the SOE was applied.
In summary, the system of social insurance introduced by 
the Franco dictatorship was an indispensable instrument within the 
overall strategy of propaganda and subjugation of the workers.44 
In particular, sickness insurance played a key role in the dicta-
torship for two fundamental reasons. First of all, before the Civil 
War, the state did not legislate, regulate or fund the area of health 
care provision, which remained in the hands of mutual societies 
and private companies. This resulted in substantial deficiencies in 
the coverage of the population. The dictatorship took advantage of 
the weakness of these institutions, and of the gap in state regulation 
of the risk of sickness, to convert this insurance into a key element 
of its political propaganda. Once the subordination of the workers 
had been achieved through the repressive measures that were im-
posed by means of strict labour regulation, it was necessary to ensure 
a certain degree of social stability. In order to achieve this aim, the 
regime needed to show a ‘friendlier’ face to workers. Social insurance 
and family policies, which included goals typical of fascist regimes 
such as encouraging a higher birth rate or defending maternity and 
the traditional family, fulfilled this role to perfection. The construction 
of hospitals fitted well into this framework.
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Limited transformations of a hospital model in permanent  
imbalance in the last years of the dictatorship: 1963/75
The Spanish economy experienced strong growth in the 1960s, 
which was accompanied by a baby boom and a massive rural exo-
dus. Population growth, urbanisation and improved living conditions 
brought new consumption habits and greater demand for health care, 
which highlighted the fragile public health and hospital system de-
veloped in previous decades. In particular, three major shortcomings 
came to light: a) health care philosophy was based on limited care in 
terms of coverage and provision, a model far removed from the uni-
versal health care existing in other European countries; b) funding, 
in view of the scarcity of public resources, encumbered by an archaic 
tax system inherited from the nineteenth century, and the prevalence of 
propaganda purposes in a dictatorship with insufficient political will to 
promote a modern hospital system; c) management, with underutilisa-
tion, lack of coordination and poor administration of available hospital 
establishments and services. In this regard, it is important to bear in 
mind the diversity of owners and management bodies of the public 
hospitals shared between the Ministry of Labour (to which the INP, 
managing body of the SOE, belonged), the Ministry of the Interior (to 
which the DGS belonged), the Ministry of Education (responsible for 
the clinical hospitals) and the Ministry of Justice and the Army (military 
hospitals). This complex map was completed by the provincial and 
municipal institutions that continued to manage most of the country’s 
public charitable hospitals.
Within this context, two key laws for health coverage were passed: 
the law of 1962 regulating hospitals and the Basic Law of Social Security 
of 1963 (implemented in 1967). The former was intended to improve co-
ordination between the various administrations and hospital networks 
existing at that time. However, a substantial part of this legislation was 
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not implemented due to the lack of public health resources. Nevertheless, 
this paralysis did not block the process of building large public hospi-
tals or a modest improvement in hospital care, above all in large cities. 
The law of 1963 was theoretically intended to pave the way towards 
universal health coverage, increase the state’s financial contribution, and 
improve provision. In practice it consolidated a shared system, sustained 
by the social contributions of employers and workers (particularly on-
erous for the latter in a context of low wages), while at the same time it 
demonstrated that universalisation was not economically possible, for 
the time being.45 Perhaps the main novelty of this legislation was the 
suppression of any possible profit-making intention of the managers 
of the social insurance schemes, which entailed the elimination of the 
agreements for the private management of the SOE. Consequently, health 
coverage progressed very slowly from 41.8% of the population in 1965 
to 54.28% in 1970 and 61.74% in 1975, the last year of the dictatorship. 
This general system of coverage coexisted with other special regimes that 
provided health coverage to groups of workers excluded from the SOE 
(agriculture, marine workers, coal industry, services, self-employed etc.), 
either due to the resistance of employers, or the economic limitations of 
the insurance, or because they preferred to remain under a system that 
offered better coverage and provisions than the general regime (espe-
cially in the case of white-collar workers). On the other hand, 75.2% of 
public health expenditure was still funded through social contributions 
in 1980; financing through taxes only started to become predominant 
from 1989.46 The problems of funding the public health system in gen-
eral, and the hospital system in particular, made this insurance scheme 
one of the main destabilising elements of the Social Security accounts in 
Spain at this time.47
Despite all these difficulties, there were some significant devel-
opments in the hospital sector during this period. First, the INP tried 
to respond to the growing demand for coverage with the construction 
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of ciudades sanitarias (large complexes comprising a group of adjacent 
independent buildings specialising in maternity, trauma and orthopae-
dics, children etc. that shared services such as laboratories, laundry or 
cafeteria).48 Work on building ciudades sanitarias commenced in 1964 in the 
large provincial capitals: Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville, Zaragoza, 
Oviedo and Bilbao. In most cases (except Madrid and Valencia) these 
ciudades sanitarias were built around the large hospitals created under 
the Facilities Plan. This process reinforced the hospital-based health care 
model that was being established in Spain.49 
Second, planning of hospitals in the new ciudades sanitarias was 
designed within a new organisational framework and with a renewed 
philosophy of health care as a public service, that is, as a right rather than 
as a work of charity. This was achieved thanks to the implementation of 
the Basic Law of Social Security of 1963.50 In this situation, a paradigm 
shift occurred in the training of medical specialists. In the first decades 
of the twentieth century, most doctors trained as assistants of a skilled 
practitioner in the doctor’s surgery or hospital.51 In the 1950s, a new 
generation of doctors understood that in order to specialise with any 
degree of assurance it was necessary to go abroad, as they were not 
guaranteed adequate training in Spain. These doctors who travelled to 
the United States or countries in Western Europe became a key element 
in the modernisation of medicine in Spanish hospitals, both public and 
private, and in the introduction of new medical and surgical specialities. 
In particular, the training of doctors as specialists under the MIR medical 
internship system, based on ‘learning by working’, had originated at 
Johns Hopkins Hospital (Baltimore, USA) in the late nineteenth century 
and was incorporated into the Spanish hospital system in the 1960s by 
a group of doctors who had undertaken their specialist training in the 
United States.52 Within this process, the percentage of doctors who worked 
in hospitals in Spain grew (1949: 32.8%, 1963: 39.7% and 1973: 68.4%).53 
The instigation of training programmes for medical specialists, the pro-
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fessionalisation of the body of nurses and assistant nurses as opposed 
to the voluntary and religious personnel present in a large number of 
hospitals, and the creation of a board of directors with a hospital manager 
of a more technical and professional nature, enabled the old residencias 
sanitarias to be transformed into more modern hospitals. Meanwhile, in 
order to train the management and administrative staff, the first train-
ing course for hospital managers was organised in 1967.54 Third, and as 
part of this new strategy, the dictatorship promoted the inauguration of 
new university clinical hospitals geared towards teaching and training. 
Their objective was the renewal of education in the medical faculties and 
subsequent coordination with the Social Security. 
The desire to modernise was present in all of these initiatives. 
However, progress was slow. In fact, what is seen is a Spanish hospital 
structure where two contradictory systems were forced to coexist.55 
First, there were still a considerable number of hospitals (above all 
of a charitable nature) operating under the old model from the pre-
vious stage, which were coexisting with new thriving (private and 
public) hospitals, with a heavy focus on teaching and research and a 
more professional management. That is to say, there was a problem 
of lack of integration, coordination, planning and the rational use of 
resources because there was no state institution that properly coor-
dinated this complex hospital structure. Second, the new hospitals 
needed to expand their outpatient facilities while the old outpatient 
clinics needed hospitals. Third, there was an increase in the number 
of doctors trained through modern teaching programmes that did not 
find employment in the ‘old’ hospitals.56 This enforced coexistence led 
to serious defects and aggravated the organisational crisis inherited 
from previous decades. 
All in all, in the final years of the Franco dictatorship (1939-
75), the Spanish hospital system was near to collapse, with three 
basic problems: insufficient coverage, provision and infrastructure; 
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heterogeneous strategic approaches and management; and funding 
problems.57 These were three problems inherited from previous stag-
es that were exacerbated in a situation where the hospital function 
had finally started to be modernised in Spain. The hospital map 
available for 1981 reveals the perpetuation of a model consisting 
of a constellation of numerous hospitals of different proprietorship 
and different stages of development. Nevertheless, the extension of 
coverage both in terms of provision and the number of insured, along 
with the increasing number of beds available in the residencias sani-
tarias of the SOE, weakened the role of the provincial, and especially 
the municipal, public charitable hospitals, which in 1981 showed a 
decline in number and in beds compared with the preceding period 
(Table 4). Nevertheless, the construction of large centres such as the 
residencias sanitarias and the ciudades sanitarias as a result of public 
insurance increased the weighting of hospital beds available in the 
public sector compared with the private sector (Table 1.5). However, 
it is necessary to be aware of the limitations of these figures. In this 
regard, an article published in the El País newspaper in 1977 pointed 
out that ‘the national statistics in the Catalogue of Hospitals would 
lead to false conclusions. There are many centres with an extremely 
low occupation rate and others that should be closed. We have found 
numerous examples that do not meet minimum standards either 
technically or in terms of comfort’.58 There was still a long way to go 
within an exceptionally turbulent political context (lack of leadership 
at the national level) and social conflict (strikes and protests) and in 
the middle of the country’s transition to democracy after almost forty 
years of dictatorship.59 The 1970 Foessa Report revealed that Spain 
had one of the most deficient hospital situations in Europe.
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The exclusion of insurance companies and mutuals from the private 
management of the SOE after the implementation of the Basic Law of Social 
Security of 1963 did not result in the decline of private hospitals. They 
actually flourished on the basis of agreements to provide beds for surgery 
patients who were insured under the SOE, along with the demand for 
private hospitals to cover certain specialities, especially gynaecological, 
and for the provision of medical attention to an emerging middle class and 
public servants with privileged mutual coverage. Although there are no 
public data on the number of agreements between private sector hospitals 
and the Social Security (former INP and SGM hospitals, see Table 1.4), 
the Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades Anónimas yearbook for 1980, with data 
from 1964 to 1980, includes the creation of joint-stock companies in the 
hospital sector, especially in Madrid (15) and to a lesser extent in Barcelona 
(5) and Biscay (4). This coincides with the demand for hospital care linked 
to urban growth, increased incomes and a shortage of beds. As a result of 
these factors, the number of private beds grew continuously from 52,036 
Source: See Table 4 and for 1973, 1977 and 1986, see Estadística de Establecimientos Sanitarios 
con Régimen de Internado, web INE (1978), AEE (1980), 349 and (1990), 118. Source 1981: 
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in 1963 to 63,598 in 1981. However, the number of hospitals belonging to 
the entire private sector was actually declining, falling from 1,037 to 645 
in the same period (Table 1.5). The rise in the number of beds was due 
to the increase in the size of hospitals, a similar trend to the evolution 
of public hospitals. This process was linked to the closure and removal 
from the catalogue of establishments serving as refuges for the elderly, the 
closure of private establishments where there was little activity and also 
the grouping and re-categorisation of hospitals and medical centres that 
were previously accounted for independently. Within this group of private 
hospitals, comprising companies operating for profit but also the Church, 
the Spanish Red Cross and private charitable or voluntary hospitals, the 
latter continued to benefit from favourable tax treatment and were exempt 
from paying taxes imposed on the assets of legal persons. This was despite 
the fact that the number of pay beds was progressively increasing, which 
demonstrated that they were also engaged in profit-making activities.60
By the end of the dictatorship, the problems of the health system 
in general and the hospital system in particular continued to be very 
similar to those observed in the previous section. It is nevertheless true 
that the percentage of the population covered had increased, provision 
had been extended and there were more residencias sanitarias. Moreover, 
these public hospitals had improved with respect to private hospitals in 
terms of facilities and resources and had introduced new training meth-
ods for specialised medical staff. However, health care continued in the 
hands of the INP, an institute that managed the Social Security accounts 
in an opaque fashion and which had a long history of corruption, and 
the hospital system remained fragmented, without coordination, and 
with serious deficiencies in its internal functioning. The poor territorial 
distribution of hospitals had led to an unequal allocation of material and 
human resources (Table 1.6).61 In general, the country lacked a health 
strategy in a framework where there was neither a Ministry of Health nor 
a general health law to define the model to follow. Residencias Sanitarias 
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and Ciudades Sanitarias continued to specialise in acute medicine and 
surgical operations, within a structure where public and private hospitals 
coexisted and collaborated in a number of ways. 
When Franco died in November 1975, Spain had not recognised 
health care as a basic right, the SOE was far from achieving universal 
coverage (1975: 61.74%),62 its provisions remained limited, its accounts 
had serious financial imbalances. There was no health law that defined 
the country’s health care model and no Ministry of Health to manage the 
country’s health policy in a coordinated and structured manner. Almost 
forty years of dictatorship had left too many tasks pending in the health 
sphere. Nonetheless, in 1981, on the verge of passing legislation to tackle 
these shortcomings, the public hospital system in Spain was actually 
evolving better than the private hospital sector, although it still required 
the collaboration of private hospitals (Table 1.4).
Table 1.6: Public and private hospital facilities in 1977 (Number)
Source: INP (Instituto Nacional de Previsión), Investigación sobre la asistencia farmacéutica en 
España: Estudio socioeconómico sobre el conjunto de la asistencia sanitaria española (Madrid: 
Ministerio de Trabajo, 1977), 285-306. *This basically refers to INP (Residencias Sanitarias, 
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On reflection: democracy, universal coverage and  
decentralisation of health care in Spain
The establishment of democracy in Spain enabled some key foun-
dations to be laid for the development of the country’s health care 
model. In 1977, Fernández Ordoñez’s eagerly-awaited tax reform, 
which modernised the Spanish fiscal system, was approved. In the 
same year, it was agreed that the state contribution to financing Social 
Security would be progressively increased to 20 per cent of its budget. 
In 1981, this contribution was set at just 10.39% of the total revenue 
of the system, and the contribution of employers and employees was 
73.85% and 13.14% of the revenue budget, respectively. Meanwhile, also 
in 1977, the INP (plagued by corruption and blighted by the opacity 
of its accounts) disappeared and a new institution was created for the 
administration and management of health care services, the INSALUD 
(Instituto Nacional de Salud; National Health Institute).63 In parallel, during 
the first legislature of the democracy, the Ministry of Health was created 
(1977), which integrated all competencies in health matters, managed 
up to this point by the Ministry of the Interior, and the competencies 
of the Under-Secretariat for Social Security. The foundations for change 
had been set in place, but Spain still lacked a general law establishing a 
health and hospital system. The first governments of the democracy, from 
1977 to 1985, were incapable of successfully implementing the project 
due to the lack of political consensus. Something similar occurred with 
the private health care sector, which during the years of the transition 
to democracy was awaiting necessary reforms to modernise both its 
regulatory framework and its business structure.
After years of debate on the health model since the beginning of 
the transition to democracy and no consensual solution, PSOE’s victory 
with an absolute majority in the elections of 1982 opened the way to the 
success of the health bill in Congress. In presenting the bill to Parliament 
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in 1985, the Health Minister Ernest Lluch indicated that his project 
proposed the universalisation of provision (to meet social demand) and 
the creation of more employment in the health sector, free exercise of 
the medical profession (doctors who worked in public hospitals could 
also open private clinics) and an improvement in working conditions 
(a demand of unions and professional groups). Finally, in his speech 
the Minister pointed out that, in fact, ‘it was not possible to establish a 
National Health Service’ in Spain, as there existed a system allowing 
for ‘political autonomy of services’, although the state must provide 
minimum guarantees for all Spaniards (a demand of the autonomous 
communities—comunidades autónomas—that is, regional governments). 
Furthermore, the project proposed the ‘maintenance of a mixed fund-
ing mechanism where social contributions continue to be considered 
as a source of funding’, although with the intention to progressively 
increase the state’s contribution. The passage of the bill encountered 
the opposition of conservative party (AP/PP)64 and communist par-
ty (PCE), although from very different perspectives and strategies. 
The only consensus of all the groups seemed to be on the need for a 
health care reform and on the serious (financial, managerial and health 
care provision) problems of the Spanish health system.
After a stormy process of more than three years, with compli-
cated negotiations among diverse political sectors, social forces and 
professional groups, the General Health Law was passed in 1986. 
It addressed the difficult task of laying the foundations for two com-
plex processes:65 the modernisation of Spanish health care and the 
decentralisation of its management. However, the text failed to satisfy 
almost anyone. The political right labelled the law as ‘dirigista’ (dirigiste) 
and basically accused it of not establishing the free choice of doctor 
and health system.66 Progressive sectors criticised the law for not setting 
up a national health service, along the lines of the British model, and 
for not guaranteeing that health care be provided totally free of charge 
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(limited care benefits in some medical specialties) and, consequently, 
its universality. After numerous debates, adjustments, and a lack of 
consensus, the law, Ley General de Sanidad (LGS) 14/1986, of 25 April, 
was finally passed with the votes in favour of left-wing parties (PSOE 
and PCE) and Basque and Catalan nationalist parties (PNV and CIU),67 
which entailed the state legislative implementation of the right to health 
protection established in the Spanish Constitution. However, the text of 
this law contained more a set of principles and far-reaching goals than 
a plan for the immediate implementation of health reform.68 
Meanwhile, the processes for the transfer of health care man-
agement to the autonomous communities had already begun, which 
by 1986 had now been assigned fifty-four hospitals with 14,604 
inpatient units. The transfer of functions and services to the auton-
omous communities was initiated in 1981 with Catalonia and was 
concluded in 2001. The profound changes that Spanish health care 
underwent during this period with the passage of a health law, 
the process of transferring health care to the autonomous communi-
ties, the transformation of the hospital map and the modernisation of 
health and hospital services did not break the link between the public 
and private hospital sectors. Ernest Lluch stated during the debate 
on the health law in Congress that his project aspired to ‘maintain a 
stable relationship between public and private health care’ within the 
public sector’s guidelines (demand of the private sector).69 Moreover, 
he added that ‘most of the private hospital sector in this country 
operates in relation to the public sector. In other words, it could not 
survive without having interaction with the public sector’. According 
to his calculations, only seventeen per cent of private health services 
were not part of agreements with the public sector. These services 
were used by high income groups. These words proved to be true, 
and during this period public and private hospital sectors continued 
to be closely linked.
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Furthermore, the oil crises of the 1970s, the increase of the bed 
capacity of the public system and the consequent reduction in agree-
ments signed with the private sector, along with the obsolete facilities 
of some small hospitals, triggered a crisis in the private hospital 
system. This was the case in Bilbao where, in 1984, the INSALUD 
rescinded the agreements of eleven small and medium-sized clinics.70 
This phenomenon was instrumental in the fact that the number of 
private hospitals fell again from 645 in 1981 to 509 in 1986 and the 
number of beds went from 63,598 to 54,092 (Table 1.5).
The private sector implemented numerous strategies to resist 
this downturn. Three of them are worth highlighting: the creation 
of associations of private hospitals and lobbies,71 the need to mod-
ernise in order to meet the demand of civil servants’ mutuals,72 and 
the regional decentralisation of health care were the mechanisms 
that made it possible to overcome the crisis and reinforce the private 
system in the following decades.73 With the devolution of health care 
competencies to the autonomous communities and the adoption of 
models closer to the interests of the private sector in some regions, 
the private hospital sector started to grow again. This growth was 
once again sustained by agreements with public health services, 
and some regional governments even handed over the management 
of public hospitals to private companies.
In conclusion, the originality of the Spanish public health model 
was determined by the long Franco dictatorship that made the adoption 
of a welfare state impossible, without a structural and financing model 
defined at the beginning, although some Bismarckian elements were 
incorporated to support the compulsory health insurance programme 
within a social contribution system. The long transition to democracy 
generated an in-depth debate over the health system model. Finally, 
a model financed in large part by the state (following the British mod-
el) was presented but opposing positions among political parties only 
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allowed the passage of a Health Law. This law, although it progres-
sively increased the financing of the state funding through taxes, 
did not manage to introduce universal coverage and benefits. In addi-
tion, its approval in 1986 went against the current of neoliberal policy 
processes that were underway in many European countries, imposing 
cuts in social spending, especially in public health systems. On the other 
hand, for pragmatic, financial and ideological reasons, the first state 
interventions under the Franco dictatorship when health insurance 
was created in 1942 had the opened way to the active collaboration 
of insurance companies and private hospitals insurance benefits.
The transfer of health care competencies to autonomous commu-
nities from the 1980s consolidated the public health model in many 
territories, especially those governed by left-wing parties, which put 
an end to signing of agreements with the private sector for the pro-
vision of health services. In other regions, especially those governed 
by conservative parties, health care management was encouraged in 
collaboration with private insurance and hospital companies. The key 
historical factors that determined the evolution of public and private 
health care derived from the state health model were both basically 
political (dictatorship and democracy) and financial (a regressive tax 
system until 1977). The dictatorship, for reasons of propaganda and ide-
ology, delayed the adoption of health insurance that could be considered 
as part of a welfare state model. The lack of consensus in the first ten 
years of the transition to democracy prolonged this situation. Despite 
this, the Spanish health system managed to reach the top positions in 
the international health rankings by the end of the twentieth century. 
Public investment during democracy and the training of excellent pro-
fessionals in the field of health care played a key role in this success. 
It may well be the case that this could have been achieved much earlier 
if the country had enjoyed democratic institutions similar to those of 
other Western European countries after the Second World War.
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Chapter 2
Charity and Philanthropy in the History of  
Brazilian Hospitals —The experience of São Paulo  
Holy House of Mercy and São Paulo Hospital:  
an outline of historical continuity1
Ana Nemi 
(Federal University of São Paulo)
Health care in the Portuguese Empire: a prologue
Portuguese houses of mercy were lay brotherhoods where health 
care provision was guided by Christian values, and priorities were 
set by the Crown in relation to the interest of a local elite.2 The first 
of them was founded in Lisbon in 1498, and they subsequently 
spread across the Portuguese Empire. The new houses of mercy 
were expected to operate in the model of the Lisbon Misericórdia, 
and had to deal with local particularities and the resulting connec-
tion with the elite.3 In spite of these specificities, though, houses of 
mercy enjoyed privileges of royal protection. Amid the religious 
wars of the sixteenth century, their statutes were negotiated within 
the scope of the Council of Trent (1545-1563), which reinforced their 
Christian/Catholic identities and their autonomy from bishoprics.4 
Furthermore, this autonomy and the royal sanction for the practice 
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of charity and the collection of testamentary donations conferred 
on the houses of mercy a structural governance role in the mainte-
nance of the Portuguese Empire, through the exercise of local power 
by colonial elites, despite the differences between colonial spaces.5 
In other words, the Portuguese Empire coordinated local powers 
that were autonomous to a greater or lesser extent, depending on 
the significance of the local economy for the Royal Treasury, and on 
possible connections between local elites and those at the centre of 
the Empire. In addition, the Christian/Catholic notion of charity, 
with its emphasis on the virtues of poverty, turned the assistance of 
the poor into a means of salvation for the rich. This took the form 
of alms-giving while alive and of last wills and testaments benefiting 
the houses of mercy in death. 
The sources of income of houses of mercy for the practice of 
charity, and, therefore, for the health care of the poor, were not 
homogeneous. The collection of alms was the privilege and main 
activity of the houses of mercy. Those houses located in more afflu-
ent cities, however, had higher liquidity, since they were engaged in 
trade. They also owned more real property, as they were recipients 
of assets linked to services and of testamentary donations that could 
be publicly auctioned.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, through the 
intervention of the Portuguese monarchy, a trend of incorporating 
hospitals into houses of mercy emerged. Across Europe, and in 
Portugal in particular, a separation existed between places of hos-
pitality for travelers and pilgrims, and those dedicated to the care 
of the sick. These latter were fundamental to the activities carried 
out by houses of mercy, which, for this reason, built infirmaries and 
hospitals throughout the Empire. 
Members of the brotherhoods of mercy were divided into no-
bles and the ‘officials’, who, although not members of the nobility, 
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were business people and merchants not engaged in manual labour. 
The brothers managed the finances and could therefore use resources 
for their own benefit in the form of loans. In general, brothers were 
also members of local city councils, and this explains the frequent 
loans brotherhoods and city councils extended to one another, as 
well as the difficulty in collecting from politically influential debtors.6 
The social capital attached to belonging to a house of mercy brought 
with it political power and the opportunity to manage privately re-
sources collected for the practice of charity. Although such charity was 
private when it came to collecting and applying financial resources, 
it was also intended to be public in the fulfillment of its activities. 
These were listed in the Commitment of the Misericordia, the set 
of principles and regulations for the operation of the Lisbon House 
of Mercy, which also guided the colonial houses.7
The fact that houses of mercy owned property and had never been 
taxed to the same extent as other institutions of the Empire, was the 
object of an injunction by the Marquis of Pombal in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. At the time, amid the diffusion of Enlight-
enment thought, it was evident to the Cabinet of the Marquis and 
the enlightened elites that Portugal should open its markets and take 
real property out of mortmain, which preserved inalienable rights of 
ownership in the hands of corporate boards, such as houses of mercy. 
In this public debate, elites considered that these houses of mercy 
represented a hindrance to the circulation of goods and workers. 
The Law of Good Reason, of 18 August 1769, was intended to control 
the receipt of inheritances by houses of mercy and other brotherhoods.8 
It was urgent to strengthen the nation’s workforce by ‘improving 
hygienic, nutritional, pharmaceutical, and medical practices’ and 
by reorganising hospitals and home medical care, a task that would 
also be carried out by houses of mercy.9 It was a moment when the 
Christian/Catholic notion of charity would be harshly criticised in 
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the Portuguese Empire. The same criticism had been emerging since 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in other European countries, 
such as England, France, and the German principalities.10
The tutelage imposed by the Pombaline reforms coincided with 
a time of discredit for houses of mercy and contributed to curtailing 
their autonomy.11 Such discredit, however, was insufficient to change 
the tax exemption privileges that had always characterised the prac-
tice of charity in the Portuguese Empire, which can be explained by 
the relevance of the assistance services they offered. Neither was 
it enough to alter the links between houses of mercy and the local 
powers through which they negotiated and symbolically shared 
political power, even when the elites intended to withdraw from the 
boards of directors of houses of mercy at the turn of the eighteenth 
to the nineteenth century. 
As a result, with the establishment of new liberal regimes in the 
nineteenth century, houses of mercy would have to settle accounts 
with the new civil powers. They would, though, retain their Christian/
Catholic values and their enormous capacity of negotiation with city 
councils and the state. For this reason, anchored in their social work, 
houses of mercy would be subjected to modest taxation. In Portugal, 
misericórdias would maintain their central role in providing relief 
and health care for the poor. In the imperial territories, however, 
the histories of the houses of mercy took multiple and diverse paths. 
Even in the great Empire that was taking shape in Brazil, the fifteen 
brotherhoods founded until 1750 would have different trajectories.12 
The case of the town of São Paulo will be addressed below.
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The Brotherhood São Paulo Holy House of Mercy between  
the Colonial Period and the Brazilian Empire
The Brotherhood São Paulo Holy House of Mercy (São Paulo Mis-
ericórdia), thought to have been founded in the sixteenth century, grew 
along with the city.13 This means that its greatest period of expansion 
occured in the second half of the nineteenth century, pari passu with the 
coffee economy, but also with the debates arising from the circulation 
of knowledge and people in the Atlantic. 
In the eighteenth century, the city of São Paulo strengthened its 
position as a gateway to the inland territory, serving as a point of 
departure and a place where care could be provided both to travelers 
on their way to the gold mines and to soldiers serving the interests of 
the Crown and local governments. The small hospital of São Paulo 
Misericórdia was founded in 1714, but would only start operating in 
premises acquired for this purpose in 1749. It would be much requested 
as a military infirmary. Many São Paulo citizens enriched in the mines 
were members of the brotherhood and advocated the foundation and 
consolidation of the hospital. In their view, the Brotherhood should 
cover sick care expenses and take actions to collect almsgiving to 
support its activities.14
The Empire’s houses of mercy initially enjoyed relative freedom 
to conduct their activities. Multiple petitions, though, were filed to the 
Crown by the São Paulo Misericórdia’s Board of Directors requesting 
aid and privileges equal to those granted to the Lisbon Misericórdia, 
since the town, depleted by mining, was short on financial resources.15 
In the late eighteenth century, however, strong imperial interference 
was imposed by the Marquis of Pombal, which continued for two reigns 
after Dom José I.16 This subjected houses of mercy to the sceptical over-
sight of the legislators of the time, who wanted to exert control over 
testamentary donations which were falling into mortmain, and thus 
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depriving the Crown and the municipality of tax revenue.17 At the same 
time, they could not forgo the private charity offered houses of mercy, 
since these alleviated social problems by means of their hospitals and 
foundling wheels.18 In this sense, the Royal Charter of 18 October 1806, 
which obliged all the Empire’s houses of mercy to abide by the Com-
mitment of the Lisbon Misericordia, is emblematic of the centralisation 
processes taking place in the Portuguese Empire and of the attempts to 
control local autonomous institutions. The intention was to reorganise 
care provision by controlling what the Enlightenment called vagrancy 
and by setting workers apart from those who engaged in begging for 
unworthy reasons.19
It was also in this conjuncture that the tropeiro, who had succeeded 
the sertanista,20 became a predecessor of the farmer who sought to take 
root in the lands of São Paulo plateau with sugar plantations and, still 
in their early stages, coffee plantations.21 Thus São Paulo’s modest elite 
faced an influx of soldiers, royal employees and travellers, and sought 
new ways to balance its plantation interests and local power with the 
Crown’s injunctions—marked by the arrival of the Majorat of Mateus 
in 1765.22 This small elite would combine the exercise of political power 
in the city council with the practice of charity in the brotherhood. This 
combination was maintained even in the face of the disruptions arising 
from the Napoleonic Wars, the coming of the Portuguese court to Brazil, 
and plans for the independence of Brazil. 
Most studies of the brotherhoods of mercy in Portuguese America 
state that the property and resources of these institutions were derived 
from donations and bequests from individuals, as had occurred in Portu-
gal. From what can be seen in their statutes, this was a structuring element 
of their activity.23 Although São Paulo Misericórdia had fewer resources 
available to conduct its work, it availed itself of public resources and 
benefited from tax exemption privileges, just like other misericórdias.24 
However, at the turn of the nineteenth century, a hygienist discourse 
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very much in line with the Enlightenment and civilising aspirations of 
the time, increasingly gained space in some political speeches at the São 
Paulo City Council. This set out medical justifications for organising the 
public and private spheres of citizens’ lives. Such speeches indicated the 
path and shape that the State was taking, both locally and nationwide, 
towards a rational arrangement of the ‘turba’—the common people. 
They represented the limited place of Enlightenment thought that coexist-
ed with police action and with the violence immanent in a slaveholding 
and unequal society.25 The implementers of the new politics that emanated 
from the 1806 Royal Charter were primarily landowners who took back 
control of the Brotherhood’s Board of Directors before the proclamation 
of Brazilian independence in 1822, due to their dissatisfaction with the 
Crown’s protégés brought in by the Majorat of Mateus.
It was in this context that São Paulo expanded the political and 
social domain of its house of mercy, which retained its privileges 
and its role in the development of new precepts aimed at reorganising 
the hygiene and health practices of São Paulo’s citizens. It is possible, 
therefore, to observe a redesignation of houses of mercy in the Portuguese 
Atlantic, at once retaining their private origins but also relying on public 
resources and tax exemption privileges to practice private charity. This 
state of affairs was made possible by the political influence of colonial 
elites, which operated in those institutions through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. After the independence of Brazil the established São 
Paulo Misericórdia elite constructed a building for its hospital in 1824. 
It then set out its ideals and powers in the Commitment of 1827, passed in 
1836 by the São Paulo Provincial Assembly. At that time, the imbrication 
of the provincial assemblies of the Brazilian Empire, city councils, and 
houses of mercy was reflected in the composition of the directing boards 
of brotherhoods, which always included provincial deputies, councilmen, 
and landowners, configuring a legal and effective articulation between 
private elites and public powers.26 
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Throughout the nineteenth century, São Paulo Misericórdia would 
fund its activities with revenue derived from renting out its real estate. 
This had been obtained through bequests, from donations by the brothers 
and from public resources in the form of financial aid and tax exemptions, 
which were justified by its provision to the poor. Nevertheless, the broth-
erhood was always constrained by the economic and social condition 
of the city and province in which they were located. This model was 
also replicated for hospitals not linked to brotherhoods of mercy, which 
started to be called filantrópicos—philanthropic hospitals—in the late 
nineteenth century, and which also aimed to provide free health care to 
the poor. Márcia Barros Silva studied the nineteenth-century Annals of São 
Paulo Provincial Legislative Assembly and found multiple and diverse 
requests for health care funding from the São Paulo Misericórdia hospital.27 
She also found aid requests for the construction of other hospitals:
‘Other aid requests were intended for the construction and 
maintenance of leprosariums and mental asylums. The requests 
were similar to those made by houses of mercy: allocation of direct 
funds, or creation of lotteries and other fundraising activities were 
deemed appropriate for this type of institution. These benefits, 
always insufficient, also had to compete with other solicitations 
for construction of medical accommodation. For example, in 1872, 
a project for the creation of a charity hospital in the city of São 
Paulo, which had been advanced by the physician J. F. dos Reis in 
the previous year, was rejected on the grounds that the Holy House 
was already providing health care in the city.’ 28
Thus, in the experience of São Paulo Misericórdia, it is possible to 
observe the maintenance of the exercise of private charity institutional-
Charity and Philanthropy in Brazilian Hospitals
69 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
ised in the Portuguese Empire, but now in a dialogue with public power 
that would become increasingly eloquent and effective throughout the 
nineteenth century. The development of both the city and the coffee 
economy in the late nineteenth century brought the arrival of immi-
grants and population growth, lending a new urgency to public health 
measures. In this context, some noteworthy sanitary measures included 
dealing with polluted water and ‘miasmas’, sewage treatment, collective 
vaccination, and regulation of hospitals and public areas. Another issue 
was the number of hospital beds, the demand for which increased at the 
same rate as the city and its population. This problem was worsened by 
the fact that the São Paulo Misericórdia also received patients from other 
cities of the province. It was not by chance that the Republic, established 
in 1889, would witness a rise in the number of philanthropic hospi-
tals. The health care provided by houses of mercy was already lacking, 
and these new hospitals would develop on the same basis established 
by misericórdias: private charity with public funding delivered in distinct 
ways and in dialogue with local and state public powers.29
How did this compare with developments elsewhere? A debate 
about the advantages of the new philanthropy over older endowed 
charity had also occurred in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, 
leading to a different rationale for philanthropy. The voluntary hospital 
institutions established subsequently reduced considerably their level 
of generosity towards poor people deemed healthy and able for work. 
Their premise was that philanthropic actions should be guided by the 
strengthening of the nation’s workforce and by their social usefulness 
rather than by piety. It called for less reliance on individual donors and 
for greater continuity and for more consistent and effective funding 
mechanisms.30 England then developed a two-sided model: one with 
public institutions funded with tax revenue from the local poor rates; 
the other with philanthropic institutions that benefited from tax exemp-
tions and whose trustees defined the remit, locations, and the medical 
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practices deemed appropriate. On the American side of the Atlantic, 
the thirteen British colonies replicated this model, maintaining it after 
independence, even considering a greater presence of the community 
in the business of local charity.31 
In nineteenth-century Portugal meanwhile, the Crown exerted 
strong influence over the administration of houses of mercy, with 
debate and legislation proposing health measures in the nation’s gen-
eral interest. Despite this, however, the organisation of hospitals re-
mained characterised by Christian charity, whereby private donations 
by God-fearing citizens were expected to be sufficient to fund these 
institutions. Such was the case of the most important hospital of the 
Lisbon Misericórdia, São José Hospital, whose directors complained and 
denounced the insufficiency and irregularity of allocated resources.32 
However, in the town of São Paulo, the penetration of new ideas 
from the Enlightenment was not sufficient to subvert the older tradi-
tions and mentalities of Christian/Catholic charity in the health care 
provided by São Paulo Misericórdia hospital. Only the Republic would 
show some vigor in doing so.
Charity and Philanthropy in the Republican Period
In Brazil, it was in the Republican period that the progress of 
public health actions that claimed to be philanthropic became manifest, 
especially in the creation of new hospitals.33 The federal law No. 173, 
of 10 December 1893, proposed the regulation of associations created 
for moral, religious, artistic, scientific, political, and recreational pur-
poses, thus laying down the criteria for the foundation of a plurality 
of non-profit civil associations with diverse interests. The filantrópicos 
were dedicated to providing health care services, and were most often 
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set up by physicians or groups of physicians. These are the ones ad-
dressed in this study.34 The Republic, therefore, found a legal manner 
to maintain the institutional arrangement that secured for houses of 
mercy and other philanthropic institutions the right to use both private 
and public resources to provide health care and build new premises 
when needed. The statutory characterisation of a civil association as 
not-for-profit entailed the possibility of exemption from certain taxes. 
In the same way, the provision of public health services and free hospital 
beds to the poor entailed the possibility of applying for public resources. 
These resources would come in the form of extraordinary revenue or, 
more commonly from the 1930s on, in the form of subventions approved 
by federal, state, and municipal assemblies.35
The aforementioned federal law No. 173, therefore, gave legal 
status to a practice that had been developing in the negotiations that 
led to the construction of the new São Paulo Misericórdia hospital, 
opened in 1884. Reports by Treasury officials pointed to the need for 
expanding the hospital due to an increase in demand for medical care 
in the city. Coffee farmers, who were for the most part brothers of São 
Paulo Misericórdia, made contributions and donations for the new 
building. These same brothers competed for the opportunity to donate 
the land for its construction, seeking to make the location of their stores 
and businesses more valuable. Once the hospital and its modern facilities 
were declared open, the negotiations with federal, state and municipal 
governments to fund the hospital’s services began.36
At São Paulo Misericórdia, there was an extraordinary increase in 
revenue coming from public resources, in comparison with ordinary 
resources (rents, lotteries, donations by brothers etc.) throughout the 
nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century. This can be 
verified by cross-checking the reports presented by the Brotherhood 
and the debates recorded in the Annals of the Provincial Assembly 
(after 1889, State Assembly) and the São Paulo City Council. This char-
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acteristic would be replicated in the new filantrópicos. A public health 
model was, therefore, being consolidated in which public resources 
were employed by non-profit private institutions that defined their 
area of activity and the health care practices to be offered. It should 
also be noted that this political choice, negotiated by the economic 
and intellectual elites, resulted in a reduction of public funds obtained 
through the tax exemptions that such civil associations received due 
to their non-profit status. Physicians were the most active members of 
the intellectual elite, keen to influence the paths of public health and 
the individual medical assistance provided in hospitals.
The framework of Brazilian hospital philanthropy was one in which 
private institutions fulfilled public purposes in return for tax relief and 
light regulation. This provided physicians with considerable encour-
agment to submit proposals for sanitary schemes and new hospital 
foundations to the public authorities. From the standpoint of collective 
action, the Republic’s first decades were marked by campaigns that 
aimed to regulate housing, ports, stores, factories, water distribution, 
sewage treatment, landfill sites and cemetries, as well as to implement 
large-scale vaccination, all in an attempt to develop salubrious and 
civilised sanitary practices. Individual medical assistance would only 
become a matter of concern in the 1920s, when social security medicine 
took its first steps.37 The regulation and construction of new hospitals 
would, therefore, conform to the inheritance and tradition of houses of 
mercy on the one hand, and with physicians’ interests and ideology on 
the other. Therefore, between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries, the construction of new filantrópicos was accompanied by 
debates concerning the connections between mental illness and crim-
inology. In the city of São Paulo, for example, this trend was typified 
by Juquery Mental Asylum, founded in 1898, and Pinel Sanatorium, 
founded in 1929, both of which were the result of projects advanced 
by physicians.38 Individual, inpatient and outpatient care for the poor 
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was still largely reliant on houses of mercy, since more affluent classes 
benefited from private medical care. The 1930s, however, would bring 
changes to individual medical assistance, and the experience at the 
São Paulo Hospital is quite illustrative of them.
São Paulo School of Medicine Civil Association  
and São Paulo Hospital
In 1933, a group of thirty-three physicians founded São Paulo 
School of Medicine Civil Association (SPSM). Its ‘non-profit’ status 
placed the newly founded educational institution among the so-called 
philanthropic institutions, which, under this designation, was partially 
exempt from national taxation. This exemption was justified by the 
development of a medical course which, as part of its function, would 
also provide health care for the city’s population. In 1936, with this 
purpose in mind, the Civil Association would establish its teaching 
hospital, the São Paulo Hospital (SPH), whose first wards would 
begin to receive patients into provisional premises in 1936, and into 
its own facilities in 1940. 
From the beginning, funding for the new hospital39 was based 
on resources obtained by the School of Medicine from a range of 
different sources, including: (a) monthly fees paid by students; (b) 
quotas paid by its founders; (c) agreements entered into with federal, 
state and municipal governments, which released funds in the form 
of subventions; (d) agreements executed with the municipality and 
the state to finance the hospital’s wards, its emergency department 
and hospital beds for indigents; and (e) agreements signed with 
pension funds and institutes, as of 1940. These pension institutes had 
been in development since the 1920s. In the 1930s, stimulated by the 
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Getúlio Vargas administration and linked to the Ministry of Labour, 
they expanded their coverage and activities. 
The transformations that occurred in the Brazilian economy be-
tween the 1930s and 1960s attest to an intense urbanisation process 
that would bring with it a considerable increase in demand for social 
and hospital assistance. The development of Brazilian social security 
entailed the provision of medical, hospital and pharmaceutical services 
to its beneficiaries. Pension funds and institutes hired hospital services 
for their members. Poor people, who worked in the informal sector, 
remained dependent on charitable/philanthropic institutions. São 
Paulo Hospital, thus, followed the tradition of the houses of mercy 
as a non-profit institution that sought public and private resources to 
finance its activities. It also sought to attract the social security insti-
tutes that were developing and, at the same time, secure the autonomy 
of action and choice characteristic of a private enterprise.
The 1930s and 1940s saw the reinforcement of a trend in Brazilian 
hospital care, in which the government purchased and funded services 
provided by private hospitals, especially the non-profit ones. It was as-
sumed that charitable/philanthropic institutions providing care for the 
poor and indigents could charge for services offered to public bodies, 
mainly through subventions and agreements. In the case of the SPH, 
whose clientele was for the most part composed of indigents, the reliance 
on public funding would only increase throughout the twentieth century. 
The 1940s and 1950s coincided with the development of the so-called 
modelo hospitalocêntrico. This model arose from an increased demand for 
health care, especially in big urban centres, and from the influence of 
new technologies, which resulted in more expensive medical services. 
The hospital became, therefore, the privileged locus of these services, 
as it concentrated various medical specialties and provided them with 
the most modern and expensive equipment and infrastructure. In this 
context, the SPH found a way to finance its creation and the construction 
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of its infrastructure, but not always to support its teaching activities 
and services. 
The financial hardships faced by the School of Medicine in the 1950s, 
especially in maintaining teaching beds intended for indigent patients, 
led its members to adopt a radical solution: in 1956, the SPSM was turned 
into a federal institution. The SPH, though, remained a private and 
philanthropic institution.40 The law that federalised the School did not 
include the hospital and its enormous liabilities. It made clear, however, 
that the hospital should offer beds for teaching activities.41 In this way, 
the SPSM, now an educational institution of the public federal system, 
would continue to use beds in São Paulo Hospital to teach medical spe-
cialties. The hospital, in turn, would preserve the main characteristics of 
the original civil association, changing only its name to São Paulo Society 
for the Development of Medicine (SPDM), from then on considered the 
sponsor of the hospital. The political intentions behind this change are 
quite explicit in the minutes of the members’ meetings of the original 
association. It was hoped that the federal school could obtain larger 
funds to finance teaching beds allocated to indigent patients and that 
physicians would maintain their autonomy in the management of the 
private hospital. It should be noted that the members of the SPH/SPDM 
were the same professors who came to compose the School Governing 
Council. This was a new articulation of the public-private mix that had 
been present in the SPSM’s history since its inception.
Analysis of the financial statements of the original civil associa-
tion, including those produced by the new Society, suggests that the 
professors were able to mobilise great amounts of capital for the con-
struction of buildings, such as the Tuberculosis Dispensary. Resulting 
from an agreement signed with the National Tuberculosis Service 
and the Health Department of the Ministry of Education and Health, 
the dispensary was built by the National Tuberculosis Service on a 
piece of land owned by the School. After the dispensary’s opening in 
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1958, the properties were divided between the School and the Society 
and the land passed to the ownership of the Society. Service provision 
would be maintained with resources from the School and also the 
Society, which would have to raise subventions from public authorities 
in order to carry out its philanthropic activities. These subventions, 
though, never had the necessary regularity. This can be seen as a kind 
of ‘financial engineering’ through which huge assets could be accumu-
lated by means of agreements and loans. However, short-term expenses 
for the maintenance of health care services were always beset by the 
inconsistency of the subventions targetted at the needy.
The accounting exercise carried out by the auditor Américo Oswaldo 
Campiglia in 1957 at the request of the Society and the School makes 
patent the financing problems reported here. According to the auditor, 
by ‘incorporating the subventions into the total revenue’42 as an anticipated 
but unrealised factor, a surplus was obtained for the period. In other 
words, this surplus was based on subventions yet to come, but whose 
regularity could never be confirmed through the accounting records. 
This practice therefore allowed the hospital to retain its charitable status, 
wtih accompanying tax privileges.
The creation of the Social Security National Institute (INPS, in the 
Portuguese acronym) in 1966, which replaced the old pension institutes 
and concentrated benefits into a single state-managed social security 
system, would change the role played by subventions from and agree-
ments with the municipality and the State in the SPH/SPDM’s financing. 
In the course of the 1970s, the importance of revenue received from the 
INPS in the hospital’s total revenue increased significantly. A social 
security system was, therefore, created based on health care provided 
to the individual, for curative purposes and delivered in a hospital. In 
this system, philanthropic enterprises had great importance: they were 
responsible for hospitals all across Brazil and signed agreements with 
the INPS to provide medical assistance as established in the new model. 
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This type of ‘articulation between public and private’ characterised the 
development of health care in Brazil and promoted ‘hybrid forms’ of 
organising these services.43 The experience at the complex SPH-SPDM/
SPSM undoubtedly typified and consolidated the historical trajectory 
of public health in Brazil insofar as its existence was defined by the 
shared management of a private philanthropic hospital and a federal 
medical school. 
Thus, the growth of health care funded by social security contri-
butions from workers, employers, and the federal government became 
popular. Investment by the state in public health and preventive medi-
cine was always proportionally smaller in the 1970s. The political choices 
that were made and put into effect, and that were evidenced by the 
decreasing participation of the Ministry of Health in the Union’s total 
budget certainly explain suppressed tragedies, such as the meningitis 
epidemic that swept the country in the early part of the 1970s. Funds 
for a vaccination campaign would only be released in December 1974.44
This system developed since the creation of the INPS was as fragile 
as it was large. The charges for care by a private hospital network largely 
composed of philanthropic institutions, such as São Paulo Hospital and 
SPDM, were billed by ‘Unit of Service’, such as a surgical procedure, 
an item of equipment, an appointment, or hospitalisation costs. This 
was difficult to control and often became a source of corruption as 
doctors over-billed. An additional factor was the insufficiency of the 
subventions granted by the different levels of government for the care 
of indigent patients at the same hospitals that received social security 
patients. Rates paid by the INPS for medical services were also low, 
and the transfer of resources was not free from delays and cancellations 
due to the reciprocal distrust between the INPS and the contracted 
hospital network.
The difficulties posed by the INPS’s fragile financial structure to 
the operationalisation of the hospital were as evident as they were 
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serious. There were problems paying medical residents, suppliers and 
employees; the impossibility of providing care of the expected and 
requisite quality; and constant attempts by the School and the Society 
to renegotiate contracts with the INPS and obtain subventions that 
were enough to cover the deficit created by their dependence on its 
revenue. Moreover, the urgent need to expand the hospital, incapable 
of serving an ever-growing number of patients who sought treatment 
in its wards and emergency room, led the School to request resources 
from the Social Development Support Fund. This fund, created by law 
in 1974, aimed to ‘provide financial support for social programmes 
and projects that comply with the guidelines and priorities of the 
social development strategy set out in the National Development 
Plan.’ Through the fund, it was possible to take out loans from 
the Caixa Econômica Federal, a government-owned savings bank, 
for ‘publicly relevant projects in the areas of health, sanitation, edu-
cation, labour, and social security.’45 Bearing in mind that throughout 
the 1970s the private hospital network, either philanthropic or not, 
came to be responsible for serving roughly 90% of INPS-funded 
patients, and that hospitals became the citizens’ main gateway into 
the health system, the government’s intentions were clear. Likewise, 
the difficulties in organising primary care structures, after the creation 
in 1988 of Brazil’s national health service, the Sistema Único de Saúde 
(SUS), can also be explained when one considers the history of public 
policies formulated in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the economic difficulties reported here.46 
It is based on records of current assets and liabilities (CA and CL) 
of the SPH, as well as on the application of the current liquidity 
ratio (CLR), which signifies an institution’s solvency as regards 
its financial obligations. 
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Table 2.1: Assets and Liabilities of Sao Paolo Hospital.  
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The table shows liquidity ratios mostly below 1, which is evidence 
of the institution’s insolvency. Even the years of solvency (1981-1982) 
only occurred because of the federalisation of the SPH’s employees, 
which balanced the ratio between revenue and contractual liabilities 
for two years.48
According to the Minutes of the School Governing Council and of 
the Society Members’ Meeting between the 1960s and1990s, the percep-
tion of insolvency always led to the following proposals: (a) requests 
for additional municipal and state funding for emergency care delivery; 
(b) hiring of new staff via the school, in order not to burden the Society 
payroll; (c) increases in the number of private hospital beds, in order to 
balance the finances against the expenses with teaching beds intended 
for indigents; and last but surely not least, (d) requests to turn the hos-
pital into government property. These proposals, however, had never 
been a consensus within the community. There had always been those 
who wanted the SPH to remain a private philanthropic civil association, 
and those who asserted the impossibility for the SPH to be funded on 
the historical grounds on which it had been built, thus demanding 
its complete federalisation.
In the process of transition from the INPS/INAMPS system to the 
universal and comprehensive SUS, the Society faced a serious financial 
crisis caused by the indebtedness of the late 1980s and by the aftermath 
of the economic ‘miracle’ promoted by the military between 1964 and 
1984.49 The transition to the 1990s would witness strikes and deficits, 
the likes of which had never been seen in the SPH’s history.50 When 
the SUS was created, 95% of the SPH’s activities were funded with 
public resources and payments proceeding from the agreement with 
the INPS/INAMPS. Prior forms of financial engineering would also 
point the way out of the crisis: expansion, the search for new agree-
ments and new areas of activity to increase revenue. It should be noted 
that, between the initiation of social security, when the school and the 
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hospital developed, and the creation of the SUS, the Society remained 
a private philanthropic institution, signing agreements with ministries, 
state and municipal secretariats, and receiving subventions to provide 
public health care. The health system has undoubtedly changed, but the 
continuance of the SPH/SPDM amid the change indicates the difficul-
ties in consolidating the SUS as a fully public system in which private 
insurance was unnecessary. These difficulties will be examined below, 
taking into account the very process of creation of the SUS.
The Construction of the Unified Health System
It was in the years of the military dictatorship, between 1964 and 
1984, that the social security health care system reached its apex and 
also its crisis.51 The control and distribution of social security resources 
by the state proved not only inefficient but, more importantly, unable 
to deliver quality health care to those entitled to it. Nor could it expand 
health care coverage to patients not covered by social security. A national 
health system was necessary, with a funding model that met citizens’ 
needs. Sanitary Reform was also necessary. This was a movement that 
brought together several other social movements in the late 1970s to 
demand universal public health care and the country’s democratisa-
tion.52 The SUS was created by the 1988 Constitution and became a legal 
obligation with the 1990 laws No. 8,080 and 8,142. 
As a historical process, the SUS had its practical begin-
ning in the 1970s, with social and political movements against 
the dictatorship and in favour of the democratic freedoms and the 
democratisation of the State. These movements were expanding 
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and intensifying their fight for a just and solidary society, and 
for a State with universal public policies on basic human rights. 
In health, these libertarian movements were strengthened by the 
Sanitary Reform, anticipating what would become, years later, 
the constitutional directives of universality, equality and com-
munity participation.53
As a result of the Sanitary Reform movement and the defeat of 
the military dictatorship in 1984, the new Constitution, promulgated 
in 1988 and known as the Citizen Constitution, stated:
Article 198.Public health activities and services are integrated 
in a regional and hierarchical network and constitute a single 
system, organised according to the following directives:
I – decentralisation, with a single management in each sphere 
of government;
II – comprehensive service, priority being given to preventive 
activities, without prejudice to assistance services;
III – participation of the community.
Paragraph 1. The unified health system shall be financed, 
as set forth in article 195, with funds from the social welfare budget 
of the Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities, 
as well as from other sources. (...)
Article 199. Health assistance is open to private enterprise.
Paragraph 1. Private institutions may participate in a supple-
mentary manner in the unified health system, in accordance with 
the directives established by the latter, by means of public law 
contracts or agreements, preference being given to philanthropic 
and non-profit entities.54
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This research is concerned particularly with the effects of 
Article 199 in relation to the principles laid down in Article 198 of the 
Constitution. In order to offer a full health service with the partici-
pation of the community in the making of choices and decisions, the 
regionalised, hierarchical and decentralised network must provide three 
levels of service: primary health care, which is the gateway to the SUS; 
medium-complexity care; and high-complexity care. Primary care is 
evidently provided in higher numbers and is allocated a proportionally 
greater amount of resources. The thirty years of existence of SUS have 
undoubtedly seen a substantial increase in the number of primary care 
service providers. This has made it possible to include a large propor-
tion of the population in the registers of the Basic Health Units (BHU), 
as well as to connect BHUs with nearby medium- and high-complexity 
service providers. The urgency in constructing SUS, however, entailed 
the execution of agreements and contracts with private hospitals, as 
suggested in Article 199. The Society would integrate with the hospital 
network serving SUS patients. The same would happen with hospitals 
of the brotherhoods of mercy and with all other filantrópicos in the coun-
try. There were differences here, though, that need to be pointed out.
Among Brazilian philanthropic hospitals today, including those 
belonging to houses of mercy, some are characterised as general hospitals 
and offer services that range from outpatient care to highly-complex 
care. In these hospitals, some admit any type of patient in their emer-
gency departments, whereas others are exclusively dedicated to one 
specialty (orthopedics, pediatrics etc.) and only receive patients for that 
specific specialty. Hardly any philanthropic hospital or house of mercy 
receives only SUS patients; most also have beds reserved for privately 
insured patients. In this aspect, though, hospitals differ immensely from 
one another. Some, like the SPH, allocate few beds for private patients. 
Others seek to provide services equally to SUS and private patients in 
an attempt to balance their finances, since payments from the SUS are 
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allegedly insufficient. Still others, in order to secure the number of SUS 
beds required by law for their certification as filantrópicos, operate as 
social organisations (SO), managing public service providers. These may 
be either BHUs or hospitals, located or not in their vicinities. In their 
financial statements, these SOs record inpatient and outpatient services 
offered by the public service providers they manage, as if provided by 
themselves as their mandatory share of public services. Public patients, 
however, rarely make use of the private hospital’s services. 
At present, it is a fact that SUS is harmed by policies of under-
funding, but it is also a fact that this situation affects primary care 
service providers more seriously than general and special hospitals. 
Having in mind that private health insurance plans pay more, it is 
easily understandable why medical corporations on hospital manage-
ment boards want the expansion of private plans, leaving the SUS only 
for people considered extremely poor. It is important to reaffirm that, 
when one speaks of certification as a charitable and philanthropic en-
tity, the legal possibility of a tax waiver by the government is involved. 
In other words, the legislation grants exemption from certain taxes in 
exchange for public services, provided for the needy population and 
funded by the SUS. The tax waiver necessarily entails the provision of 
these services, and it is in this aspect that medical corporations have 
great relevance. In their political actions, these corporations associate 
the demand for a tax waiver with the argument for the expansion of 
private health insurance and the decrease of their obligations towards 
the SUS, an attitude that compromises the universalising principles 
stated in the Brazilian Constitution.
Researchers of the role played by philanthropy in the SUS have 
drawn a distinction between traditional philanthropic entities and 
those following an entrepreneurial model.55 The former, true heirs 
to the Christian charitable practices, provide services almost exclu-
sively to those in need and are all but fully funded by the SUS and 
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by supplementary public funds. This is the situation in which houses 
of mercy find themselves, especially those in inland towns in the 
state of São Paulo. The others, which generally separate facilities 
intended for SUS patients from those for private patients, operate 
politically as described above. This is the case, for example, of São 
Paulo Misericórdia, which has built facilities to receive private patients 
exclusively. On the other hand, São Paulo Hospital has never had, 
in all its history, more than 5% of its revenue derived from fully 
private resources, even though the Minutes of the Society Members’ 
Meetings show the need to increase the number of private beds so as 
to improve funding for its activities. After the creation of the INPS, 
in 1966, the dependence on resources from social security was very 
heavy, as has been pointed out. These resources, however, were 
distributed and managed by the state, according to the military 
dictatorship’s intention of universalising health care through social 
security, although this never materialised. 
Therefore, Brazilian health care would continue to be regulated 
by public powers, but provided through multiple types of agreement 
involving institutional obligations between the public and private 
spheres. This historically constructed trend would be further consoli-
dated with the 1990 Managerial Reform of the State, which gave legal 
status to the juridical entity of the Social Organisations.56 These were 
private institutions which could also benefit from its philanthropic 
status, and which were incentivised to apply for the management 
of public service providers. 
In 1994, the Society started operating joint primary care pro-
grammes with municipalities and states, independently from the 
activities of the Hospital. This would lead to the SPDM’s certification 
as a SO in 1998. This expansion process of the Society, which would 
turn it into the most important manager of public service providers 
in the state of São Paulo in the early twenty-first century, was based 
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on the SPDM’s relations with the School and on its management of 
São Paulo Hospital, since the public medical school and its teaching 
hospital offered academic support that justified that expansion.
Final Considerations
Throughout the twentieth century, philanthropy was defined 
as publicly relevant action which was not for the pursuit of profit. 
According to this definition, direct-management public institutions 
and philanthropic institutions could be considered qualified to pro-
vide public health care services funded by the INPS/INAMPS or, after 
1998, directly by the SUS. This pattern of expansion of individual 
health care activities resulted in the growth of the private hospital 
network and blurred the distinction between public and private in 
the Brazilian health care system. 
A hybrid system was, thus, historically created which is explained 
by the pervasiveness of misericordia and filantrópicos in Brazil and 
by the urgency of structuring a unified health system after 1988.57 
This situation also opened a private gateway into SUS which com-
petes with public spaces and services, within these very hospitals, 
for public funding. This competition takes place in different ways, 
since the SPH, as discussed here, has always received patients coming 
mostly from the INPS/INAMPS or the SUS, whereas Albert Einstein 
Hospital, for example, despite being considered a philanthropic 
hospital according to the same regulations, gives preference to private 
patients. A single group of laws promotes distinct inequalities. This 
is possible because large philanthropic hospitals can be accredited 
as SOs and remotely manage public service providers, leaving their 
own beds out of the equation.
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Any assumption that Brazil has transitioned from philanthro-
py-linked charity, which characterised its early health care experience, 
to public health, is refuted by the resilience of historically constructed 
medical practices and public service management practices. What is 
more, these practices have been sanctioned by the same Constitution 
that stated the universality of the right to health. In this context, the 
connection between private charity/philanthropy and public funding 
explained private charity’s difficulty in collecting enough donations. 
At the same time, the government considered that building hospitals 
and organising health care for the entire population with physicians, 
assistants and nurses directly paid by the Treasury was too steep 
an investment. 
The Christian and private origins of charitable and/or phil-
anthropic practices impacted the contemporary construction of 
citizenship, given that Brazilian hospital provision has always been 
located between citizenship entitlement and hierarchical benevo-
lence, between the possibilities of creation of public spaces and the 
permanence of private actions that establish themselves as public, 
thus taking the place of the state. These private activities receive 
tax exemption privileges and select their clientele and their areas of 
operation without regard to the public interest. Moreover, Christian 
compassion, the basis for charitable actions, brought with itself a 
hierarchy between charitable givers and receivers. These latter nev-
er participated in the political decisions concerning how to relieve 
suffering caused by poverty and disease. Most of the time, it was 
nothing but charitable compassion enfolded into social hierarchies 
that were thus legitimised.58
If solidarity was at the basis of what some Enlightenment thinkers 
proposed for a world based on the pact among equal citizens, the 
survival of Christian charity in the health care structures developed 
in Brazil since the nineteenth century has hampered the under-
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standing of health care as a universal right. The idea of Christian 
private charity had a public dimension and became, in the Brazilian 
experience, a political motivation for segmentation of clientele and 
for obtaining private advantages. This, however, is history under 
construction. The SUS, Brazil’s greatest social achievement after the 
end of the military dictatorship, belongs to all Brazilians, who are 
still awaiting its effective consolidation.
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Chapter 3
Principles and Problems of Hospital Funding  
in Germany in the Twentieth Century
Axel C. Hüntelmann 
(Charité—University Medicine Berlin)
Nearly every historical or contemporary publication dealing with 
health insurance and hospital economics in West Germany since the 
1960s starts by complaining about the deficiencies of the current health 
care system and its lack of funding.1 Be the authors hospital physicians, 
complaining about their out-dated or missing equipment, or politicians, 
railing against the rising costs of hospitals and medical technology, 
regardless of the money spent, it is never enough. 
Since the late 1960s, numerous expert commissions, established 
by the government, have analysed and proposed reforms to the West 
German health care system and hospital funding. The result has been 
a near-perpetual reign of reform: no sooner has one structural reform 
been elaborated and implemented, than a new initiative gets underway 
designed to reduce health care costs, especially hospital expenditures.2 
As to the causes of the rise in health care expenditure, government 
officials and health care policy experts have identified ever more ex-
pensive technical equipment, an overcapacity of beds, and a general 
lack of efficient cost management. Hospital economists have suggested 
reducing bed capacities and improving hospital management, while 
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financial experts recommend competition between hospitals and health 
care institutions as a means of reducing costs. Such policy prescrip-
tions have prompted German politicians, health care professionals, 
and patient groups to complain about an increasing economisation and 
commodification of health care.3
Although at a first glance the debate about the economisation of 
health care and insufficient hospital funding seems to be relatively new, 
in fact it dates back at least to the late eighteenth or early nineteenth 
century when the hospital became a “modern” medical institution.4 
But in contrast to the large number of political publications complaining 
about insufficient resources and suggesting improvements to hospital 
finance, there have been only a few publications addressing the his-
tory of hospital finance in Germany. Whereas for Britain there exists 
a rich literature on the history of hospital accounting5 and finance,6 
for Germany there are only few local case studies, mainly focussed on 
the early modern period and the nineteenth century.7
Sometimes publications dealing with current hospital management 
issues sketch the history of hospital finance, but mainly as a pre-history 
to more contemporary developments or problems in the second half of 
the twentieth century.8 And these publications pay scant attention to 
the socio-political and cultural historical background. Publications on 
the history of public health care in twentieth century Germany likewise 
ignore or marginalise hospital finance. The same is true for historical 
studies on medical institutions, which have focused first and foremost 
on hospitals and medical faculties during the national socialist era 
or—inspired by the work of Michel Foucault and because of rich source 
material—on the history of mental hospitals.
In light of these historiographic shortcomings, this text examines 
the principles and development of hospital funding and finance in 
Germany in the twentieth century and major shifts in this history. 
An analysis of hospital funding can facilitate broader insight into 
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the structure and financing of public health care in Germany. It also 
illuminates the interrelationship between health insurance and hospital 
funding, and the effects and problems it has spawned. As a consequence 
of the shift from care to cure, as hospitals were transformed into med-
ical institutions in the nineteenth century, hospital expenses increased 
(as did national health care budgets). As part of this process, hospitals 
were forced to reduce costs at any price and, as I argue, in the last dec-
ades of the twentieth century the hospital’s character changed from a 
charitable or welfare institution and a public enterprise, which served 
and was responsible to the community, into a profit-orientated enterprise. 
This transformation has led to ongoing conflicts between neo-liberal 
ideas and profit-driven goals on the one hand, and humanistic ideals 
and practical health care concerns on the other; conflicts between 
neo-liberal and social health care policy experts, between hospital man-
agers, physicians and hospital staff. As both social welfare institutions 
and as important components of public health care systems, hospitals 
have for more than a century been hailed as features of modernity 
and progress, essential to the preservation of the healthy fighting and 
working bodies needed to defend the country (in the inter-national 
struggle for survival) and to enhance the national stock of human capital. 
But over the past few decades, with the rapid economisation of medicine 
and commodification of health care, health has been reduced to a 
cost-factor in debates about ailing public finances.
In addressing the principles and prehistory of hospital funding in 
Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, this text relies 
on secondary literature on the history of hospitals, hospital finances, 
and public health care. For the second half of the twentieth century, 
the study is based on contemporary sources and manuals about hospital 
economics and management. 
I will begin with a sketch of the German system of hospital finance, 
starting with principles that had evolved in the early modern period 
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and during the nineteenth century. Then I describe the establishment 
of statutory health insurance in the 1880s and its importance for hos-
pital funding, followed by sections on changes during the Wilhelmine 
Empire, the Weimar Republic, and the 1930s. I then summarise the 
history of hospital finance in the 1950s and 1960s, before a longer 
section describes developments since the 1970s during a period of 
ongoing reforms. Due to limitations of space, these sections focus 
mainly on West Germany. I conclude by analysing the changes and 
problems of hospital funding in Germany during the twentieth century. 
Pre-history of hospital finance in Germany until the  
introduction of statutory health insurance
The history of hospital finance in Germany (and especially the 
health insurance laws of the 1880s) is incomprehensible without 
taking account of its prehistory. In the middle ages and in early 
modern times, hospitals were commonly hospices, alms houses and 
infirmaries. At this time there was little difference between hospitals 
in German territories and other states.9 This changed during an era of 
absolutist state-building and the establishment of statehood in com-
peting German principalities. In absolutist states, population policy 
and public health care were issues of public order and the common 
good was deemed to be the responsibility of the state or sovereign, 
as articulated in publications on population policy by Johann Peter 
Süßmilch or on medical police by Johann Peter Frank.10
Up until the end of the nineteenth century, hospital operating costs 
were comprised mainly of expenses for staff, food, clothing, lighting, 
heating, and the maintenance of buildings and furniture. Medical 
treatment and instruments comprised only a small fraction of a 
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hospital’s outlay.11 The structure of hospital expenses changed after 
1900, a development that also prompted efforts to increase hospital 
income, as we will see below.
In the early nineteenth century, hospitals were owned mostly 
by cities, the state or the church. The owners of large hospitals usually 
provided the land, buildings and various forms of funding. Having 
often originated from earlier donations of land or capital, hospitals 
generated income from capital interest or rents of land and houses, 
such as Hubertus-Spital in Düsseldorf or Julius-Spital in Würzburg,12 
or from contributions made by prosperous landed estates. Further-
more, some hospitals generated income from privileges granted to 
them by the state (like special customs, taxes or fees for certificates),13 
from cultivating land, or from profit yielded by the hospital’s own 
household economy. Another important source of income was gov-
ernment or municipal subsidies granted especially for treating the 
poor. Hospital owners would normally reimburse hospitals for budget 
overruns.14 University hospitals and medical schools were special cas-
es: their educational responsibilities imposed additional costs which, 
in turn, had to be subsidised by the state. During the nineteenth century, 
as a proportion of hospital income, donations decreased rapidly, while 
at the same time state and municipal subsidies grew.15
By 1800, hospitals in Germany were already generating revenue 
from patient fees and this source of income increased rapidly during 
the nineteenth century.16 Dating back to early modern times, guilds 
had ‘rented’ their ‘own’ rooms in hospices where members (especially 
journeymen) were cared for when sick or injured; and over time these 
arrangements evolved into hospital subscription schemes. Furthermore, 
since the early nineteenth century various forms of voluntary health 
and hospital insurance plans helped establish and fund hospitals.17 
In Bremen and Würzburg, for instance, associations of craftsmen and 
domestic servants were established to pay for members’ hospital care 
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
10010.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
or treatment.18 From the 1830s, population growth, urbanisation, and 
the erosion of traditional communities prompted municipalities to 
establish guild- and employer-based insurance schemes. As a result, 
from mid-century various forms of (sometimes mandatory) local health 
insurance or hospital subscription plans became a permanent source 
of hospital revenue. In the long run, it appears that the establishment 
of statutory health insurance in the German Empire in 1883 was part of 
a structural shift rather than a turning point or milestone in the history 
of the welfare state.19
Establishment of statutory health insurance in Germany  
and its consequences for hospital funding
In June 1883, the German government began implementing a 
statutory health insurance programme for industrial workers with an 
annual income less than 2,000 marks, soon to be followed by accident 
insurance in 1884, and old age pension insurance in 1889. Both workers 
and their employers contributed to the health insurance programme, 
which was based on principles of reciprocity and solidarity, meaning 
that every person paying contributions was entitled to certain benefits: 
visits to the doctor, medication, hospital care, and limited sick-pay 
were covered. Prima facie, the programme aimed to protect industrial 
workers in case of temporary illness and prevent them from becoming 
impoverished. In principle, however, the health insurance programmes 
merely centralised the existing system of municipal and regional health 
insurance schemes. Furthermore, health insurance was not the main 
focus of Bismarck’s social security legislation and was designed only 
to bridge the period following an accident and to cover claims related 
to industrial injuries. For this reason, the benefits were limited to the 
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insured worker and did not extend to other family members. Further-
more, in the mid-1880s only about ten per cent of the population was 
included in the programme. And finally, the government established 
social insurance with the aim of pacifying and co-opting the working 
class after having implemented anti-Socialist legislation in 1878 that 
outlawed the Social Democrat Party and suppressed workers’ rights 
to organise.20
In subsequent decades, statutory health insurance had—albeit 
often limited—consequences for hospitals and hospital funding because 
more people had access to and were able to afford hospital treatment. 
In addition, the number of people willing to visit hospitals was increas-
ing, mainly for two reasons. First and foremost, with improvements in 
medical therapy more people placed their hopes in hospital treatment, 
resulting in a rise in the number of in-patient admissions. Second, older 
health funds had different payment schemes: most resolved claims 
by disbursing money directly to the member as compensation for lost 
income (or medical treatment); others executed payments for medical 
services directly to physicians or hospitals. In the first case, members 
often preferred to take the money, purchase medication, and remain 
home in order to avoid expensive hospital visits. After the introduction 
of statutory health insurance, members were compensated for income 
loss and had access to hospital care.21
After statutory health insurance had been implemented, a great 
number of local health insurance associations were founded and reg-
istered with the Imperial Insurance Office. Some of these associa-
tions had emerged from older associations of factory workers, guilds, 
and occupational associations. Of varying size, ranging from hundreds 
to thousands of members, these groups soon amalgamated into larger 
district organisations.22 In subsequent decades, more and more workers 
and employees became members of health insurance funds, which in 
turn generated additional burdens on hospitals’ administrative staff. 
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In general, a hospital charged patients for the number of days they 
had stayed at the hospital, based on a daily rate that covered hospital 
operating costs, like food and accommodation. At the end of a pa-
tient’s hospital stay, in addition to the daily rates, hospitals also billed 
for more expensive medical treatments.23 Billing procedures varied 
depending on the patient’s status: if patients stayed at the hospital of 
their own account, they were billed directly and had to pay part of their 
bill in advance. If patients were insured or impoverished, they had to 
provide evidence of their membership of an insurance programme or 
present official certification of their indigence in order to ensure that 
their hospital expenses would be paid for by the municipal welfare 
authority. Costly medical treatment often had to be pre-approved by 
health insurance or welfare officials if they were to reimburse hospitals 
for the additional expenses.24
 
Changes in hospital funding around 1910
Between the 1880s and the 1910s, German society witnessed a de-
mographic and sociopolitical sea change: the population grew rapidly 
from 41 million in 1871 to 64 million people by 1910, and people from 
the countryside migrated into overcrowded cities. Besides urbanisation, 
rapid industrialisation compromised the working and living conditions 
of large parts of the population. The German Empire became a leading 
industrial nation, entangled in numerous international conflicts in the 
era of imperialism. On the other hand, mortality rates declined as food 
production improved, infectious diseases were checked, new medical 
innovations were introduced, and new hospitals and other medical 
institutions were constructed. The health of the nation’s population 
manifested itself in falling rates of mortality and morbidity; rising 
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numbers of hospital beds were considered to be signs of progress 
and modernity.25 In Berlin, for instance, where the population more 
than doubled from 826,000 in 1871 to 1.9 million in 1900, the Charité 
hospital was complemented by four new community hospitals, founded 
between 1872 and 1906. The growing number of physicians trained 
at medical schools facilitated medical innovations and specialisation; 
in addition to municipal and confessional hospitals, numerous small 
private clinics were established, usually owned and operated by 
consultants, housed in regular apartments or houses, and often counting 
only a small number of beds.26
These developments not only increased the number of patients 
but changed their status as well. In 1883, only a small proportion of 
the national population had been eligible to benefit from statutory 
health insurance, but by 1914 nearly all sectors of production, trade 
and agriculture were included. In addition to workers, servants and 
craftsmen, salaried employees as well as their relatives could now 
also receive benefits.27 Consolidated in district organisations, health 
insurance funds expanded their bargaining power vis-à-vis general 
practitioners. This led to a number of serious disputes between health 
insurance funds and physicians, to doctors’ strikes, and to the foundation 
of the “Hartmannbund”, a professional association aiming ‘to protect 
the economic interests of physicians and the medical profession’.28 
By comparison, health insurance funds had little leverage when it came 
to bargaining with municipal and state hospitals which treated hundreds 
and thousands of patients. Funds offset this imbalance by diversifying 
the health care benefits they offered to their members.
As they incorporated new medical innovations and expensive 
therapies, hospitals modified their accounting practices and sched-
uled special tariffs for novel treatments like chemo- or serum thera-
py and for laboratory analyses and other diagnostic techniques like 
x-rays. After 1900 hospitals started to publish leaflets showing their 
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daily rates, dietary schemes and charges for medical services.29 What 
started, for instance, at the community hospital in Düsseldorf around 
1910 as a four-page leaflet soon became a twelve-page brochure in the 
1920s.30 As a consequence of these innovations, costs per patient rose 
from 11.05 marks in 1885 to 28.49 marks in 1914,31 which spawned 
renewed complaints about rising costs for medical care and hospital 
treatment.32 But beyond treatment usually covered by health insurance, 
special services were listed for different classes of patients. For example, 
the brochure of the Düsseldorf community hospital listed additional ser-
vices for first-class patients like special meals or larger hospital rooms.33 
The differentiation helped to attract middle- and upper-class patients 
who might previously have avoided hospitals which were still struggling 
to overcome their reputation as working-class or pauper institutions. By 
offering more expensive services and accommodation, hospitals could 
generate additional income directly from the patient. These additional 
services point to a characteristic of the German system that is valid to 
this day: hospitals charge standard rates for medical services covered 
by statutory health insurance, but alternatively, if patients are enrolled 
in private health insurance plans (or willing to pay additional expenses 
on their own), they can receive extra services.
Another characteristic of German health insurance funds was their 
autonomous self-administration, with employees and employers equally 
represented in their supervising committees.34 Employee representatives 
tried to expand—often successfully—the range of medical services 
covered by their plans,35 helping to attract new members in competition 
with other funds.36 A steady influx of new, healthy employees allowed 
funds to provide more generous benefits. But for smaller funds, a few 
cases of severe illness could put their solvency at risk. It turned out 
that many smaller funds had overextended themselves, forcing them 
to either reduce their benefits or go bankrupt. On occasion the Imperial 
Insurance Office had to intervene. As a consequence of these risks, social 
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security programs were substantially revised, and the Imperial Insurance 
Code enforced in 1911. The so-called Reichsversicherungsordnung came 
into force on 1 January 1914 and remained essentially unchanged until 
the 1970s. The new code standardised funds and services, enlarged the 
group of people included in statutory health insurance, diminished 
the influence of employees in the committees and prescribed that health 
insurance funds had to have a minimum number of members. All these 
measures were thought to consolidate the funds’ financial situation and 
reduce the risk of bankruptcy.37
Changes in hospital funding in the 1920s
The First World War and post-war turmoil delayed the effects of 
the Imperial Insurance Code on hospitals and hospital finance until 
1919. Indeed, well into the 1920s, hospitals confronted a number 
of severe problems which can be illustrated using the example of 
the Charité hospital in Berlin. During the war, many Charité physi-
cians had been called up for military service causing a shortage of 
staff at a time when hospitals also had to treat wounded soldiers. 
In addition to the political turmoil,38 the war’s effects on public health 
saw hospitals struggling to cope with rising numbers of patients, 
especially invalided veterans and malnourished patients with de-
ficiency diseases. Food shortages, rising prices and ultimately the 
hyperinflation of 1923 all placed severe strains on hospital finances.39 
Staff wages were also rising: before the war it had been common 
for nurses and ward staff to work ten to twelve hours a day; but at 
the end of the war public institutions were forced to pay standard 
wages and implement the eight-hour workday. Thus, hospitals had 
to hire additional staff to compensate for the reduced working hours. 
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The Charité also faced additional problems specific to its role as a 
military hospital, subsidised by the war ministry and responsible 
for educating and employing military surgeons. The demobilisation 
of military staff caused further personnel shortages and a reduction 
in subsidies, thus requiring new civilian staff to be hired and again 
boosting personnel costs.40
All of this turmoil was reflected in the hospital’s accounting prac-
tices during and after the war: since 1915, no regular budget had been 
drafted; the budget for 1916 had simply been extended every year until 
1924; and the Charité operated on quarterly financial reports used to 
justify ongoing state subsidies. Whereas before the war hospital admin-
istrators had meticulously calculated daily catering rates, after the war 
existing rates were simply adjusted for inflation.41
One way of dealing with rising expenditures and generating more 
revenue involved increasing the daily catering rates or the fees charged 
for medical services and treatment. But galloping inflation soon made 
the calculation of daily rates impractical. Furthermore, at times of 
hyperinflation, the pre-payment of hospital charges became problem-
atic in the case of long-term patients. And because economic turmoil 
exacerbated the inability of patients and health insurance funds to pay 
for medical services, the hospital’s outstanding accounts ballooned and 
often remained unsettled for longer periods of time, sometimes having 
to be written off entirely. To make a long story short: expenditures rose 
much faster than income, generating enormous deficits. Public hospital 
owners, who previously had subsidised these deficits, now shortened or 
cut public funding due to their own financial straits. To finance short-
term funding gaps, hospitals like the Charité accumulated enormous 
liabilities which came due in the post-war period. Although the situation 
stabilised after the currency reform in 1924, tensions remained well into 
the 1920s and were revived five years later by the global economic crisis 
and the Great Depression.42
Hospital Funding in Germany
107 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
Exacerbating these difficulties, health insurance funds did not 
simply acquiesce to rising daily hospital rates. As a result of the Imperial 
Insurance Code, health insurance funds had merged and, representing 
thousands of insured members, had become large and powerful organ-
isations. Faced with their own financial challenges, health insurance 
funds also had to cut spending drastically and began pushing general 
practitioners into contracts with lower fees for medical treatment or 
establishing so-called ambulatories (Ambulatorien),43 i.e. out-patient 
polyclinics run and staffed by health insurance funds themselves. 
General practitioners and hospitals viewed these facilities as a major 
threat to their market dominance in the area of medical services.44 Health 
insurance funds also began to question the amount and composition of 
daily hospital rates in the 1920s. For instance, one local health insurance 
fund (AOK) asked the Municipal Hospital in Düsseldorf why its daily 
rates were higher than those of other local and regional hospitals.45 
Rising costs and the composition of rate-schedules became an on-going 
topic in discussions between health insurance funds, hospitals and 
public health institutions.46
Also in the mix were a diverse array of private clinics that had 
evolved especially since the 1890s. Some of these facilities counted 
only a couple of beds and were located in apartment blocks, often in 
the neighbourhood of a consultant’s practice. Medical school professors 
sometimes ‘owned’ these private clinics or else they rented and main-
tained rooms or beds in larger hospitals, where they treated wealthy 
patients. Often these clinics existed only for a couple of years and then 
vanished. These private clinics, with the notable exception of larger 
sanatoria, were relatively small; they filled a medical niche, and their 
owners were consultants or medical specialists. Furthermore, they were 
often exclusive, offering specialised, costly, or alternative treatments. 
And because they were not registered and reimbursed by health insur-
ance schemes, conflicts between them were rare.47
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After a short period of economic stability, discussions about cost 
cutting started all over again during the world economic crisis in the 
early 1930s. In these conflicts, funds became even more important 
because nearly all professional groups and their family members were 
covered by statutory health insurance. In addition, the introduction 
of unemployment insurance in the 1920s saw the unemployed also 
being covered by health insurance funds, as were retirees in the 1930s. 
At the beginning of the 1930s, payments from health insurance funds 
had become the main source of hospital income.48 However, disputes 
about hospital financing demonstrate the plurality of actors involved 
in negotiations on different institutional, local, regional, and national 
levels: health insurance funds representing employers and employees, 
physicians and other medical practitioners, as well as hospitals (all of 
which were represented by their respective district or national associa-
tions) interacted with public health and regulatory institutions, like the 
Imperial Insurance Office or the Ministries of Interior or Health, with 
municipalities or public-private corporations (like the Red Cross or the 
church), or other hospital owners, and finally even with political parties 
of all stripes. But in subsequent years, this pluralism came to an end.
The monistic structure of hospital funding and other  
changes in the National Socialist era
After the National Socialist Party had come to power, it used the 
conflicts between hospitals, practitioners and insurance funds as an oc-
casion to intervene in health policy and restrict the contractually-agreed 
rights of health insurance funds, physicians and hospitals. As concerns 
hospital funding,49 these restrictions began in August 1933 when health 
insurance funds were prohibited from offering health care services like 
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the above mentioned ambulatories.50 In addition, a third-party agent 
was installed to mediate between and resolve conflicts of interest: the 
Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians [Kassenärztliche 
Vereinigung]. The Association negotiated fees and prices centrally and 
processed the settlement of bills and the distribution of payments. 
Only physicians who were organised in this centralised and semi-public 
association were allowed to bill insured patients and, vice versa, pay-
ments for insured patients were processed through the Association. 
Prima facie, the Association should pacify conflicts between health in-
surance funds and physicians. But the closure of out-patient facilities 
run by health insurance funds was designed to dismiss Jewish and 
socialist physicians who often held these posts. The Kassenärztliche 
Vereinigung became an obligatory and narrow clearing house for in-
surance payments and, because only ‘Aryan’ physicians could become 
members of the Association, Jewish (and socialist) practitioners were 
excluded from this vital source of income. They were only allowed to 
treat private Jewish patients, and, for a while, to work in privately-run 
clinics. The foundation of the Association has to be understood as an 
effort to centralise and exploit social policy for nationalist bio-politics, 
embedded in the realisation of the race-based eugenic-state. In addition, 
the establishment of the Kassenärztliche Vereinigung further co-opted 
physicians and their professional organisations into the Nazi-state.51
Additional political interventions in 1936 had an enormous 
impact on hospital funding. Until then hospitals had been increas-
ing daily rates to finance rising expenses. As a consequence, public 
spending for hospital treatment continued to rise. The so-called 
Price-Stop-Decree (Preis-Stopp-Verordnung) fixed prices for medical 
care and treatment and was not rescinded until 1948. Furthermore, 
as part of the enforced political co-optation affecting all fields of 
medicine, the so-called monistic principle of hospital funding had 
been implemented. Heretofore, hospitals had been free to enter into 
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contractual arrangements with private persons, insurance funds, and 
municipalities (or federal states) and could subsidise the construction 
of new buildings or expensive equipment (beside budgeting deficits). 
But the new law stipulated that all income had to originate from one 
single (monistic) source. The duration of a patient’s hospital stay was 
calculated using a centrally fixed daily rate that took into account 
expenses for food, staff and maintenance; and medical treatments 
were calculated using a fixed expense ratio and the sum for care and 
cure billed to (and financed by) the patient’s health insurance fund. 
In principle, hospitals’ income from health insurance funds had to 
cover all of their costs (Selbstkostendeckungsprinzip).52 Medical schools 
were able to apply to the Ministry of Education for extra money to 
pay for scientific equipment and expenses related to teaching.
The monistic principle also affected direct payers. In 1936, self-em-
ployed individuals or those with high levels of income (above the 
assessment ceiling and thus exempt from social security contributions) 
could pay hospitals directly. But with the implementation of the mo-
nistic principle this was no longer possible, forcing these individuals 
to insure themselves in so-called private medical insurance funds.53
The so-called monistic principle represented the starting point 
of direct state intervention and regulation of hospital organisation: 
hospitals were obliged to enter into contracts; prices for care and 
medical treatment were fixed; health care administrators centrally 
planned the supply of hospital beds and the construction of hospitals 
(Krankenhaus- und Bettenbedarfsplan); and hospitals were financed 
solely by statutory or private health insurance funds. This led to 
two main problems for the future. Although regulated by the state, 
hospital funding remained difficult, especially during the war.54 
In addition to implementing general cost reduction programmes, 
hospital administrators tried to compensate for deficits and funding 
shortfalls by suspending maintenance work or deferring necessary 
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capital investments. Second, hospitals became dependent on health 
insurance funds as their sole source of revenue, a problem which, 
as we shall see, preoccupied administrators for decades to come.
 
Hospital funding in the post-war period through the late 1960s
During and after the Second World War, the entire welfare and health 
care system collapsed. On the one hand, the situation was similar to that 
after the First World War: wounded soldiers and invalids returning home 
needed urgent medical treatment, infectious diseases like tuberculosis 
and deficiency diseases drove a steady stream of patients into already 
overcrowded hospitals, while at the same time one third of the health 
care infrastructure, including hospitals, had been damaged or destroyed.55 
On the other hand, everything remained unchanged: hospitals were 
generally operated by municipalities (92%) and to a lesser extent by 
churches (5%) and private owners (3%); hospital fees were still fixed at 
1936 levels and the monistic system of financing continued. In the initial 
chaos of the post-war era, hospitals complained that financial restrictions 
prevented them from guaranteeing proper care and cure. In June 1948 
price controls ended on medical services and daily hospital rates (Pre-
is-Freigabe-Anordnung). But in response, a couple of months later, health 
insurance funds complained that without price controls, they would go 
bankrupt. And so again, rates for daily care and medical treatment were 
fixed, but this time at a higher level than before (Pflegesatzanordnung).56
After the currency reform and the foundation of two different German 
states, further adjustments became necessary in West Germany. There, 
in September 1954, the government passed a law implementing rules 
on hospital fees.57 Subsequently, a commission consisting of members of 
the health insurance funds, hospitals and civil servants from the Federal 
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Health Office and later from the Federal Ministry of Health negotiated 
the daily rates and fees for medical treatment and regularly adjusted 
them to account for inflation.58
The implementation rules stipulated that hospital fees cover the 
institution’s own operating costs (Selbstkosten), including food, accommo-
dation, medical treatment and basic maintenance. Marie-Theres Starke 
has shown that the term Selbstkosten meant different things depending 
on whether an institution was a charitable or a business enterprise: in the 
fee schedules of charitable institutions there was no accounting for profits 
or for interest rates on equity capital. But more importantly, there was 
no provision for long-term capital investments in larger medical devices 
nor for the construction or restoration of war-ravaged physical plant.59
De facto, the daily rates led to an under-funding of health care 
institutions. Ultimately, deficits had to be covered by hospital owners 
or bank loans. Analysing the long-standing structural causes of the 
deficits, Starke pointed to the charitable origins of hospital financing 
which had tended to separate donations for land and buildings and 
the overall planning of bed-capacities from the hospital’s ongoing 
fee-based economy and operating costs.60
In the context of these concerns, health insurance funds played an 
ambiguous role. Like hospitals, they too were part of the commission 
charged with negotiating health care fees. But since hospitals’ main 
source of revenue was derived from patient fees paid for by health 
insurance funds, the funds had no interest in higher fees. Moreover, 
neither the funds themselves nor anyone else believed they should be 
responsible for constructing hospitals or promoting technical innova-
tions. In addition, the West German government was loath to increase 
the health insurance rates in order to finance the modernisation of 
hospitals. Government officials feared that rising health insurance con-
tributions would increase labour costs and threaten the competitiveness 
of Germany’s still fragile post-war economy. 
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All of this points to a fundamental problem of the monistic prin-
ciple of hospital funding in twentieth-century Germany: hospitals’ 
dependency on health insurance funds as their sole source of income 
exposed them to the interests of employers and employees and tied their 
financial wherewithal to the vagaries of the market economy. Economic 
recessions forced hospitals do draw on their reserves, resulting in tech-
nical equipment and hospital buildings (much of which dated back to 
the 1930s or the turn of the century) becoming outdated in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Physicians complained about inadequate equipment and 
about German medical science falling behind international standards.61 
As early as the 1950s, contemporary concerns about the investment 
backlog led to renewed calls by politicians and health care policy experts 
for a reform of hospital funding.62
The following discussion focuses on West Germany for two main 
reasons. At first, the development and problems of hospitals as such in 
West and East Germany were quite similar until the 1960s. Franz Knieps 
and Hartmut Reiners have concluded that, due to deferred investments, 
there was little difference between hospitals in West and East Germany 
until the 1970s.63 And second, the system of hospital funding and the 
debates about lacking money, beginning in the 1960s in West Germany, 
continued onwards in the 1990s in the unified Germany. Nevertheless, 
it has to be mentioned that the funding of hospitals in East Germany was 
quite different. Social security and the health sector, and hospitals as part 
of it, were financed partly by workers’ and employees’ social security 
contributions, organised and administrated by the Free Federation of 
German Trade Unions (FDGB) and by direct state subsidies. According 
to the type and size of a hospital, the money was re-distributed using 
centralised expenses- and bed capacity-plans. Booklets about health 
economics and hospital funding published mainly undifferentiated 
figures about increasing amounts of money successfully spent on health 
and hospitals. Thus, complaints about crumbling buildings, lack of 
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medicine and out-dated equipment were not discussed in public as in 
West Germany, though people could write petitions to governmental 
authorities, asking for instance for additional medicine or specific 
medical treatments.64
The shift from monistic to dualistic funding in the early 1970s
In the 1960s, several attempts were undertaken to reform the 
system of hospital funding in West Germany, which by 1966 had seen 
hospital deficits balloon to 1.355 billion marks. The Federal Minister 
for Employment drafted two bills—both of which were opposed by 
various interest groups and ultimately rejected—and created a commis-
sion with the task of evaluating the effectiveness of the social security 
system.65 The Ministry of Health, headed by Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, 
created another commission tasked with evaluating the hospitals’ 
financial situation, their demand for new buildings and their need for 
new technical investments. This commission’s report, the so-called 
Hospital Enquête of 1969, concluded—not surprisingly—that the exist-
ing structure did not ensure adequate medical care for the population 
and that hospitals produced an annual deficit of between 800 million 
and two billion marks.66 The commission’s suggestions were included 
in a new law that came into effect in June 1972: The Hospital Funding 
Law (Krankenhausfinanzierungsgesetz). 
The Hospital Funding Law represented a fundamental shift in the 
system of hospitals finance. It replaced the monistic funding structure 
with a so-called dual structure. Patient fees, charged and invoiced by 
hospitals to health insurance funds for the care and medical treatment 
of their members, remained a key source of hospital revenue. But the 
construction of new buildings, the modernisation of older ones and 
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investment in new technical equipment were now financed directly 
by federal and state governments. Ensuring adequate health care in-
frastructure, especially a sufficient number of hospital beds, came to 
be defined as a public task. 
The Hospital Funding Law sought to combine divergent aims. 
First, the law aimed to secure the economic viability of hospitals and 
put their finances on a sound footing. Second, the law was designed 
to ensure adequate health care for the general population. And third, 
these aims needed to be achieved within the framework of socially 
acceptable social security contribution rates. The dual funding structure 
sought to ensure, on the one hand, the modernisation of hospitals and 
medical care. On the other hand, state funding of capital investments 
was intended to ensure that social security and health insurance con-
tributions would not increase and thus put German companies and the 
economy in general at a disadvantage in international competition.67
As a consequence of the new law, the investment backlog was elim-
inated and a decade of major investment in modern equipment and new 
buildings ensued. The state’s commitment to investment in health care 
infrastructure occurred against the backdrop of a sea change in German 
politics. Until the end of the 1960s, liberal-conservative governments 
(Christian-Democrats in coalition with Liberals) focused on economic 
growth and a balanced budget. The Social Democrats joined the con-
servative government as junior partners in 1966 and in 1969 became 
the ruling party, changing the political landscape of West Germany.68
After the reconstruction of Germany and the ‘economic miracle’ of 
the 1950s and 1960s, Social Democrats embarked on policies of economic 
redistribution. Although the oil crisis pushed the West German econo-
my into recession in 1973 and threatened to upend increased spending 
on health care infrastructure, Social Democrats embarked on a policy 
of deficit spending in hopes of stimulating the economy.69 The money 
spent by the state on investments in hospital infrastructure tripled from 
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one billion marks in 1972 to 3.5 billion in 1973, while expenses incurred 
by hospitals for treatment and care and paid for by health insurance 
increased from 9.4 billion marks in 1972 to 25.4 billion in 1980.70
Soon, conservative politicians and health insurance funds com-
plained about skyrocketing costs in the health care sector, predicting 
the system’s imminent collapse. New technical devices and large-
scale equipment (like computer tomography and magnetic resonance 
imaging), and the computerisation of medical diagnostics helped to 
drive costs upward. In general, the costs of medical treatment and 
care rose and health insurance funds accrued debts which they tried 
to compensate by raising health insurance contributions from 14% of 
earned wages (half of which was paid by the employer and half by the 
employee) in 1967 to 19.2% in 1985. In the mid-1970s, the Christian 
Democratic Minister of Social Affairs in the state of Rhineland-Palati-
nate, Heiner Geißler, warned that the total expenditure for health care 
was on track to triple and the employee’s health insurance contribution 
would increase from 8.1% to 13.1% of earned wages. In this context, 
Geißler introduced the politically controversial and polemical term 
“cost explosion” (Kostenexplosion).71
In addition to expansive and expensive investments, other 
aspects of the Hospital Funding Law were also subject to scrutiny in 
the 1970s. Critics lamented the lack of effective cost control mechanisms 
and complained that hospitals were wasting public money. In general, 
more and more voices raised doubts about whether hospitals were 
a public good and the public’s responsibility, reinvigorating claims 
that hospitals produced marketable services just like other enterpris-
es.72 Furthermore, since 1972 the federal government had calculated 
the demand for hospital beds centrally in an effort to overcome the 
backlog in infrastructure investment. Since these investments also 
affected the outlays of the federal states (which were responsible for 
a portion of the infrastructure spending), the states now criticised the 
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federal government’s mismanagement and demanded a greater role 
in decision-making processes.73
In an effort to put the genie of rising costs back into the bottle, 
the German parliament adopted a law in 1977 designed to reduce 
expenditure on medical treatment, but the law had little impact and 
was followed by another in 1981 designed to cut back on the benefits 
provided by health insurance funds.74 In contrast with earlier efforts, the 
1970s heralded the beginning of an era of ongoing health care reform. 
As each reform agenda was enacted into law, another would follow 
to offset the problems created by the preceding legislation.
Restructuring hospital finance since the 1980s
In 1982, a new conservative-liberal government assumed power and 
tried again to rein in rising expenditure on hospitals and health care. 
In December 1984, a new reform bill restructuring hospital planning 
and finances passed the parliament (Krankenhaus-Neuordnungsgesetz). 
Henceforth, two principles of hospital finance and accounting changed. 
First, the responsibility for hospital planning and finance passed from 
the federal government to the states. As a result, tariffs for care and cure 
were no longer centrally mandated by the federal government, but nego-
tiated between hospitals and local health insurance funds.75 The second 
involved cost management and was designed to counter accusations 
that hospitals wasted public money. Prior to the new legislation, hospital 
accounting was governed by an ex-post principle: it was not until the 
end of a patient’s hospital stay that the various costs were calculated 
according to official tariffs and charged to the patient’s health insurance 
fund. Thus, hospitals could generate income only when beds were oc-
cupied. This led politicians to insinuate that patients had been kept in 
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hospitals longer than necessary and to complain that hospitals had no 
incentive to discharge patients earlier. In order to prevent this kind of 
malpractice, hospitals would in future have to calculate their occupancy 
rates in advance, as part of a national estimation (Bettenbedarfsplan), 
and based on this forecast hospitals were assigned a budget.76 Another 
bill called the hospitals’ charitable character into question by allowing 
them to turn a profit. It introduced a so-called flexible budget—meaning 
that savings from a previous accounting period could be transferred 
to the following period.77 According to the neo-liberal zeitgeist of the 
1980s, the aim was to allow hospitals that saved money to use it for other 
purposes, like research or technical equipment, while punishing the 
wasteful. Both laws implied a break with the long-standing principles 
of total cost reimbursement and ex-post accounting.
During an initial transition period, prospective budgeting was 
easy since the budget only had to be submitted for the current year. 
But in subsequent years, it became more difficult because both the 
budget and prospective bed occupancy rates had to be submitted 
ex-ante for the previous year. The new budget principles caused 
numerous problems, mainly because of the divergence between esti-
mated targets and real-life numbers. And some hospitals were better 
situated to deal with the new rules than others, for instance hospitals 
in regions with older populations or treating patients suffering from 
chronic diseases faced disadvantages compared to those in regions 
with a younger and healthier population. Because the treatment of 
some diseases, like hemolysis, dialysis or organ transplantations, was 
particularly expensive, just a few such patients in one hospital’s dis-
trict could wreak budgetary havoc. Beside these imbalances, hospital 
administrators complained about the increased bureaucratic burdens 
of the new accounting techniques.78
And yet, in spite of these changes, key problems remained un-
solved. Declining rates of mortality and morbidity since the Second 
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World War were resulting in an older population with more chronic 
diseases. Patients and employers were becoming more demanding as 
rising health insurance contributions raised expectations about the 
quality of medical services. And as the health care system expanded, 
the growing influence of lobby groups, each in competition for re-
sources, was not just making root and branch reforms more difficult, 
but also further transforming health care into a commodity with high 
profit margins, especially for pharmaceutical companies and manu-
facturers of medical equipment. All of these problems intensified after 
German unification in 1990 as East German hospitals were renovated 
and integrated into the West German system of hospital financing.
The hospital system produced a number of imbalances, such as the 
treatment of patients suffering from cost-intensive diseases, unpredict-
able increases in patient numbers (due to an epidemic or the closure 
of a nearby hospital), or an atypical age structure (in rural areas). In 
order to manage these imbalances, exceptions were clearly defined 
and cost-intensive diseases were allowed to be accounted for separate-
ly. Over time, ever more exceptions were made and in the 1990s the 
whole system was—again—revamped by a number of new laws.79 The 
introduction of so-called case rates, as formulated in the 1993 Health 
Structure Law (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz), superseded the calculation 
of daily rates for bed occupancy and represented another decisive 
shift in accounting practices. Accordingly, each disease was allotted a 
‘normal’ number of occupancy days. If a patient with a certain disease 
was discharged earlier, the hospital made a profit; if the patient stayed 
longer, the hospital lost money. Overall, it was assumed that profits and 
losses would cancel each other out. But this mode of accounting caused 
numerous problems: what happened if a patient had been released too 
early or if complications arose? And what happened if a patient was 
transferred to another hospital? And again, this change did nothing to 
address the hospital financing system’s main problems and contradic-
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tions: predicted treatment vs. actual treatment; targeted costs vs. actual 
expenses; fixed estimated costs vs. varying actual costs; projected vs. 
actual patient numbers; not to mention the fundamental contradiction 
between health as a commodity vs. health as a public good.80
Throughout the twentieth century the proportion of private clinics 
remained small. In 1991, a quarter of all hospitals (358 in relation to 
2,050 in public and charitable ownership) were privately owned. Beside 
those owned by charitable foundations or the Red Cross, they often had 
only a small number of beds, were led or owned by consultants and 
offered special or alternative treatments—not covered by health insur-
ance schemes. Other private clinics were sanatoria-like rehabilitations 
centres. But since the 1990s, after hospitals were allowed to make profits, 
some hospitals turned into commercial enterprises, some entrepreneurs 
already active in the health sector bought former municipal hospitals. 
Since the 1990s the number and size of these commercially operated 
hospitals has risen and even university clinics have been taken over 
(now 707 privately owned/commercially operated hospitals in rela-
tion to 1,244 in public and charitable ownership),81 while the number 
of public, charitable and municipal hospitals decreased and a larger 
number of unprofitable hospitals were closed and overall the number 
of hospital beds decreased rapidly.82
In 2000, the new coalition government of Social Democrats and 
Greens reorganised hospital finances again and a number of structural 
reforms (the so-called Gesundheitsreform) were introduced, resulting 
in a variety of further state interventions.83 These reforms drew on US 
accounting practices that posited a fictional calculation-unit “diagnosis” 
that was more detailed than the previous case rate. This “diagnosis”-unit 
became the new basis for the reimbursement of medical care and treat-
ment. Hospital physicians now had to classify patients’ diseases exactly, 
including (various) secondary diagnoses, as well as their healthiness. 
The amount that health insurance funds were charged for a patient’s 
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treatment depended upon that patient’s “Diagnosis Related Group” 
(DRG). The detailed classification according to the DRG was designed 
to minimise the gap between ex-ante forecasts and actual results. But it 
involved immense administrative efforts—and in the end, the problems 
remained unresolved.84 Furthermore, case rates and other success-orient-
ed accounting systems caused other problems. Cases were sometimes 
diagnosed differently, for instance a normal delivery was less expen-
sive than an abdominal delivery (C-section). The problem arose that 
doctors began choosing more expensive alternative therapies: the rate 
of C-sections increased rapidly in the 1990s as did surgical operations 
for disc prolapses (instead of time-consuming physiotherapy). At the 
same time, patients were discharged much earlier than in the 1980s or 
as early as possible and often patients were transferred to short-term 
nursing facilities (which they had to arrange and pay for themselves) 
or discharged so early that medical complications arose.
Conclusion
In general, there are three historical eras of hospital funding distin-
guishable in Germany. Prior to the 1930s, nearly anything was possible: 
in a pluralistic field, various actors were involved in negotiating tariffs 
and hospitals had different sources of income and the freedom to con-
tract out their services. Between 1936 and 1972 hospital funding was 
characterised as monistic: hospital revenue was derived solely from 
(private and statutory) health insurance funds for medical services 
rendered to their members. In 1972, the monistic structure of hospital 
funding was transformed into a dualistic one: health insurance funds 
reimbursed hospitals for medical services and the state financed build-
ings and technical infrastructure. 
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In this chapter, I suggest a fourth historical phase, starting in the 
mid-1980s and characterised by permanent hospital finance reform, 
by continuous state intervention (and corrections) and by the conviction 
that neoliberal incentives and reward systems could reduce hospital 
costs. During this fourth phase, the notion of public health as a common 
good was replaced by the neoliberal notion of health as a commodity. 
Since the 1980s, hospitals have been able to either (rarely) turn profit 
or (more often) record losses. As a result, hospitals tried to find oth-
er sources of income, reduced their labour costs, merged, or closed. 
In rural areas, where hospitals had to provide less densely populated 
areas with an older population, politicians complained about lacking 
hospitals and insufficient health services. Paradoxically, since the 1990s 
the health industry has been identified as an important stimulus to the 
national economy and health economists have enthusiastically debat-
ed the commercial and economic potential of the health care market. 
At the same time, however, those same economists have criticised rising 
costs in the health care sector (and hospitals as indirect consumers of 
medical products).
In the 1920s, health insurance funds became the most important, and 
in the 1930s the only, funding source for public hospitals in Germany. 
This caused various problems. First, statutory health insurance had 
been established originally as an insurance programme for industrial 
workers. As further groups came to be included in the programme, 
health insurance funds began to contribute the lion’s share of revenue 
for hospitals that served the medical needs of all groups of the popula-
tion. Furthermore, hospital income depended on the national economic 
well-being because the funds’ contributions were paid by employers 
and employees. During recessions funds collected fewer contributions 
and came under increasing pressure to save money. Furthermore, 
the financial situation of hospitals hinged on other expenses such 
as those for practitioners or drugs. If the overall cost of drugs rose, 
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hospital finances were also indirectly affected because insurance funds 
were under pressure to save money. The fixed income of hospitals ex-
plains why German manuals on hospital economics focused primarily 
on bed capacity planning, expenditures, and, since the 1980s, efficiency. 
The public image of hospitals changed in the 1970s. Until then, 
they were considered to be welfare institutions and an important part 
of the infrastructure of a healthy society (which in turn was seen as a 
basis for a stable political order),85 to be a public good, and to be icons 
of modernity and national economic strength. This changed in the 1980s 
under neo-liberal governments. Hospitals and other community tasks 
were re-defined merely as cost factors—like patients—or as entrepre-
neurial profit-centres. 
But this latest phase in the development of hospital financing is 
confounded by at least four paradoxes. First, for a long time it seemed 
to be a consensus in Europe that hospitals were not profit-orientated 
businesses but public responsibilities. Hospitals that try to find new fields 
of income, offer more expensive services, or regard patients as sources 
of profit are liable to be criticised for unethical behavior. Second, within 
a fixed state-controlled environment that restricted their sources of in-
come, imposed contractual obligations, and fixed the prices they could 
charge for their services, hospitals were forced to act like entrepreneurs. 
This led, thirdly, to the paradoxical situation that, under neo-liberal 
auspices, hospitals were defined as profit-oriented enterprises which at 
the same time had to draw up annually ex-ante cost and income plans 
and to justify deviations from the plan in ways reminiscent of socialist 
economic policies. Fourth, longer life expectancy and more sophisticated 
medical equipment has certainly led to rising expenditure in the health 
care sector. Ever since the 1960s, resources have been scarce and experts 
have been predicting the system’s bankruptcy. But it is misleading to 
suggest that insufficient funding will persist merely because hospitals 
act like entrepreneurs. In the end, hospital financing seems to have been 
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played as a zero-sum accounting game: money saved at one hospital 
was missing at another, a surplus in one period was a loss in another, 
and a short term profitable strategic advantage at one juncture could 
become a costly disadvantage at another. Through it all, enormous 
resources of time and money have been eaten up by endless reforms 
to an immense administrative accounting system.
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1. In addition to countless articles in news-
papers and magazines (the news magazine 
Der Spiegel, for instance, had a thematic 
issue [No. 50] in 1970 titled: Is the hospi-
tal broke [Ist das Krankenhaus pleite?]), 
there is an overwhelming amount of liter-
ature lamenting insufficient funding and 
health care infrastructure. For example, 
for the 1960s, see Max Kibler, Das kranke 
Krankenhaus. Heilkunde im Spiegel un-
serer Zeit [The Sick Hospital] (Stuttgart: 
Hippokrates Verlag, 1962); for the 1970s, 
Harald Clade, Das kranke Krankenhaus. 
Reform der inneren Struktur [The Sick Hos-
pital. Reform of its Inner Structure] (Köln: 
Deutscher Industrieverlag, 1973); for the 
1980s, Thomas Dersee and Stephan Dupke 
(eds), Bankrott der Gesundheitsindustrie. 
Eine Kritik des bestehenden medizinischen 
Versorgungssystems [Bancruptcy of the 
Health Industry] (Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft 
Gesundheit, 1981) and Ernst Bruckenberger, 
Dauerpatient Krankenhaus. Diagnosen und 
Heilungsansätze [Permanent Patient Hos-
pital] (Freiburg: Lambertus, 1989). See also 
the various yearbooks Krankenhaus-Report 
[Hospital Report], including such thematic 
issues as Krankenhausversorgung in der 
Krise? [Crisis of Hospital Care?] in 2010 
and Strukturwandel [Structural Change] in 
2015. Such pessimistic views have also been 
adopted in the historical literature. See for 
example the preface in Alfons Labisch and 
Reinhard Spree (eds), Krankenhaus-Report 
19. Jahrhundert. Krankenhausträger, Krank-
enhausfinanzierung, Krankenhauspatienten 
(Frankfurt: Campus, 2001) or the concerns 
about the decline of the German welfare 
state in Gabriele Metzler, Der deutsche 
Sozialstaat. Vom bismarckschen Erfolgs-
modell zum Pflegefall (Munich: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 2003).
2. See for instance the implementation of 
the West German government’s hospital 
enquête [Krankenhaus-Enquête] in 1969, 
the commission on hospital finance [Kom-
mission Krankenhausfinanzierung] of the 
Robert Bosch Foundation dating from the 
early 1980, and various commissions in the 
1990s on structural changes and health re-
form (Gesundheitsreform). On the reform 
efforts, see Douglas Webber, ‘Krankheit, 
Geld und Politik. Zur Geschichte der Ge-
sundheitsreformen in Deutschland’, Levi-
athan. Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft 
16 (1988), 156-203; idem, ‘Zur Geschichte 
der Gesundheitsreformen in Deutschland. 
II. Teil: Norbert Blüms Gesundheitsreform 
und die Lobby’, Leviathan. Zeitschrift für 
Sozialwissenschaft 17 (1989), 262-300; Sebas-
tian Bechmann, Gesundheitssemantiken der 
Moderne. Eine Diskursanalyse der Debatten 
über die Reform der Krankenversicherung 
(Berlin: edition sigma, 2007); Ingo Bode, ‘Die 
Malaise der Krankenhäuser’, Leviathan. 
Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft 38 (2010), 
189-211; Franz Knieps and Hartmut Rein-
ers, Gesundheitsreformen in Deutschland. 
Geschichte – Intentionen – Kontroversen 
(Bern: Huber, 2015).
3. In contrast to Anglo-American countries, 
where the commodification of health and 
competition between physicians was part 
of the system, in Germany such commod-
ification was sharply criticised. For a long 
time, health was instead regarded as a com-
mon state-regulated responsibility. Paul U. 
Unschuld has spoken here of a German 
Sonderweg. On this, and more generally on 
the commodification of health, see Paul U. 
Unschuld, Ware Gesundheit. Das Ende der 
klassischen Medizin (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
2009); and Alexandra Manzei and Rudi 
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
12610.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
Schmiede (eds), 20 Jahre Wettbewerb im 
Gesundheitswesen. Theoretische und em-
pirische Analysen zur Ökonomisierung von 
Medizin und Pflege (Wiesbaden: Springer 
VS, 2014).
4. See for instance the complaints about 
insufficient funds expressed by the for-
mer medical director of the Charité hos-
pital in Berlin, Ernst Horn, Oeffentliche 
Rechenschaft über meine zwölfjährige 
Dienst-führung als zweiter Arzt des Königl. 
Charité-Krankenhauses zu Berlin nebst 
Erfahrungen über Krankenhäuser und Ir-
renanstalten (Berlin: Realschulbuchhand-
lung, 1818). And along similar lines a cen-
tury later, see the reflections of the director 
in the Prussian Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
Otto Krohne, ‘Die zunehmende Verteuerung 
unserer modernen Krankenanstalten und 
deren Ursachen sowie einige Vorschläge, 
ihr entgegenzuwirken’, Ergebnisse und 
Fortschritte des Krankenhauswesens. Jahr-
buch für Bau, Einrichtung und Betrieb von 
Krankenanstalten (Krankenhausjahrbuch) 
2 (1913), 43-96.
5. See the review of Florian Gebreiter and 
William J. Jackson, ‘Fertile Ground: The 
History of Accounting in Hospitals’, Ac-
counting History Review 25 (2015), 177-82.
6. See Martin Gorsky and Sally Sheard (eds), 
Financing Medicine. The British Experience 
since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2006).
7. See the contributions in Labisch and Spree 
(eds), op. cit. (note 1). For the Hubertus-Spi-
tal in Düsseldorf in the sixteenth century, 
see Fritz Dross, ‘Their Daily Bread: Man-
aging Hospital Finances in Early Modern 
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Chapter 4
The development of hospital systems in new nations: 
Central Europe between the Two World Wars1
Barry Doyle, Frank Grombir, Melissa Hibbard & Balázs Szélinger 
(University of Huddersfield)
The study of hospitals has grown substantially in the last twenty 
years especially in Britain where there has been important work on 
issues of finance and control, particularly at a local level.2 As this spe-
cial issue shows, similar research is now underway in many countries, 
including France, Germany and Spain where the focus has been on the 
rise—or not—of a state-supported hospital system funded through 
compulsory state insurance.3 Initial research tended to characterise 
pre-welfare state health provision as limited, disorganised and poorly 
funded while rarely recognising the significant development taking 
place.4 Yet it is apparent that across much of Western Europe hospital 
provision was growing, with central and local state, philanthropy and 
the private sector all responsible for increased and improved services.5 
To fund this growth, a complex mixed economy of financial systems 
developed, including National Insurance, local authority funding, 
mutual insurance schemes and direct payments.6 However, in all 
of these schemes access to hospital treatment was restricted while 
in terms of coverage the self-employed in business and agriculture 
were often excluded.7
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Although studies of western European health care are growing, 
there is little published research examining the hospitals of Central 
Europe—a region dominated by emergent nations attempting to build 
new health systems from the ruins of Europe’s old empires. The nations 
of central Europe fit uneasily into the traditions of the established 
nation state, their multinational roots and new nation status offering 
a very different perspective from which to view the development of 
their hospital provision. 
To date, their hospital historiography has been dominated by a 
traditional medical history approach focused on individual institu-
tions and specialties, often written by senior medical practitioners 
working at the hospital or in the area of specialism.8 There have been 
important studies on the growth of hospitals in Czechoslovakia by 
Svobodný and Masova9 and useful work on Poland,10 though little 
critical analysis of the situation in Hungary.11 The communist era 
in these countries imposed significant checks on historical method 
while history of medicine has been largely abandoned as a subject 
for medical degrees.12 Much of the health history of the region before 
the Second World War has focused on racial policy, and especially 
eugenics, with major contributions from Paul Weindling and Marius 
Turda.13 There is a more extensive historiography of the work of in-
ternational agencies in these nations, with particularly rich research 
focusing on the Rockefeller Foundation,14 including studies of support 
for health institutes, nurse training and the development of health 
policy generally.15 However, the Rockefeller Foundation were not 
interested in the development of hospitals per se, although their field 
officers did amass a great deal of information on the establishment 
of national services in the 1920s. 
Over the course of the interwar period the new nations of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia and a much-truncated Hungary sought to utilize 
health care, and especially hospital provision, as evidence of their 
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progressivism and modernity and as a symbol of nationhood.16 Yet 
their intentions were constrained by a complex health inheritance, 
persistent financial crises and significant health challenges, especially 
in their poverty stricken eastern regions. 
Building on an understanding of the complex demographic, 
ethnic and economic structures this chapter will utilise case studies 
of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to examine the challenges 
faced by these new nations in delivering a modern health care system. 
It will explore three key themes: who provided hospitals and how 
did their scale and scope change over time? How and by whom were 
hospitals financed and how did this affect access? And did health 
care feature in the process of nation building? It will show that these 
three themes were linked as they were pursued by governments with 
the aim of providing more and better institutions, branded as the 
work of the new nation and underpinned by a seemingly modern, 
extensive payment system. Yet despite considerable effort, resource 
and political will, financial weakness, ethnic conflict and urban-rural 
divisions limited choices and curtailed the expansion and moderni-
zation of the institutional infrastructure.
Access to primary sources varied across the three nations. Both 
state and local records were extensive for Czechoslovakia, more 
limited for Hungary and almost non-existent for Poland, where the 
destruction of Warsaw and other major cities meant few public records 
survived.17 The main sources utilised in this text are published reports, 
such as the Czechoslovak Health Yearbook, which provided extensive 
statistical material on provision and funding structures.18 Similar, less 
full, publications exist for Hungary and Poland.19 In the former case, 
extensive use has been made of medical and hospital journals for 
evidence of change at an institutional level and in all cases material 
has been drawn from insurance data. This has been supplemented 
by important national data collected by the League of Nations in the 
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1920s and the International Labour Organisation for the later 1930s. 
These surveys relied on local contacts well placed within the national 
health system and included both hospital statistics and information 
on the operation of insurance schemes.20
In a similar vein, the study has drawn on the international 
publication, Nosokomeion, which included a number of articles on 
general and specific issues concerning hospital services in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with Poland receiving the most 
attention. In addition, particular use has been made of material from 
the Rockefeller Foundation who worked extensively in Central Europe 
in the 1920s. The Foundation appointed Selskar Gunn as a resident 
officer in Poland at the beginning of the decade and he continued to 
work closely with government health departments until the onset of 
the Depression saw a shift in RF focus away from Europe to Asia.21 
In addition to a collection of baseline country surveys conducted 
between 1920 and 1924 and ongoing field officer visits to the region, 
a number of local reports were produced by teams examining ap-
plications for Foundation grants. Together the RF material offers a 
rich mix of macro level assessment undertaken by policy insiders 
with considerable knowledge of the country and specific examples 
of health service provision on the ground.
The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of 
the health care, and especially hospital, inheritance of these nations 
at their formation in 1918 set in the context of demographic, ethnic 
and economic variables. The second will examine developments in 
the extent and ownership of hospital provision; the third explores 
the funding landscape, and how this affected access to care while 
the final section will consider the effect of the multi-ethnic character 
of these nations on the provision of hospitals and the role of health 
care in nation building.
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The new geography of central Europe
Between 1918 and 1924, following the collapse of the German, 
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, a number of new or much 
re-drawn nations were created across central Europe.22 Formed by 
local politicians and the peace treaties, these countries combined na-
tional self-determination with economic and geographical pragmatism, 
leaving multi-ethnic states to cope with recalcitrant minorities, unsat-
isfied neighbours, angry separatists and a substantial Jewish minority 
that the new countries only partially tolerated.23 In this environment, 
the body was a key site for the legitimation policies of the new nations 
with eugenics, racial politics and health care strategies deployed to tie 
together the disparate national and ethnic groups.24 In their quest for 
political legitimacy the governments of the new states directed some 
of their energies to the creation of modern, efficient and progressive 
health care provision, often using this to establish a sense of democratic 
entitlement and national identity.25 Yet this was a difficult and complex 
task. Poland and Czechoslovakia inherited multiple hospital systems 
from their former imperial rulers; Hungary was massively reduced in 
size and lost many of its leading institutions to the successor states; 
each new state had large geographical areas with very limited service 
provision, especially in the eastern lands; and all had to deal with huge 
financial difficulties, including inflation, currency instability and the 
effects of the economic depression.26
The Polish Republic was created out of lands from each of the 
former empires including German Silesia and the Polish Corridor, Gali-
cia from Austro-Hungary and both Congress Poland (the central area 
around Warsaw) and the Pale of Settlement, the predominantly rural 
area with a largely Jewish population, from Russia.27 The background 
for Czechoslovakia was equally complex, with the Czech lands of 
Bohemia and Moravia in the west seceding from Austria, while Slovakia 
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and Ruthenia were Hungarian territories, the latter with a substantial 
Jewish population.28 As a result of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), how-
ever, Hungary saw its population and landmass reduced by almost 
60%, with the large and urbanised region of Transylvania transferred 
to Romania while substantial territory was ceded to the new states of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.29
This complex inheritance was important for a number of reasons. 
Although Hungary was reduced to a coherent ethnic and linguistic 
core by the peace settlement, elsewhere ethnic diversity led to problems 
with delivering a unified, national health system. In Czechoslovakia 
the Germans continued to maintain and guard their own provision, 
while in the cities like Prague the main hospitals and the medical 
schools operated on separate ethnic grounds.30 In Eastern Poland, 
the geographical and economic limitations of the dispersed Jewish 
settlements demanded a different approach to institutional care to 
that found in the rest of the country.31 As Table 1 shows, roughly one 
third of the population of Poland and Czechoslovakia belonged to 
another ethnic group, with Germans forming a powerful lobby in west 
Czechoslovakia and Ukrainians and Jews in Eastern Poland. This was 
particularly apparent in some big cities, with Poles a bare majority of 
the citizens of Lemberg/Lvov, while Jews numbered around a quarter 
of the population of Budapest.32
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Table 4.1: Ethnic Population of Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Hungary, percentage distribution, 1921-31
 
The first problem facing these new states was managing the effects 
of the First World War. In much of the region, especially across Poland, 
there was considerable war damage compounded by the ongoing dis-
putes with Ukraine and Soviet Russia that lasted until 1922.33 Millions 
of people were displaced in this process, some spending up to seven 
years away from their farms. Large numbers died in the fighting, or as a 
result of displacement or even of starvation in the famine that swept the 
region in 1920-21. Epidemic diseases were rampant, especially typhus, 
typhoid and recurrent fever, the latter proving more life threatening due 
to inadequate feeding. Around one and a half million houses had been 
destroyed, farms were in ruins with vegetation across the fields, there 
were no horses, implements, seed, timber or food and some returnees 
were reported to be living in the dugouts made by the German army.34
Though less extreme, in the Hungarian city of Gyär there were 
thousands of refugees from Transylvania living in overcrowded barracks 
while resources were diminished by looting, the occupying Serbian army 































Sources: Heimann, Czechoslovakia, 64-5; Prażmowska, History of Poland, 102; Molnár, A 
Concise History of Hungary, 268.
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the southern town of Sikles.35 The borders were officially settled by 
1924, but disputes continued to cause instability in the region until 1939.
The economic effects of the treaty settlements hampered the growth 
of hospital systems. Economically these countries suffered many of the 
problems of other nations between the wars, but in an aggravated fash-
ion. Both Hungary and Poland were plagued by hyper-inflation until 
major currency reform in the mid-1920s although the Czechoslovak 
economy remained stronger than the others and benefitted from a more 
stable currency.36 Poland and Czechoslovakia were more economically 
advanced in the western regions ceded from the German and Austrian 
empires whose industrial and urban development was more extensive. 
However, in the eastern areas like Slovakia, Belarus and Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia (known by the Czechs as Podkarpatská Rus or PKR) subsistence 
agriculture predominated, there was little urban development and social 
infrastructure was limited.37 For Hungary the loss of Transylvania and 
cities like Bratislava proved particularly problematic as they included 
many of the country’s leading hospitals and medical schools. Moreover, 
outside of Budapest much of the country was rural, with few towns and 
a limited organisational base to support an extensive hospital system.38 
The later 1920s saw gradual expansion of public investment across the 
region, especially on hospitals. Thus, the Czechs focused on ‘modernising’ 
the east with public health projects in both Slovakia and PKR. In 1927, 
the Slovak politician in charge of health secured significant funding from 
the state insurance scheme surplus for infrastructure development in 
Ruthenia, including the continued upgrade of the hospital in Mukače-
vo.39 However, these nations were badly hit by the depression leading 
to a significant squeeze on health spending.
All three nations had significant rural populations. In Poland roughly 
75% of the population lived in the countryside, for Hungary the propor-
tion was around 67%, while in Czechoslovakia the figure was over 40%.40 
Although there were urban centres in the west, especially in Bohemia 
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and Polish Silesia, in central and eastern areas there were relatively few 
large towns and illiteracy was widespread, especially among the older 
population and women.41 Transport and communications were weak and 
in parts of rural Slovakia and Poland the roads were impassable by cars. 
Moreover, some regions were very poorly integrated into the market. 
Currency was limited in the east of Poland, many peasants living within a 
barter economy—indeed there were attempts to allow payment for health 
services in goods rather than cash.42 These problems were exacerbated in 
the early 1930s as the Great Depression forced down world agricultural 
prices, reducing incomes for farmers, workers and the state. Again, the 
effects were rather different in Czechoslovakia where both the industrial 
west and the rural east experienced recession at different points in the 
cycle and recovered at different rates. In all three countries state and local 
finances were severely affected, restricting both capital investment and 
operational income for health provision. However, recovery was driven, 
at least in part, by war preparation and rearmament and by the changes 
in relations with Germany after 1933.
There were, moreover, severe public health problems. Infant mor-
tality was well above the western European average and remained 
stubbornly high throughout the period.43 The lowest rates were found 
in Czechoslovakia where a steady decline was noted in the later 1920s 
to 140/1000 in 1929. However in Hungary the figure remained static at 
around 180/1000 while for Poland figures were only available for the 
more prosperous western and southern provinces where in 1926 the 
rate was 180/1000.44 Across the region the infrastructure to tackle infant 
mortality, tuberculosis and contagious diseases was limited despite 
investment and support from bodies like the Rockefeller Foundation.45 
Mobile infectious disease units were developed for use in remote areas, 
especially PKR and eastern Poland46 and across these regions the health 
centre—with the hospital as support—emerged as the key vehicle for 
delivering services.47
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The new nations inherited a diverse range of health funding sys-
tems from the previous imperial regimes. The German, Austrian and 
Hungary governments had introduced health insurance by 1914, though 
this was absent from the Russian empire. Polish Silesia benefitted from 
the highly developed German system, established in the 1880s and 
offering cover to the region’s industrial and white-collar workers. 
Austria was quick to follow Germany in establishing health insurance and 
by 1914 it covered a similar range of industrial and transport workers. 
In each case family members also benefitted. As a result, these two nations 
led the world in coverage in 1910 with around one third or more of the 
population insured by the end of the First World War. The new nations 
were quick to adopt and adapt these schemes, the Poles ambitiously 
basing their new national coverage on the German model (even if it was a 
largely unaffordable aspiration). Each nation also inherited the Hungarian 
system. Claimed to be the oldest in the world (a voluntary initiative was 
launched in the 1870s) a limited state health insurance scheme was in 
operation by 1891 covering a similar range of industrial and transport 
workers along with a wide range of state employees. In Russia, however, 
no compulsory state health insurance existed, leaving a substantial hole 
in the health finances of the new Polish state. Although these countries 
could draw on these existing schemes, significantly none of them included 
agricultural workers, a prominent part of each workforce.48
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Hospital numbers
The new states inherited a health infrastructure based on the four 
different imperial systems. Hungary, Galicia, Slovakia and PKR had 
the Hungarian system with strong central control of local institutions. 
Bohemia and Moravia and Silesia had German or Austrian structures 
with a national insurance system but devolved hospitals. Poland had a 
complicated mix of all four former regimes and, with some good provi-
sion in the former Austrian, German and Hungarian areas although the 
bulk of the nation was covered by the very limited Russian inheritance 
with relatively few hospitals and a weak health infrastructure.49
Defining a hospital is a challenging exercise, especially in this 
period of rapid organizational, intellectual and technical change.50 
A basic definition might include any institution that accepts patients 
for residential treatment with the aim of curing or ‘materially relieving’ 
their condition. By 1918 the bulk of general hospitals had provision for 
surgery and internal medicine while increasing numbers had specialist 
departments for various parts of the body. They might include isolation 
facilities for infectious diseases, facilities to treat venereal diseases and in 
many cases maternity and gynaecology blocks. From the late nineteenth 
century specific demographic groups also secured specialist institutions, 
including women and children. But the hospital was also separating out 
traditional patient groups and developing services beyond the acute 
sector. Tuberculosis was usually treated separately from other infectious 
diseases. The elderly, the infirm and the chronically ill—the bulk of 
patients in the nineteenth century public hospital—were squeezed out, 
coming to occupy a less medicalised space in the hospice-style accom-
modation of the municipality.51 Those with mental illnesses attracted 
their own, frequently overcrowded and underfunded, establishments. 
The extent of these divisions differed across Europe and North America 
and even within countries.52
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Figure 4.1: Relative Proportion of Provision in Hospitals  
and Mental Institutions 1931
The available statistics for central Europe, unlike those for the 
west, rarely distinguished between the curative general and specialist 
hospital and the care-oriented, chronic institutions associated with 
the hospice and the poor law.53 Progress in the visible and politically 
important general teaching hospitals of urban centres can blind us 
to the lack of change in county areas administered by cash-strapped 
local authorities.54 With these caveats in mind we can see the extent of 
hospital provision in Europe in 1931 (Fig.1). The northern and western 
European nations were offering a ratio of approximately 70-80 beds 
per 10,000 people while the Central European countries provided 
Source: C. Neville Rolfe, ‘Hospital and venereal disease’, Nosokomeion, 3, 3 (1932), 245. 
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roughly half that number. But as can be seen from Table 2, progress 
was being made to increase capacity: first by building new institutions 
and, second, by renovating and reorganizing existing hospitals to meet 
modern demands—although many of these institutions still fitted the 
older model of mixed acute and chronic care, especially in rural areas.
Table 4.2: Number of Hospitals and Beds in Czechoslovakia,  
Hungary and Poland, 1918-37
In the case of Poland the key need was to increase the number 
and spread of institutions and in this there was success. When the 
new nation was formed in 1918 the country had just 332 hospitals with 
around 47,000 beds for a population of approximately 26 million.55 














1920 163 26,000 183 26,500 - -
1925 - - 205 30,000 634 47,000
1930 389 53,500 233 40,000 656 53,000
1935 411 64,000 291 46,500 677 75,000
Sources: István Ágoston, A kórházi kapacitások és szabályozásuk története, University of 
Pécs, 2013, 104; Jiří Říha (ed.), Zdravotnická ročenka Československa, 1928-1940 (Vols. 
I-XI) (Praha: Piras, 1928-1940); Ministerstwo Opieki Społecznej, Dwadzieścia lat publicznej 
służby zdrowia w Polsce odrodzonej, 1918-1938.
* The figures for Hungary for 1918 show the number of institutions and beds prior to 
treaty changes.
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the early 1920s while the mid-1930s saw a new programme of addition 
and improvement so that the hospital stock had reached almost 700.56 
From this point the number of institutions stabilized but capacity in-
creased significantly while many of the smaller chronic hospitals that 
had dominated the countryside were upgraded to take more patients 
and adopt a more curative function. 
The Czechoslovak Republic began with an inheritance of 163 hos-
pitals and 26,000 beds in 1923 for a population of 13.4 million, or just 
over 2/1,000. By 1929, the number of hospitals and beds had almost 
doubled, while the period 1929-36 saw beds in general hospitals rise by 
almost a quarter and in all types of institution, including care-focused 
sick houses, they rose by a third from 70,000 to 93,000.57
In 1918 the situation in Hungary was a little better than in Poland 
in terms of numbers of institutions and beds but as a result of the peace 
settlement, it lost 57% of its hospitals and 42% of its hospital beds. 
Yet the nation was able to overcome these problems and by 1935 the 
number of both had doubled so that there were more beds than in 1915 
with a significantly higher ratio of beds to residents than before the 
War. Part of this transformation was the result of institutions built to 
replace those lost to neighbouring states, such as the Horthy Miklós 
Royal State Public Hospital at Debrecen opened in 1931 to serve the 
city and the new university.58 In the following ten years over 100 
additional establishments were added, restoring provision to above 
the 1918 level.
Along with deficiencies in the number of institutions these health 
systems also had to deal with the poor distribution of facilities, 
the interwar period seeing some progress towards a more uniform 
allocation. In post-war Poland the existing hospitals were uneven-
ly distributed with virtually none in the north-east area along the 
Russian border, leading to the erection of 100 temporary hospitals in 
the region adding thousands of new beds. The average coverage also 
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improved significantly to one bed per 467 inhabitants overall (just over 
2/1,000) by 1938 but this was the national average; enormous regional 
disparities remained. For example, in the north east there was still 
only one bed for 1,250 persons and in the district of Postawski only 
one bed per 5,000 residents. Indeed it was calculated by the Ministry 
of Public Welfare that to meet the modern standard of three beds per 
1,000 residents, beds would need to increase by around 50 per cent.59 
Similar uneven distribution in the quantity and quality of provision 
wa5s found in Czechoslovakia. For example, in 1920 the Czech lands 
(Bohemia and Moravia) possessed three quarters of the nation’s hos-
pital stock (123/163). Conversely there were just eight institutions in 
Silesia and four in Ruthenia, and these were all of very poor quality 
at this time.60 The 1930s saw significant improvements in peripheral 
areas like Silesia, as well as attempts to modernize the under-developed 
region of PKR. Bed numbers in the region increased by 68% while 
the number of patients treated increased by 175%. However, this did 
cause problems as the facilities proved unable to keep up with the 
growth in demand and at Užhorod it was not uncommon for two or 
more patients to share a bed while others slept on the floor.61
As can be seen from Figure 2, new building in Hungary set out 
to address the poor distribution across the country. In 1923 Selskar 
Gunn had noted that: ‘The total number of beds in the entire country 
is theoretically sufficient. However, the distribution is not the best, as 
Eastern Hungary is poorly supplied with hospitals’ but by the later 
1930s the east had secured a number of prominent new institutions.62 
Yet once again the distribution remained uneven with the central and 
eastern portions of the country less well served than the west and 
south. Moreover, the lost institutions were heavily based in Transyl-
vania and included a number of medical schools as well as important 
hospitals. Replacements had to be established within the truncated 
Hungary in cities like Pécs (which acquired staff and equipment from 
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the university at Bratislava), Szeged and Debrecen63 supplemented by 
new hospitals in Budapest, like the Hospital of the National Insurance 
Institute, opened in 1927 with over 500 beds.
Figure 4.2: Hospitals in Hungary, 1938
Hospital Ownership and Management
In each of these three nations there was a mix of providers in-
cluding central, regional and municipal government, charitable, 
philanthropic and private sector involvement.64 Given their origins 
in the four predecessor systems, both Poland and Czechoslovakia 
even had more than one type of local provider. Thus hospitals in 
former Hungarian regions were managed by the higher level county 
authorities acting as the representatives of the central state, while in 
Map drawn by Balázs Szélinger.
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the Austrian areas the main provider was the lower tier city or district 
council—usually referred to as the municipality. This diversity was 
demonstrated by the Rockefeller Foundation’s agent, Selskar Gunn, 
who found four main types of ownership in Hungary in 1923: a) state, 
b) public, c) semi-public, and d) private.
‘A: State hospitals were run by central government and included 
university clinics, midwifery schools etc. The staff were well qualified 
civil servants. The fees were fixed by the Ministry.
B: Public hospitals were supervised by an Administrative 
Commission of the County and usually had departments of internal 
medicine, surgery and venereal diseases as well as accommodation 
for mental illnesses and infectious diseases. Fees fixed by Ministry 
of Welfare together with the county council.
C: Semi-public institutions were private hospitals recognized 
by the Ministry and therefore eligible for payments from public 
sources for treating the poor. Fees for sick poor set by Ministry in 
consultation with owners. 
D: Private hospitals were subject to the supervision of the Ad-
ministrative Commission but otherwise independent of the system.’65
Within categories C and D were to be found a number of religious 
institutions including the Brethren of Mercy. 
These categories of ownership and responsibility were broadly 
replicated across the region, as shown by Tables 3 and 4, although 
in Czechoslovakia the private sector appears to have been weaker. 
Thus, in 1921, the largest number of hospitals in Hungary were pri-
vate, including many run by religious houses, but these tended to be 
small or very small. The county hospitals, operating services for the 
central state, were the second largest category and they also included 
the bigger institutions, many with departments of internal medicine, 
surgery and venereal diseases, as well as accommodation for mental 
illnesses and infectious diseases. There was a relatively small number 
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of medium-sized, semi-public hospitals recognized by the Ministry 
and therefore eligible for payments from public sources for treat-
ing the poor. In terms of specialist facilities, the biggest expansion, 
in line with developments across Europe, was among obstetrical 
clinics and hospitals which by 1930 numbered 34 and offered 4,700 
beds. Counties were able to extend their hospital provision after 1928 
with the assistance of US loans, almost 50 authorities taking advan-
tage of the Speyer loans.66 Thus, the Miklós Horthy public hospital 
in Nagykanizsa completed an extension funded by a combination of 
Ministry of Welfare loans and grants, a subvention from the County 
of Zala and over 600,000 pengo67 from the town council thanks to 
a Speyer loan.68
 






State Hospitals (Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia) 4,127
County Hospitals (Slovakia & Ruthenia) 2,186
Provincial Hospitals (Moravia & Silesia) 1,883




Source: Pelc, Organisation of the Public Health Services in Czechoslovakia
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In both Galician Poland and Slovakia, a similar pattern of pro-
vision was evident to that in Hungary of county management and 
state finance. In Poland the central state had limited input—mostly 
the infectious disease hospitals they had established in 1918. Gen-
erally local municipal control was the norm—although by the later 
1920s federations of local authorities were joining together to build 
institutions of wider significance such as mental illness facilities. 
As can be seen from Table 4, by 1927 local government was the largest 
provider, although these were mainly small institutions, social organ-
isations were very significant while the fully private sector was small 
in terms of beds. The social organisations included social insurance 
funds and social/congregational bodies, such as charities like the Red 
Cross, and religious and ethnic communities—Catholic, Jewish and 
Orthodox.69 Among social insurance providers was Kasa Chorych, 
supported by very good hospitals in the west run by Spólka Bracka, 
the miners’ insurance fund. In 1928 they ran eight hospitals, including 
the substantial, modern facility at Katowice which had undergone a 
significant extension, increasing capacity to just under 500 beds for 
internal, surgical, eye and ear patients.70 The legacy institutions from 
the German and Austrian empires tended to be of a higher quality 
than those left by the Russians and Hungarians—although it was 
noted that the former German institutions were beginning to age by 
the later 1920s.71 In the east, conversely, social insurance hospitals 
were less prominent, Bialystock did not have any kind of insurance 
institution until 1933.72 However, there was an attempt in this region 
to meet need by the creation of health centres, supported by both 
the Rockefeller Foundation and by levies from the health insurance 
fund and offering preventive services and some mobile facilities.73
In general, the Public Health Department of the Polish Ministry 
of Welfare favoured a centralized system similar to that operating in 
Galicia, for it was seen to provide uniformity and financial stability. 
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In 1922 they had proposed taking all hospitals under state control and 
funding them as far as possible from state taxes.74 However, many local-
ities resisted this, claiming government preferred large, multi-purpose 
institutions rather than responding to specific local needs. Critiques 
of the 1928 Hospital Ordnance suggested it failed to support local 
initiative which had done much to develop hospital provision over the 
preceding fifteen years preferring urban new builds over improvement 
and better administration.75
Table 4.4: Hospitals in Poland by Provider, 1927 and 1937
By 1937 there had been significant expansion of bed numbers espe-
cially in the facilities run by the state and the social welfare organisations, 
for example the Polish Red Cross. This was facilitated by increased state 
planning and a policy of closing hospitals with fewer than ten beds and, 
where possible, merging institutions to increase efficiency. For example 































Source: Ministerstwo Opieki Społecznej, Dwadzieścia lat publicznej służby zdrowia w Polsce 
odrodzonej, 1918-1938
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and the Jewish Hospital decided to merge since they already shared 
the same building.76
In Czechoslovakia a plan to nationalise the hospitals in 1920 only 
included a small number of strategic institutions, mainly in Prague 
leaving Hungarian-style county hospitals to operate in Slovakia and 
PKR and municipal control in Bohemia and Moravia. Private institutions 
were uncommon, although works’ hospitals were common in the west, 
especially in the coal mining areas. However, the most famous company 
institution was the Baťa Health House in Zlín which brought together 
health and social services on one site. By 1936 it included partnerships 
with associations like the Red Cross, the Masaryk League for Combatting 
Tuberculosis, local leagues concerned with the health of young people 
and mothers and babies, the Health Centre of the Baťa Works and the 
District Health Insurance fund.77 The key success of the institution lay 
in the way it brought these interests together to get the sick worker into 
the health system at an early point, thus reducing chronic and recurring 
illness and bringing down costs for the company and insurance fund.78
Despite these initiatives, many municipalities only provided simple 
hospice-style care in their institutions along with some infectious disease 
beds—though these might not be segregated. Thus, in 1926 in Bendzin, 
Silesia, the Rockefeller surveyor, Dr George Bevier, visited the hospital 
which he found to be:
…an old institution and under the Russian regime was a sort 
of “poor law hospital”. It has been remodelled to some extent, 
but is not really satisfactory even now. It has an average of 80 to 
90 patients per day, supports a small laboratory and an X Ray… 
There were many old ladies who were apparently chronics and 
we were told that it was the only place for old people. However, 
all were bed cases.79
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The social care functions of hospitals were very evident in small 
town Hungary in the early 1930s, the director of a hospital in Miskolc 
writing that:
Due to the grave economic situation, disjointed or absent 
family background, the shortage of food and housing, the hospi-
tal today is a shelter for the poor. Especially when the rainy and 
cold season comes, masses try to get admitted into the hospital… 
considering the social environment…some 15-20% of the patients 
treated have no serious illness but we replace their missing home 
with hospitalisation to give them back the ability to work.80
Yet the generally poor quality of much of the provision meant 
local populations were often sceptical about hospitals, Dr Ryder of 
Bendzin observing ‘that people in this district usually object to going 
to hospital as they still associate it with dying and prefer to die at 
home. They have to be educated to go to hospital.’81
New-build hospitals were significantly larger, some with more 
than a thousand beds, and plans were in place for major projects, 
like that in Prague in the later 1930s. This envisaged creating a new 
4,000 bed hospital with 32 clinics spread across two main blocks and 
a shared central service building, to replace the existing Czech and 
German university hospitals and medical schools. The new complex, 
which shared much in common with the project for the Regional 
Hospital in Lille,82 envisaged state of the art planning in skyscraper 
tower blocks connected by bridges. The final ‘hospital city’ would 
have a Czech facility with 2,400 beds and twenty-two clinics while the 
German side would consist of 1,200 beds and ten clinics supported by 
a substantial shared medical school. The building was not developed 
but instead a new hospital was created in the suburbs at Motol and 
began taking patients in 1943.83
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This new building was underpinned by grandiose planning, 
including the district plans demanded by the Polish government in 
1928 and the proposed Trapl-Albert plan in Czechoslovakia. The latter 
plan, produced by two medical doctors, Jiří Trapl and Bohuslav Albert, 
was published in 1933. Drawing on the experience at Zlín and US ideas 
about hierarchical regionalism, it proposed a merger of smaller uneco-
nomical hospitals with larger provincial ones including the provision of 
social care and advice all in one institution or at least a set of affiliated 
institutions run from the centre. It had much in common with the health 
centre model promoted by Thomas Gruska with its focus on outpatient 
Source: J. Havlicek, V. Uklein, B. Albert, ‘Study of A Health Centre and University Medical 
School at Prague’, Nosokomeion, IX, 3 (1938), 210. (Reproduced with the permission of 
the Wellcome Collection)
Figure 4.3: Plan for new Hospital and Medical School, Prague, 1937
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work as the primary function of institutional provision.84 The plan formed 
the basis of a hospital bill introduced into the Czechoslovak parliament in 
1937 but as a result of the worsening political situation this was shelved 
and not revived in the changed world of 1945.85
In all three countries nursing was in the hands of religious organ-
isations. This was particularly the case in Poland, the most devoutly 
Roman Catholic of the three nations, but replacing the religious carers 
was a substantial task. There were few trained lay nurses and train-
ing facilities were limited. In 1922, Selskar Gunn found that in Poland 
nursing was largely ‘done by nuns and on account of a strong catholic 
feeling it is difficult to dislodge them’ while the country’s leading health 
reformer, Ludwik Rajchman, thought them the ‘most poisonous fea-
ture’ of the Polish hospital situation.86 It proved difficult for lay nurses 
to get training in hospitals dominated by nuns while ‘the attitude of 
the medical profession towards the trained nurses is the same as that 
found in other continental countries, and it will take time to educate 
the doctors to the status of the trained nurses.’87 In the 1920s Rockefel-
ler’s Elizabeth Crowell toured central Europe to establish the scale of 
training facilities—and the problem with untrained nurses—and built 
lasting networks to establish new schools.88 However, Crowell and the 
RF generally favoured the training of public health nurses rather than 
the bedside staff the hospitals desperately required.89 Moreover, neither 
hospitals nor doctors particularly wanted to see the nuns replaced. They 
were cheap, compliant and dedicated to care—essential for institutions 
which still dealt largely with the sick, infirm and chronic.90 Nevertheless, 
by the late 1930s lay nurses dominated the hospitals of Budapest where 
the city’s eleven public hospitals employed over 1000 nurses only 200 
of which came from religious orders.91
Overall, the hospital services of these three nations were in the hands 
of multiple providers, with local authorities at the centre. The role of the 
central state was limited and outside of the big cities institutional care 
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was largely in the hands of cash strapped counties and districts who 
concentrated on meeting the needs of the poorest. Non-state providers 
played a prominent role in Catholic Poland while employers managed 
a range of institutions in the industrial west. 
 
Finance
As with provision, a mixed economy of finance existed across cen-
tral Europe drawing on national insurance schemes, local taxes, state 
subsidies and private philanthropy as well as obligations imposed by 
government on employers. As noted, the former German, Austrian 
and Hungarian areas all inherited national insurance schemes from the 
former imperial systems but in the Russian territories no state scheme 
had been instituted before 1914. The benefits from these schemes were 
generous—certainly in terms of domiciliary and ambulatory services—
and included some institutional care. Much of the responsibility for 
maintaining and treating hospital patients should have fallen to these 
schemes which were extended during the 1920s. But in each country the 
proportion of the population covered was low—usually less than 20 per 
cent. In particular, agricultural workers and peasant proprietors were 
excluded in all three countries, a major issue when up to three quarters 
of the population were involved in agriculture.92 Hospital treatment 
was seen as expensive—a drain on the insurance funds’ reserves—
and an uncertain method of treatment. Strict conditions were applied. 
There was a requirement that institutional treatment would result in 
a cure, chronic diseases were excluded and benefit was usually time 
limited to four weeks—while domiciliary treatment could last up to a 
year. On the other hand, dependents were eligible for hospital treatment 
in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia.93
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
16210.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
The widest scheme was in Czechoslovakia where a programme 
inherited from Austria was revised and extended on four occasions. 
It covered all workers with a contract and by 1938 around 3 million 
workers were included in the scheme, approximately 20% of the pop-
ulation.94 Contributions were collected from employees and employers 
in equal proportions and administered by sickness funds overseen 
by a central social insurance institution and ultimately the Ministry 
of Social Welfare. The Key benefits were sickness benefit paid for up 
to a year—including dependents—GP ambulatory and domiciliary 
care, dentistry, access to a sick fund dispensary and some specialist 
treatment. Hospital treatment was available on a discretionary basis to 
cover maintenance and treatment in the lowest class of public hospital 
ward for up to four weeks. Further treatment beyond four weeks and 
admission for family members was optional to the fund. Tuberculo-
sis sanatorium treatment could also be recommended where it was 
felt invalidity might be prevented. All hospital referrals were strictly 
controlled with GP recommendations approved by the Medical Officer 
of the Sickness Fund.
‘The guiding principle laid down by the [Central Social In-
surance] Institution make a distinction between cases in which 
hospital treatment is indispensible and those in which it is indi-
cated by the presence of special conditions; they also enumerate 
the cases in which hospital treatment is not indicated.’95
Patients had to be admitted in the case of acute attacks, infec-
tious diseases and where immediate surgical treatment was required. 
Ambiguous cases included those where: no specialist was available 
locally; housing conditions prevented effective treatment at home; the 
patient was too far from the GP for regular attendance; specialist di-
agnosis or treatment was required; a ‘patient is recalcitrant to medical 
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or other supervision’. But the GP and the Fund MO also had to ensure 
that admission was neither ‘unduly prolonged’ nor ended prematurely, 
‘negating the effects of treatment’. Exclusions encompassed chronic 
patients without the prospect of ‘substantial improvement’; those who 
could be treated at home; and ‘in particular, patients disabled by an 
incurable disease’.96
The social insurance scheme in Hungary was similar to Czechoslo-
vakia, though it was more restrictive in terms of coverage with the focus 
on trade and industry, mining and state employees. The self-employed, 
including peasants, were therefore excluded. Access to benefits was 
also similar and included dependents who could be eligible for hos-
pital treatment for up to four weeks. As with other schemes the focus 
was on a GP service closely regulated by the funds with some urban 
dispensaries, access to specialists including gynaecologists for home 
births and the whole overseen locally by a District Practitioner. There 
was significant central state control, with GPs employed on salary and 
the schemes regulated by statute.
Poland was the most complex as it necessitated the development 
of a new scheme to cover the whole nation. Although the Austrian 
system was the preferred model, it proved too expensive to contem-
plate and instead a watered-down version was rolled out across the 
nation in 1934. Insurance was compulsory for all wage earners with 
a contract and for salaried employees up to a certain level. Again, the 
self-employed, including tenant farmers and peasants, were excluded. 
Treatment was only available for 26 weeks, while dependents were 
eligible for just thirteen weeks’ cover. In addition to GP, dental and 
specialist services, funds could grant free maintenance and treatment 
in the general class ward of a public hospital. As elsewhere, institu-
tional treatment was reserved for those who could not be treated at 
home, the infectious, those who needed constant observation, and 
those who would not comply. Unlike the other schemes, there was a 
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
16410.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
small co-payment element ‘intended rather as a means of preventing 
unnecessary consultations than as a participation of the insured person 
in the cost of treatment.’97
Given the low coverage of the health insurance systems—especially 
in rural areas—the hospitals remained dependent on traditional sourc-
es of income to cover the cost of poor patients, though they were also 
able to open their doors to paying patients. The poorest patients were 
charged to the local authorities in Austrian areas or the central state 
through the counties in Hungarian regions. As in France this proved 
highly problematic in the era of rampant inflation that undermined 
the economies of Poland and Hungary until the late 1920s.98 Municipal 
allocations—and even insurance payments - were frequently insuffi-
cient, either because the flat rate subvention did not cover the cost of 
patient treatment or because inflation ate into the daily rates paid. Thus, 
in industrial western Poland in the mid-1920s both midwives and 
doctors complained that the health insurance fund (the Kasa Chorych) 
‘pays not only poorly but very slowly’.99 Even before the depression, 
Kasa Chorych was failing to meet its obligations, owing the hospi-
tals of Warsaw almost two million zlotys in October 1929.100 As the 
depression of the early 1930s peaked across Poland and Hungary, 
health insurance funds failed to pay to the hospitals and with a rising 
number of debtors, hospitals had to close wards and limit capacity. 
In Hungary, this was caused primarily by a shift in the means of paying 
for municipal patients. Up until 1930 the local authorities had paid a 
daily treatment rate but after this point a flat rate fee per capita was 
paid irrespective of the cost of the patient. Hospital managers calculated 
this was equivalent to a 50% reduction in the tariff while the number of 
indigent patients increased by around 20% to two thirds of all admissions 
due to the impact of the depression. One hospital director complained 
that ‘Management by this fixed flat-rate is possible only in one of two 
ways. First, which the hospital has done, is to reduce the number of 
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beds according to the state flat-rate; Second is to compromise the level 
of the treatment. Both of these are anti-social actions’ but clearly ones 
being practiced by managers across the country.101
In one Hungarian hospital the number of debtors increased from 
sixteen in 1929 to 445 in 1936, around half of whom were insured 
patients and the rest poor patients who were the responsibility of the 
council.102 More generally by 1932, Hungarian hospitals were operating 
at only 78% of capacity and one institution reported that it could only 
open 200 of its 600 beds due to lack of funds.103 Although the situation 
in Czechoslovakia was less serious, the sharp increase in unemploy-
ment—to around one third of the insured population in 1933—meant 
the income of the schemes was substantially reduced. As a result the 
insured were forced back on to municipal support—also constrained 
by the depression—or charitable initiatives promoted by the govern-
ment.104 For each of these nations, the main weakness in the system 
was the exclusion of peasants from the insurance scheme. In an echo 
of the feudal era, it was expected that Hungarian landowners would 
meet the health costs of their tenants and workers. As the depression 
put significant downward pressure on agricultural prices and incomes 
many landowners defaulted on this obligation, forcing their peasantry 
onto the local state just as income from taxes was falling.
Hospitals set fees based on three classes of patient. In the Hungarian 
situation, which was similar to that elsewhere, third-class patients paid 
little or nothing with their costs met equally by the community of resi-
dence and the Ministry of Public Welfare (also the case in Slovakia and 
Polish Galicia). The insured were paid by the insurance fund. First-class 
patients had a private room, second-class shared two to three bedroom 
wards. This mix of public and private patients was different to the case 
in England or France—though similar to the US and Germany—and may 
have helped to supplement the income of hospitals in the difficult years 
around 1932 when all institutional funders were struggling.105 Thus, at 
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one small public hospital in north-east Hungary one in six patients paid 
for their own treatment, mostly in the third-class public wards, while 
just over ten per cent were covered by the insurance schemes and two 
thirds by the local state.106 But there was also concern that potential 
paying patients were taking advantage of the hospitals to secure free 
treatment: ‘It cannot be the interest of the provider, nor of the doctors, 
that wealthy patients, misusing the conditions, get beds, food cheaper 
than hotel prices, and medical care for free, at the public’s expense.’107
There was also some philanthropic and charitable income within 
the sector, along with a range of institutions funded partly or wholly 
by employers and mutual funds. The primary philanthropic providers 
were religious bodies and ethnic groups who managed much of the 
chronic care along with services for specific communities. There was 
also a prominent contribution from the Red Cross. Although the Rocke-
feller Foundation did not fund hospitals directly it was instrumental in 
supporting the capital development of services, especially for research 
and nurse training for example in Prague and Cracow.108
Hospitals for a new nation
The countries that emerged from the collapse of the central Europe-
an empires after 1918 had to build both coherent social, ethnic and po-
litical nations and strong states with modern services from their diverse 
inheritances. For Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary this involved the 
development of social welfare, and particularly health, infrastructure 
that would distinguish the new nations and build national identity. 
New hospitals, extended health insurance schemes, and modern social 
care facilities were created as evidence of the commitment of the new 
states to their people. In particular, each nation demonstrated a desire 
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to create a modern, democratic health care system that reflected the 
power and status of an independent nation, free to make its own choices. 
This was especially evident in Poland where a myth had developed that 
the Russians had suppressed their original and well-developed hospital 
system. Writing in Nosokomeion in the 1930s various Polish authors 
pointed to the Russian fear of the Polish hospital services that led to 
them being placed under the dependence of political administrators 
and to their suppression for ‘exclusively political motives’.109
Thus these new states attempted to build their identity through their 
health care policies in a range of areas. Most importantly they sought 
a uniform and generous health insurance scheme and each attempted 
to establish this by the 1930s—though often with limited operational 
effectiveness.110 They also tried to develop curative hospitals over the 
caring regimes that dominated in the institutions they had inherited—
especially in rural areas. The medical profession attempted to establish 
themselves as modern and progressive, even ahead of the traditional 
nations of Europe. In particular through the pages of Nosokomeion, they 
promoted the importance of the health centre model and of hospital 
led extra-mural services, with a Polish doctor active in public health 
management stating in 1934 that the ‘modern hospital cannot longer 
be confined to its conventional work; it must dive into the masses and 
for that purpose it must go beyond its walls.’111 They also sought to 
deliver uniform provision across the country both in terms of standard 
and quality of service and of management and administration. But this 
proved difficult given the persistence of different administrative systems 
for the delivery of hospital services in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
Across the region, we see a focus on the name of the national 
leader—Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, Horthy in Hungary—and of 
symbolic national characters, like St Elizabeth. This naming process 
was particularly applied to new or controversial types of facility, 
like the Masaryk Homes development in Prague which saw traditional 
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sick houses replaced by new social care facilities.112 Similarly, in PKR 
the Czechoslovak state attempted to integrate the new region by im-
proving health facilities—but with a nation building intent. The state 
had nationalised some of the region’s hospitals and focused surpluses 
from the national insurance scheme on rebuilding projects in the east. 
Thus, the planned reconstruction of Ruthenia’s Berehovo Provincial 
Hospital included a new maternity unit and a four-storey surgical 
block for male and female patients. Plans were also in place for three 
other new pavilions for internal, Ear, Nose and Throat, isolation and 
VD and skin.113
In Hungary, the new medical schools and hospitals were a defiant 
response to the losses suffered as a result of the treaty of Trianon. In the 
immediate pre-war period there had been a spate of new public hospi-
tals (seven between 1900-1914) named Erzsébet after the national hero 
St Elizabeth of Hungary. However, a number of the new hospitals built 
in the 1920s and 1930s in border areas to replace institutions seceded to 
neighbours carried highly nationalistic names. The new institution for Bihar 
county on the Romanian border was named Count István Tisza, the prime 
minister of Hungary during the First World War who was assassinated 
at the beginning of the ‘Aster Revolution’ in October 1918. In Debrecen, 
where a new medical school was established, the hospital was called the 
Miklós Horthy Royal State Public Hospital while that in Szikszó took the 
name Ferenc II Rákóczi after the leader of a failed nationalist uprising of 
the early eighteenth century. There were at least two other Miklós Horthy 
hospitals, including an existing institution renamed after 1918.114
Further efforts to modernise and nationalise saw attempts to trans-
form hospital personnel, replacing untrained nuns and patient helpers by 
nursing staff who had completed lengthy, accredited courses. They sought 
to ease out German, Austrian and Hungarian medical staff (there were still 
many German doctors in Silesia in the late 1920s),115 while establishing skill 
and authority through schemes like the Rockefeller Fellowships and the 
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Figure 4.4: Plans for Berehovo Provincial Hospital,  
Ruthenia, 1933
Source: Československá nemocnice, 3,5, 1933, 109 (Reproduced with the permission 
of the National Library of the Czech Republic)
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establishment of national associations. They drew on western examples, 
and, where available, western advice and money.116
However, ethnic diversity made the creation of a unified health 
care system nearly impossible. Many cities had two or three large 
ethnic groups who often set up institutions to provide for their own. 
Duplication of services remained a severe problem, especially in elite 
institutions like universities, medical schools and even hospitals. For 
example, in Czechoslovakia, the German population maintained 
a prominent role in health provision and as a result both Czech and 
German speaking doctors were trained and practiced in Prague’s main 
hospital, alternating clinics on a weekly basis. As the Czechs gradual-
ly took over Charles University, the Germans formed their own Ger-
man University and Medical School. Thus when plans were developed 
for a new hospital in Prague city centre in the late 1930s, two sepa-
rate buildings were envisaged with a 2,800 bed Czech institution and 
a 1,200 bed German facility on the same site sharing key services like 
catering, laundry and laboratories.117 Jewish populations of the east 
also established a range of institutions for their own use. In the ear-
ly 1920s separate nurse training schools existed for Jewish women, 
Gunn noting that ‘in general it may be stated that the mixing of Jewish 
and gentile pupil nurses in the same school presents great difficulties’ 
and he reported that a separate system for Jewish nurses was planned 
with schools in Warsaw, Łódź and Wilno where there were large Jewish 
hospitals to facilitate training.118 As political tensions mounted at the end 
of the period the Rockefeller Foundation found that the Germans refused 
to share a new nurse training institution they were willing to fund and 
insisted on their own classes in German. They eventually walked out and 
formed their own school in 1938.119
The experience of these three states is paradigmatic of the 
experience of most of the post-imperial nations of interwar Central 
and South-East Europe formed by the break-up of the four empires. 
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These were largely multi-ethnic nations that drew on two or more im-
perial inheritances. Economically they were rural and as such struggled 
to raise the levels of finance needed for a modern health care system— 
a task made more difficult by rampant inflation in the 1920s and by the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s. But their inheritances also meant 
they could benefit from the existence of well-established national insur-
ance schemes and a basic hospital infrastructure with professional staff 
trained mostly in the German/Austrian system. The central states were 
also determined to modernise and extend the system—with some success. 
Certainly, by 1938 the number and quality of hospital beds had expanded, 
with concerted attempts to improve provision in the least developed areas 
of eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia and in central Hungary. The later 
1930s saw each nation, and especially Hungary, launch extensive schemes 
to extend access to and provision of hospitals, while specialist, and espe-
cially maternity services, became more widespread. But delivering this 
proved to be a significant challenge as economic crisis, political instability 
and ethnic conflict undermined these schemes, while the rural nature of 
these countries limited their ability to create a robust health infrastructure. 
Moreover, the ambition to create unified and universal systems proved 
very difficult to fulfil, particularly in Czechoslovakia where political and 
ethnic conflict saw the country become less integrated by the end of the 
period. The ambition of these countries to create inclusive, modern health 
care for the new nation foundered on the central state’s inability to fund, 
or create the environment for, a uniform model while the contribution of 
non-state actors proved patchy and parochial. Yet overall, the interwar 
period did see these countries improve their hospital services significantly 
and position health as a major political feature of their political ambitions. 
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Chapter 5
Public, private and voluntary hospitals: economic  
theory and historical experience in Britain, c.1800-2010
Martin Gorsky 
(London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
Introduction
In considering the balance of public and private in the history of 
the British hospital, we may helpfully think in three, rather than just 
two categories: public, private and ‘voluntary’. We may also distinguish 
different periods, particularly across the juncture of 1948, when the 
establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) disrupted existing 
patterns of ownership and financing and heralded a period of active 
management by the central state. Crudely we can classify the public 
hospitals as those funded principally by taxation and overseen by some 
appointed or elected body subject to statutory regulation. The private 
hospitals we may consider as those run for profit and privately owned. 
The voluntary hospitals we may understand as those financed prin-
cipally by philanthropy or mutual funds, staffed largely by honorary 
consultants, constituted as charitable trusts and managed by volunteer 
committees. In the British narrative, the for-profit hospitals do not fig-
ure significantly, though there were numerous nursing and maternity 
homes, commercial ‘lunatic asylums’ and private beds or wings within 
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voluntary hospitals; private hospitals remained of limited scale under the 
NHS. Thus, the dynamic of most interest is that between the voluntary 
and public sectors before 1948, and within the public sector afterwards.
The British hospital has an established narrative of change, 
broadly understood as a social response to industrialisation.1 
The public hospital emerged from the Poor Law workhouse and 
was systematically developed in the Victorian period. Psychiatric 
hospitals—‘asylums’—were predominantly provided by county or 
municipal councils and from the 1870s local government also over-
saw isolation hospitals for infectious diseases. Voluntary hospitals 
emerged in the eighteenth century, then proliferated, generally pri-
oritising acute but non-infectious diseases, and leaving long-stay, 
‘chronic’ and psychiatric patients to the public sector. This changed 
in the twentieth century as municipal hospitals and public infirma-
ries expanded general care. A radical break occurred in 1948, when 
the NHS Acts took the voluntary hospitals into public ownership, 
also incorporating local government hospitals, public asylums and 
many ex-Poor Law institutions. NHS history breaks into an early 
statist period marked by central planning, albeit ineffective, then 
from the 1980s an effort to introduce market disciplines under the 
aegis of ‘neo-liberalism’. There was also a trend of dehospitalisation, 
as technological and surgical processes allowed for shorter stays and 
community treatment. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the changing relationship 
between public, private and voluntary sectors over this long peri-
od. As a framing device, it will use a body of theory drawn prin-
cipally from welfare economics, which makes normative claims 
about the strengths and weaknesses of each sector. After introducing 
these ideas, the discussion that follows asks how adequately they 
address four questions that are not usually confronted explicitly: 
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1. How to explain the growth of the hospital since the eighteenth 
century, and the distribution of activity between private, 
public and voluntary sectors?
2. How to explain the transfer of control from the voluntary 
sector and local government to the central state in the NHS 
system reform of 1946-8?
3. How to explain the pattern of decline of the hospital in 
the later twentieth century, and the distribution of activity 
between the public and private sectors?
4. How to explain and appraise the market-oriented manage-
ment reforms adopted in the NHS since the 1980s?
The analysis synthesises existing work based on what is already 
a rich literature, combining policy history with a strong quantitative 
underpinning. 
Market, voluntary and state failure
A preliminary conceptual framework to aid thinking about the 
sectoral dynamics of the British hospital is presented in Figure 5.1. 
This proposes various positive ‘virtues’ of the market, voluntary 
institutions, and the state as providers of health care, and also various 
inherent ‘failures’ that may explain why each predominates at differ-
ent times. As outlined below, it is constructed from the longstanding 
literature of welfare economists, and more recently from the fields of 
health economics and third sector analysis. 
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Figure 5.1: A conceptual model of hospital sectors in time
It is axiomatic to classical economic theory that free markets can 
most directly satisfy human needs. Competition drives innovation and 
quality, the price mechanism optimises the balance between supply 
and demand, and an ‘invisible hand’ ensures that by meeting individ-
ual utility markets will increase the general welfare.2 However, theory 
had also to contend with the growth of public expenditure. Adolph 
Wagner’s ‘law’, propounded in Bismarckian Germany, first claimed 
this as an inexorable concomitant of economic growth.3 Later there 
developed the concept of public goods, whose benefits (‘positive exter-
nalities’) extended to all, not just their immediate purchasers—urban 
sanitation systems that reduce infectious disease, for example. To avert 
‘free riding’ by other beneficiaries, collective intervention could be jus-
tified. Another market failure could arise from imperfect information, 
where the purchaser lacked the requisite knowledge to assess the price 
of a technically complex service, such as medicine. This introduced a 
‘trust failure’, where sellers might be tempted to profiteer, particularly if, 
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as in the case of doctors, they exercised a professional monopoly. It was 
also arguable that health care was not really a consumer good at all, 
because the catastrophic expense of serious illness might price supply 
beyond the means of average earners.4
What about voluntarism? An economic ‘language of sectors’ 
emerged in the mid-twentieth century, making general claims about 
the capabilities and limits of charity, as it reoriented under the welfare 
state.5 This asserted the voluntary sector’s role was to pioneer new forms 
of intervention, reach hitherto neglected groups, produce individualised 
services, and advocate for change. In this sense, it could address insuf-
ficiencies of supply when catastrophic costs threatened and, because 
it was premised on philanthropic ethics, could resolve trust failures. 
It was also unfettered by the bureaucracy or need for consent that accom-
panied state action.6 However, voluntary failures were also observed. 
The problem remained of free riders enjoying the positive externalities 
funded by charitable citizens alone, not least in public health.7 Other 
weaknesses were a lack of co-ordinating mechanisms, undemocratic 
governance, under-resourcing, amateurism of the workforce and polit-
ical ineffectiveness. Third sector theorists subsequently augmented this 
catalogue. Philanthropy was inherently insufficient and geographically 
uneven, because its spontaneous nature, its reliance on wealthy givers, 
and its lack of coordinating mechanisms meant that supply could not 
match demand. Charity’s paternalist and hierarchical overtones also 
offended equity considerations.8
These failures opened the way for the state. Whether through man-
datory insurance or social security, public funding ensured sufficiency 
of supply while averting free riding in the provision of public goods. 
Planned distribution could overcome geographical or social uneven-
ness, and bureaucrats appointed on merit could deliver professional 
administration. Trust failures from information asymmetries could 
be overcome through expert oversight of pricing, and sanctions. Yet 
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against these virtues, the lineaments of state failure were soon set out, 
both by Hayekian neo-liberals and by rational choice theorists. Because 
bureaucrats seek to maximise their own utility rather than pursuing the 
public interest, they will try always to enlarge departmental budgets 
to obtain status and power.9 Nor does the state necessarily prevent 
rent-seeking by professionals.10 Instead there is a tendency to ‘provider 
capture’ by public employees—doctors, nurses, administrators—who 
organise services to suit their own preferences, not the consumers’.11 
The patient meanwhile lacked the levers of ‘voice and exit’, which in 
market settings would permit the expression of demand.12
So much for theory—what about application to historical exam-
ples? To the extent they exist, these addressed the supersession of 
voluntary, local or market approaches by the central state.Wagner 
had attributed his ‘law’ to technological costs, the desire for educa-
tion and culture, and the social frictions arising from urbanisation. 
Polanyi argued that the ‘practical and pragmatic’ advance of social 
legislation responded to the ‘objective’ needs of industrial societies 
to manage the ‘weaknesses … inherent in a self-regulating market’, 
a functionalist ‘countermove’ against ‘degradation’.13 Peacock and 
Wiseman’s long-run study of British public expenditure observed this 
rising at a far greater rate than GDP, indicating a ‘natural ... propensity’ 
of democratic citizens to consume desirable services, compounded 
by the ‘displacement effects’ of war, which legitimised state action.14 
New right readings interpreted the same processes first as vote-seek-
ing by cavalier politicians, and later as the errors of socialism, which 
overturned the successes of capitalist welfare.15
The following discussion asks how well this welfare economics 
model of sectors explains historical transformation in the hospital. 
Its appropriateness need not be presumed prima facie, for its different 
components were designed to illuminate the present, not to explain 
change. Despite the accoutrements of social science, such theory was 
Public, Private and Voluntary Hospitals in Britain
187 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
usually developed from assumptions about behaviour rather than 
empirical testing. Where causation was identified, it was generally 
in very unspecific terms, evoking broad shifts of majority opinion in 
liberal democracies. Nonetheless, in what follows it provides a useful 
heuristic to begin thinking about the problems of growth, change and 
decline within the three hospital sectors. 
Before 1948: patterns of growth and sectoral distribution
The first point to make is that markets do not appear to have pre-
vailed in early hospital provision. In the modern period, the private 
hospital was most obviously discernible in the area of psychiatric care. 
By about 1800 surveys of the institutional distribution of ‘lunatic’ patients 
showed approximately 200 in private ‘madhouses’, with some 600 in 
charitable asylums (the York ‘Retreat’ for Quakers is the best known), 
and uncertain numbers in the parish or union workhouses and gaols.16 
It seems plausible that small-scale market operators met demand from 
families unable to manage insane kin, although many inmates were in 
fact admitted under contract from Poor Law authorities.17 The main trend 
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the massive 
expansion of the public sector, following legislation in 1808 to establish 
rate-funded county asylums. Thenceforth there was a very large rise in 
the numbers of ‘lunatic’ admissions—from 477 in 1819-20, to 7,144 in 
1850, to 74,004 in 1900—though part of this represented transfers from 
existing Poor Law accommodation.18 Private patients were subsequently 
only a small proportion of the whole: nineteen per cent in 1844, to eleven 
per cent in 1870 and nine per cent in 1890.19
The other manifestation of the public hospital was the infirmary 
function of the Poor Law workhouse. Parish Poor Law accommodation 
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dates back to the Elizabethan origins of statutorily enshrined localist 
poor relief. The power to incorporate several parishes to provide a large 
institution from a broader resource base was originally limited to act 
of Parliament and thus confined to London and major cities—about 
fifteen had done so by 1712.20 Sporadic surveys suggest 129 workhouses 
were open by 1725, 700 by 1732 and by the 1770s there were some 2,000 
institutions, with about 90,000 places.21 Gilbert’s Act of 1782 permitted 
autonomous combinations of parishes into unions, encouraging more 
construction. Workhouses accommodated a mix of inmates including 
the insane, sufferers of infectious diseases, infirm older people, orphaned 
children, homeless or tramping workers, stigmatised single mothers and 
the destitute. The mid-nineteenth century saw systematisation through 
the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834), which created larger administra-
tive ‘Unions’ and a network of institutions financed by local taxes. The 
pattern of the mid-century was initially for approvals of general work-
house building with standardised designs, and subsequently for more 
specialised units, particularly sick wards, within building complexes.22 
Thus, by the early 1900s some workhouses in larger cities had developed 
as public infirmaries, while others had separate infirmary blocks. 
Meanwhile, from the 1870s a network of infectious diseases hospi-
tals emerged, also funded through local property taxes and managed 
by borough and district councils.23 These provided isolation facilities 
for those with notifiable infectious diseases, such as smallpox, scarlet 
fever, typhoid and diphtheria. In 1929 a Local Government Act carried 
forward the development of public general hospitals by ‘breaking-up’ 
the Poor Law and transferring its functions to local councils, who could 
then remove the infirmaries from the stigmas of poor relief and manage 
them as municipal institutions, from which citizens would not be deterred. 
By 1938, as Table 5.1 shows for England, the public infirmaries—general, 
poor law or isolation—remained the most important provider in respect 
of medical care, and also dominated the psychiatric field.
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Table 5.1: Numbers and Percentage Distribution of Hospital Beds  
by Type (excluding asylums) 1861-1938
As for the voluntary hospitals, an early wave of foundations in 
the capitals and provincial cities occurred in the eighteenth century, 
bringing about sixty general and special hospitals into existence.24 
The endowed trust was superseded as main philanthropic vehicle 
by this new style subscriber charity, in which donors were issued 
with admission tickets that they could dispense to applicants (with 
emergency patients admitted automatically).25 After 1800 general 
hospitals opened in most large towns, while specialist institutions 
(maternity, ophthalmic, ear, nose and throat etc.) followed. Finally, 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a cottage hospital 
movement promoted smaller rural institutions.26 Medical education 
was supplied at the largest voluntary hospitals, first by honorary con-
sultants providing clinical teaching for apprentices and subsequently 
through formal links with medical schools.27 By the early twentieth 
century, the transition of voluntary hospitals from primarily phil-
anthropic to primarily medical institutions was complete, with the 
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teaching hospitals now major centres of research, laboratory-based 
diagnosis, clinical training and care.28
What about private care? Pay-beds or wards for general medicine 
were also located in voluntary hospitals, in small numbers, and by 
the 1930s some had built private blocks as money-making concerns. 
In London, where these were most numerous, there were 552 paying 
beds for middle-class patients in 1921, rising to 2,260 by 1938, nearly 
11% of the total.29 This reflected the presence of technical services like 
radiotherapy and orthopaedic surgery, which removed the social stigma 
of entering a hospital. By the 1920s there were also considerable num-
bers of small nursing and maternity homes, with about 26,000 beds.30 
Some were managed by qualified nurses, where eminent doctors at-
tended wealthy patients. Others, prior to licensing legislation (1927), 
were run by unqualified people, and included centres of complementary 
healing, rest cures, and ‘massage houses’.31 There was also a trend to-
wards means-tested user fees in the interwar voluntaries, to compensate 
for the diminution of philanthropic largesse that followed rising tax 
burdens. However, this was quickly offset by the expansion of mass 
contributory schemes based principally on small payroll deductions. 
Given the small scale of the for-profit sector, a private medical insurance 
system was slow to develop.32
How does this first phase fit the specifications of welfare economics 
for state and voluntarism as reaction for market failure? There seems 
no evidence that the modern hospital sprang from an inadequate pri-
vate sector. Nor had that been true of the early or pre-modern hospital. 
As Guenther Risse’s longue durée global survey suggests, the hospital 
has since early times been a ‘house of ritual’, with its disciplines, daily 
routines, uniformed staff and ward organisation.33 Over the very long 
run, an interplay between religion and the state seems to have been 
the driver, whether in the sacred settings of Ancient Greek Asclepeiae, 
or Roman legionary hospitals, or monastic infirmaries, or medieval 
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leper houses, or in the ‘hospitals’ for orphaned children. An ethic of 
‘caritas’ on the one hand, and on the other the expression of collective 
purpose by ruling elites, have always mattered most, not the imperative 
of commerce. 
It could however be argued that the new public hospitals responded 
to a different kind of market failure under early capitalism. Foucault’s 
concept of a ‘great confinement’ discernible across Europe puts it in simple 
terms. New spaces of constraint were created by governments—France’s 
hôpital general, Britain’s workhouse, the German Zuchthaus—to house 
populations defined by their place outside the labour force, including 
the mad, the sick, the ‘beggar’, the ‘vagabond’ and the ‘moral libertine’.34 
For Foucault, this was the assertion of ‘bourgeois order’ through the local 
arms of the state.35 The British workhouses, in which public hospital care 
became embedded, restricted mobility by localising entitlement. Eligibility 
was also anchored to the complementary ‘out-relief’ system, providing 
doles to manage labour market seasonality. More than this though, 
they represented the liberal creed that poverty amongst working-age 
adults was moral failing, legitimising crusades against out-relief after 1834 
and again in the 1870s.36 The gradual distinction between the hospital 
and workhouse function was therefore in part a recognition that sickness 
caused poverty regardless of character—the germ of the catastrophic 
costs insight—and so justifiable as both humanity and efficiency.37 Yet the 
underlying rationale of separating categories of pauper into deserving 
and undeserving of aid also meant that as medicalisation proceeded 
standards tended to be low, with the work disdained by doctors. 38
The rise of the county asylums also testifies to the default role of 
the state, rather than the market or charity, in segregating and managing 
populations unable to negotiate the transition to modernity. Alongside 
traditional physical restraint, the public asylum adopted new thera-
peutic routines, which sought to manage insanity in an environment of 
work, morality and order that instilled social norms and self-control.39 
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Scholarship typically treats the expanding populations of county asylums 
as a response to rapid urbanisation, which disrupted the solidarities of 
kinship and community through which emotional distress and psychi-
atric illness had formerly been dealt.40 Thus, as fast as the state provided 
accommodation, so isolated individuals or the families of the insane 
increased their utilisation—an early manifestation of ‘Roemer’s Law’, 
that demand for health services tends to follow supply.41
What explains the emergence of the British voluntary hospital? 
In the European context, this was unusual, as elsewhere a single hos-
pital sector that blended philanthropy and public financing was more 
typical. In part, the voluntary hospital was the obverse of the Poor Law, 
similarly founded on assessment of entitlement. Its patients were those 
who merited benevolent support rather than state assistance premised 
on dependency; here was more forthright acknowledgement that unpre-
dictable and potentially catastrophic illness could impoverish prudent 
wage-earners. This judgment manifested in the inpatient admission system 
revolved around obtaining a subscriber’s letter from a local dignitary 
or businessperson. In practice the ‘deserving/undeserving’ binary was 
muddy, with quite similar patient populations and voluntary admissions 
favouring recent in-migrants without a Poor Law settlement or kinship 
support. Voluntary provision was therefore also a way of managing the 
labour mobility necessary for economic growth, by prioritising adults of 
working age with maladies susceptible to cure. 42 The ubiquity of major 
local employers as donors or subscribers (increasingly through firms 
rather than as individuals) ought not to be read as kindness alone.43
However, it would be reductionist to attribute the voluntary hos-
pital entirely to concerns for human capital and social order. Part of the 
explanation lies with the supply side: the charitable resources generated 
by the peculiar combination of factors that underlay British economic 
dynamism—high agricultural productivity, colonial ‘ghost acres’ pow-
ering trade, finance and services, and the classic industrial revolution 
Public, Private and Voluntary Hospitals in Britain
193 10.5920/PoliticalEconomy.fulltext
in textiles, metals and cheap energy. Also important was the social and 
political appeal of voluntary association to the urban middle classes.44 
This provided the basis of a new public sphere that undergirded net-
works of trust, sociability and civic action for both men and women. 
The personalised admission ticket system also tightened bonds of ob-
ligation within hierarchical societies, in ways that the depersonalising 
Poor Law did not. Finally, because the voluntary hospitals largely accom-
modated ‘deserving’ patients with acute diseases, honorary consultants 
could work in them without loss of social status. Hence it was here that 
biomedicine became grounded once the Paris revolution in clinical practice 
diffused outwards, and a more thoroughgoing medicalisation took place. 
1942-8 Explaining the critical juncture
For the hospital, the mid-twentieth century establishment of the 
British NHS marked a distinct break in several respects. The broad pa-
rameters of the 1946-7 legislation ensured universal population coverage, 
comprehensive service provision meeting needs ‘from cradle to grave’, 
and progressive tax-funding which rendered access free at the point 
of use. 45 Within this settlement, voluntary hospitals were ‘transferred’ 
from their ‘governing body or trustees’ and ‘vested’ in the Minister of 
Health.46 Effectively this was compulsion, though hospitals could apply 
to be ‘disclaimed’; 230 were so treated, mostly small religious institu-
tions, hospices and convalescent homes.47 They now came under the 
control of appointed statutory bodies, which also oversaw the former 
Poor Law and local government hospitals. Existing charitable endow-
ments were taken over by the state, although the teaching hospitals 
retained theirs, with the restriction that they could only be spent on 
‘non-core NHS’ areas: amenities for patients and staff, medical research, 
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and building improvements. Financing came from general taxation, 
supplemented by a small proportion from national insurance. This built 
on a growing consensus about the justice of basing state revenue on 
high levels of income tax, both as a response to the Depression, then to 
finance the war effort.48 Along with the demise of locally raised funding 
went grassroots democracy, hitherto exercised through the local ballot 
box or on voluntary hospital management committees (which by the 
1930s, combined patrician, bourgeois and worker governors).49 Instead 
control now resided with the central state, through the accountability 
of the Minister of Health to Parliament. Private beds were permitted 
to continue, as a necessary compromise to win professional consent 
for the reform, but hospital consultants (though not GPs) now became 
salaried staff. 
The short-term narrative of change runs as follows. In the late 
1930s a momentum grew amongst health bureaucrats, ‘think-tanks’, 
progressive doctors and leftist social reformers in favour of health sys-
tem reform, with ministerial discussions sparked by funding difficulties 
in the London teaching hospitals. During wartime, the policy process 
quickened pace, in response to ‘Assumption B’ of the Beveridge Report, 
which stated the necessity of a comprehensive health service within 
a universalist welfare state. The coalition government introduced 
proposals for this, including reform of voluntary hospital funding, 
sidelining charity and mutualism in favour of taxation, and this in 
turn sharpened debate about how public accountability would follow. 
The interest groups (doctors, hospital leaders, contributory schemes, 
local government) disagreed on the optimal arrangements and dead-
lock ensued. Labour’s sweeping victory in 1945 gave Bevan a free hand 
to override these interests with his bold solution, for in reality only the 
doctors wielded any political leverage. The BMA was duly pacified 
with the concession on private beds, and by generous remuneration: 
GPs remained mostly private contractors to the service, while hospi-
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tal consultants became salaried. On 5 July 1948, the ‘appointed day’, 
the NHS was launched. 
Does the welfare economics model, which foregrounds volun-
tary failure and shifting ‘majority opinion’, provide an adequate 
explanation for the hospital settlement? There is good evidence that 
spatial distribution of voluntary hospital beds was highly uneven, 
and often inequitable. The ‘caprice of charity’, in Aneurin Bevan’s 
words, favoured London and wealthy towns like Bath and Oxford, 
while manifesting an ‘inverse care law’ of under-resourcing in poor 
areas like South Wales.50 However, the pattern of municipal hospital 
provision was increasingly plugging these gaps, and in this sense a 
public/voluntary mix still remained viable.51 Charitable insufficiency 
also challenged some hospitals. Current account deficits and ero-
sion of capital reserves worsened during the 1930s, as expenditure 
on staffing, equipment and supplies soared. In part this reflected 
the inability of middle-class philanthropy to keep pace with patient 
needs, and although the voluntary sector also generated the solu-
tion of mass contributory schemes, these further fueled demand.52 
Again though, financial shortages were limited to particular areas 
and types of hospital (such as teaching hospitals in London and the 
North West) and there were also locations where the charity of major 
donors and community activists remained robust.53 Bevan also made 
clear he found voluntary paternalism ‘repugnant’, and there is some 
evidence of class resentment at hospital patronage in Mass Observa-
tion surveys and diaries.54 Finally, voluntary particularism was also 
critiqued in a policy discourse replete with tropes like ‘co-ordination’, 
‘integration’ and ‘co-operation’ that highlighted the disjointed na-
ture of the existing provision. Though yoked to greater state agency, 
this was, paradoxically, a language of the market, derived from indus-
trial management where the vertical integration of the firm similarly 
promised systematic planning and cost saving.55
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Beyond this, the case for a shifting social climate in favour of a 
centralised single-payer system is implicit, not overt. The marked 
transition of voluntary funding from benevolence to mass contribution 
(albeit with some charitable overtones) could be read as signalling public 
acceptance of collective funding, rather than enduring commitment to 
voluntarism. This was certainly the interpretation of Ministry of Health 
civil servants.56 Also heralding change was the demise of the Poor Law, 
now incorporated within local government, and renamed ‘public assis-
tance’ to destigmatise access. The idea that consuming public services 
was a right of citizenship became accepted, and a broad consensus was 
established around the existing tax and social insurance structure that 
maintained it.57 That said though, there is no evidence in contemporary 
opinion poll data of thirst for reform. On the contrary, most were satisfied 
with the existing mixed economy, and this only changed somewhat in 
1942-5 after the Beveridge Report was disseminated.58
In sum, while the welfare economics model provides context for the 
NHS system change, its evidence is too ambiguous to offer a fundamental 
explanation. Other causes were contingent, such as the effect of the Second 
World War, ratcheting the pace of state action through the creation of an 
Emergency Medical Service. This empowered government to manage the 
whole hospital sector to cope with civilian and military war casualties, 
stabilising hospital finances, rationalising labour flows, and accustoming 
the population to public control.59 Another relevant consideration is the 
role of the labour movement. The comparative historiography, pointing 
for example to the Scandinavian and New Zealand experience, argues 
that in periods of social democratic party-political control, welfare policy 
will be more generous and expansive.60 To the extent that the NHS was 
the creation of a majority Labour government, and Bevan himself a left-
wing tribune schooled in the coalminers’ union, this has some salience. 
But again, it is an incomplete account. Much of the reform process had 
occurred earlier, under the cross-party wartime coalition government. 
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Moreover, while some socialists and trade unionists clearly advocated 
public provision, Britain’s labour movement had no unitary position.61 
Many trade unionists were also voluntary hospital worker governors, 
content with the status quo; others favoured extending coverage through 
social insurance, not taxation; and the left generally envisaged a local 
government health service, not one under the central state.62
A final aspect of this complex web of causes is the ‘institutionalist’ 
analysis, which argues that the nature of the state and the legislative 
process is the key determinant.63 The British state had several features 
that facilitated radical change. It was essentially a two-party system, 
where elections periodically delivered the winner a strong governing 
majority, where legislative proposals came predominantly from Cabinet, 
where members’ loyalty to the party whip was the norm, and where law 
making was unhampered by an obstructive second chamber or a complex 
committee system. Also in play were path-dependent processes—in the 
sense of former policy decisions that shaped later trajectories. In particu-
lar, the early introduction of national health insurance (NHI) in 1911 had 
accustomed much of the population to state entitlements, while raising 
expectations for their expansion (not least to include hospital coverage). 
64 NHI had also undermined the opposition of the British Medical Asso-
ciation. Formed in 1832, since the 1890s this had functioned increasingly 
as the doctor’s trade union, initially defending their interests as friend-
ly society employees.65 Though vocally opposing the NHS proposals, 
its membership proved more amenable, having experienced the personal 
economic advantages of state provision since 1911. Probably ministers also 
concluded that apparently implacable hostility was just sabre-rattling. 
A narrow welfare economics explanation therefore furnishes only 
part of the context for the coming of Britain’s NHS, and the consequent 
impact on hospitals. Other contributing factors were the impact of war, 
the position of labour and the conducive institutional setting, and last but 
not least, the electoral mathematics favouring the Atlee government.66
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1948-2010 The changing pattern of hospital  
provision and utilisation
In the NHS era, the pattern of sectoral distribution had changed, 
such that hospitals were now predominantly public institutions. Initially 
only limited private provision remained under the new dispensation, 
although, as Table 5.2 illustrates, it was soon to grow. 
Table 5.2: Private Medicine under the NHS, UK 1955-2009






Private Medical Insurance    Independent Acute Hospitals
Population 
Coverage % Hospitals Beds
Private spend
as % UK total
1970 930 3.6
1975 1,087 4.1
1980 1,647 6.4 154 7,035
1985 2,380 8.9 200 9,955 9.9
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It had survived a fierce debate when the Labour government 
(1974-9) sought to phase out pay beds in NHS hospitals. Not only 
did this boost separate private hospital foundations, it also failed in 
its own terms, with NHS pay beds first falling from 4,919 (1974) to 
2,819 (1981), then rising to 3,144 by 1983, following legislation reinsti-
tuting NHS consultants’ rights to private practice.67 Private hospital 
expansion of capacity also followed the fostering of commercial med-
ical insurance by government from the 1980s. Insurance companies 
such as BUPA and Medicash were descendants of the contributory 
scheme movement, initially retaining a non-profit stance and socially 
responsible ethics.68 Another pre-war philanthropic foundation, 
the Nuffield Trust, became a significant hospital provider outside 
the NHS. Other private insurers and hospitals were more purely 
commercial, and their presence in the British medical market was aided 
in the 1990s and 2000s by the liberalisation of international trade in 
services, promoted by the European Union and the World Trade Organ-
isation.69 More recently, a policy of encouraging NHS commissioners to 
consider ‘any qualified provider’ when tendering for services opened 
further opportunities for sectoral growth.
The other main pattern of change, shown in Table 5.3, lay within 
the public sector. This was the relative decline of the hospital as a 
locus of health care, in favour of primary and community settings. 
The downward trend of utilisation, and the accompanying reduction 
in bed numbers was visible first and most markedly in the psychiatric 
hospitals. Here volumes began a sequential decline from the 1950s, 
which continued in the 1960s, after the then Minister of Health, Enoch 
Powell, inaugurated a closure policy. A famous speech conjured grim 
imagery of the asylum: ‘isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded over 
by the gigantic water-tower ... rising unmistakable and daunting out 
of the countryside’.70 Part of the aim was to incorporate psychiatric 
units in new general hospitals proposed by the 1962 Hospital Plan, 
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Source: E. Hawe and L. Cockcroft, OHE Guide to UK Health and Health Care Statistics, 
London: Office of Health Economics, 2013, 102; Kathleen Jones, History of the Mental 
Health Services, 358-9; Ewbank, Thompson, McKenna, NHS Hospital Bed Numbers, 































































































Table 5.3: NHS hospital beds and inpatients, 1951—2009/10
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further medicalising a field that had hitherto blended treatment with 
control. Partly it was to devolve greater duties of care to local authority 
welfare departments, increasingly staffed by professional social workers. 
This policy accelerated in the 1980s when it was framed as a transition 
to ‘care in the community’.71
Also underlying the numerical decline of the public hospital were 
changes to general health care. The post-war development of geriat-
ric medicine as a specialty had reduced hospitalisation of the older 
infirm. These were patients who had hitherto been abandoned to the 
‘therapeutic nihilism’ of the residential or infirmary wards of Poor 
Law institutions, where low staffing and skill levels militated against 
active treatment.72 Now bed throughput levels rose, and length of stay 
declined, again benefitting from the extension of community services 
such as home helps, home nursing and ‘meals-on-wheels’ (originally 
a wartime innovation). Over time the material fabric of the Poor Law 
legacy was replaced by new hospitals and old peoples’ homes (though 
many sturdy ex-workhouses and asylums enjoy postmodern afterlife 
as residential housing or business centres).73 Technological and surgical 
changes also reduced the length of time spent in acute hospital beds. 
Numerical decline has been long-term, since a peak in the early 1960s. 
Between 1979 and 2012 there has been there been an overall decline of 
59%. This was composed of a 35% fall in acute beds, with much larger 
reductions in geriatric (65%), psychiatric (74%), and maternity (58%) 
beds, hardly offset by a small rise in numbers of day beds (for very 
short stays) to 8.7% of the total bed stock by 2016/17.74
What can the welfare economics model contribute to explaining 
these different patterns? A ‘state failure’ argument was certainly in-
troduced by proponents of private hospitals, initially in response to 
empirical evidence of two areas of difficulty for the NHS—waiting lists, 
which were held to be caused by the moral hazard inherent in a free 
service, which produced excess demand, and the continuing spatial 
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inequities of funding, beds and specialist care, which the reform still 
had not alleviated by the 1960s.75 In the 1980s, as enthusiasm rose for 
privatisation, it was suggested these shortcomings might be obviated 
by commercialising hospital care, so that the price mechanism would 
adjust supply to demand more effectively.76 Conversely, as Thatcherite 
austerity restrained public expenditure, the argument changed. Now 
it was proposed that fostering private hospitals would ease the burden 
of state insufficiency, by siphoning well-heeled patients off towards 
comfortable paying hospitals; this justified generous tax treatment 
for private insurance.77 Subsequently, as NHS commissioning from 
the private sector increased, initially for ancillary services, and more 
recently for medical care, the emphasis changed again. Now the focus 
was on the greater efficiencies that a private hospital should be able 
to achieve, thanks to the spur of the profit motive so lacking in state 
institutions.78
The empirical evidence underpinning all this has been ambiguous 
and hampered by poor data. In the 2000s, economists evaluated the 
results of NHS contracting from ‘independent sector treatment centres’ 
(ISTCs). Critics had worried about ‘cream-skimming’, whereby ISTCs 
concentrated on less challenging procedures from which it was easier 
to make profit, thus leaving the NHS with more difficult, costly cases. 
There was some evidence for this, alongside the perceived benefits 
of driving down waiting lists.79 More recently there have been claims 
that health outcomes were better in regions where commissioners 
have the greatest choice of alternative public and private providers; 
it is hypothesised that this is because competition has galvanised 
hospital managers to greater efforts. However, the outcome data are 
limited, the underlying regressions based on imperfect mapping of 
hospital catchments onto mortality data, and the causal pathways 
uncertain.80 In sum, the survival and growth of the private sector 
needs to be understood less in terms of its positive attributes vis a vis 
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state failure. More important has been the political context in which 
it has operated, with accommodation from the left and positive en-
couragement from the right. 
What about the numerical decline of hospital beds? Neither state 
failure, nor state successes seem particularly apposite as explanations. 
Dehospitalisation has been a feature of all advanced industrial econ-
omies, with the reasons primarily located in technological change, 
the greater efficiency of surgical procedures and pharmaceutical ther-
apies, particularly of psychiatric illness. It is certainly arguable that 
British deinstitutionalisation has gone comparatively further and faster: 
in 2004, for example, the UK had about 3 acute beds per 1,000 popu-
lation, whereas European peers like Belgium (7 per 1,000), Germany 
(6.5) and France (4.7) had more. Given that these nations had mixed 
insurance modes of health funding and plural hospital ownership, then 
it may be that the tendency of the single-payer NHS towards greater 
cost-containment has been a factor.81 However, whether or not this has 
made the system relatively more vulnerable to shortages is dependent 
on other factors, such as the availability of social care accommodation, 
and the quality of treatment in primary and community settings. 
With respect to psychiatric beds, the asylum’s demise has been 
much debated by historians of madness. Their main focus has been on 
the medications that have underlain deinstitutionalisation, beginning 
with the antipsychotic chlorpromazine in the 1950s, and subsequently 
antidepressants.82 Some countered this technological account with an 
emphasis on political economy. Was the real motive for Powell’s ‘water 
tower’ speech a desire for a cheaper model of managing the disorderly 
nature of mental illness? Similar suspicions fuelled the critique of late 
twentieth-century community care. A cognate argument is that rather 
than providing a chemical ‘cure’, drug therapies work by altering 
intellectual and emotional processes in potentially harmful ways.83 
At its demise, the asylum has also had its champions, who 
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elegised its humanitarian achievement in providing refuge and care. 
However, it would be difficult to conclude from all this that the im-
perative of restraining expenditure was distinctive to the statist NHS.84 
‘Decarceration’ and the accompanying anti-psychiatry movement was 
a widespread phenomenon, spanning for example Basaglia in Italy, 
Foucault in France, Szasz, Goffmann, Kesey in the USA, and Laing in 
Scotland. If its common theme was state failure, then this was within 
a larger argument about the harmful effects of social control.
Finally, sociology provides another account of the hospitals’ demise 
that is rooted in the concept of medicalisation and neutral towards 
sectoral type.85 This begins from the argument that the hospital’s long 
run transformation from refuge to clinic was a timebound phenom-
enon. As medicine staked a claim to knowledge based on pathology 
and bacteriology, spaces were needed in which medical practitioners 
had bodies readily available for analysis. By the mid-twentieth century, 
the status of biomedicine was assured, and with the decline of infec-
tious disease the clinical gaze began to turn outside the hospital’s walls 
and into the community.86 The cancers and cardio-vascular diseases 
appeared to have preclinical causes, rooted in individual choices about 
behaviour and consumption, long preceding their morbid manifes-
tation. The result was an increasing medicalisation of society itself, 
in which a ‘surveillance medicine’ sought to turn unhealthy consum-
ers into virtuous self-governing subjects.87 Whether this claim has any 
predictive power remains to be seen. The secular decline of hospital 
capacity has certainly continued since it was enunciated, although the 
rate has slowed markedly since 2010. The advantages for fixed costs 
of concentrating expertise in large institutions seem likely to persist. 
For example, the long run retreat from home births in favour of increas-
ingly large hospital obstetric units remains almost complete, despite 
the safety advantage now having disappeared (proportion of births 
at home: 1927—85%; 1948—46%; 1965—28%; 1981—1%; 2010–2.5%).88
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1948 to 2010: NHS hospitals under the state—success or failure?
In arguing for the NHS, Bevan had claimed that centralising and 
nationalising the hospital system would eradicate the inequities of 
access determined by place and local prosperity. It would universalise 
the best, bring serenity ‘in place of fear’ and deliver efficient, effective 
care.89 The assumption behind this, and in the policy documents that 
had informed the debate, was that system integration under responsible 
administrative bodies, coupled with stable financing, would inevitably 
bring this about. How well did the public hospitals perform in the era 
of control by the central state?
Before attempting a general appraisal, it is important to note that 
hospital policy-making, however good or bad, took place within a 
budgetary envelope set from above. With charity now consigned to 
marginal areas, and income from the pay beds minimal, the scope of 
activity was determined by the annual financial settlement. In almost 
every year since 1948, this Exchequer subvention for the NHS included 
a real increase. However, as is well known, the rising proportion of older 
people in the population, and hence the overall prevalence of morbidity, 
has driven a commensurate rise in demand. Technological costs and 
culturally determined expectations of service have also fuelled this. 
However, the pace of real increase to the NHS budget has been quite 
variable over time, with three periods—the early 1950s, the 1980s-1990s, 
and the 2010s—times of relative austerity.90 All three periods have been 
episodes of Conservative government, in which NHS expenditure 
played second fiddle to broader economic policy considerations. 
International comparison also casts light on the financial con-
straints within which hospital policy must be judged. As in Table 5.4, 
this consistently shows British health expenditure to have been 
relatively modest when set against peer nations, whether viewed in 
real per capita terms, or as a proportion of GDP. 
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Table 5.4: Current health expenditure (public and private) as share 
(%) of gross domestic product, UK and comparator nations
Two conclusions are possible. One is that the NHS model has been 
particularly suitable for maximising efficiency and preventing waste. 
The other is that this kind of single payer, centralised system has been 
more vulnerable to under-funding than those based on social insurance 
(Germany, Japan), local taxation (Sweden), or plural sources (United 
States). Until the 1990s, comparative health outcome data was limited 
and tended to support the former; since then however, Britain’s poor 
ranking against indicators like avoidable mortality and cancer survival 
rates has inclined judgment to the latter.91 If so, then it is here that the 
real ‘state failure’ of the NHS model lies, with its ‘institutionalised 
parsimony’ and vulnerability to Conservative retrenchment. 92
The financial constraints of the 1950s explain the initial diffi-
culties faced by the NHS hospitals, when regional health boards 
(RHBs) and their subsidiary hospital management boards (HMBs) 
found themselves unable to implement development plans due to 
lack of resources. Indeed, capital expenditure in the 1950s ran at a 
lower level than in the 1930s. This though is explicable in terms of 
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post-war austerity, when social spending on health took second place 
to that on council housing and school building. Within this context 
the newly integrated management structure did nonetheless deliver 
some achievements. Annual accounting became standardised and sys-
tematic. Savings from fixed costs for energy and laundries, and from 
bulk order of food and supplies, could now be obtained by HMBs, 
which mostly contained a cluster of hospitals. Regional treasurers 
monitored comparative costings and alerted institutions to areas 
of potential waste. Clinical management committees planned the 
distribution of specialists within the region, ensuring that expertise 
became better allocated in light of estimated need (though inter-re-
gional disparities remained).93 Alongside this came the capacity to 
manage the overall hospital stock, for example to further the goals 
of geriatric medicine, or to repurpose the increasingly redundant 
infectious diseases hospitals. 
State direction became more ambitious in the 1960s under Enoch 
Powell’s Hospital Plan. In addition to the asylum closures, planning 
sought to establish optimum bed to patient ratios, then to meet these 
through a network of district general hospitals, which would com-
bine acute, geriatric, psychiatric and other specialty beds. Historical 
verdicts have been unkind to the Plan, though for its execution rather 
than its ambition. It transpired that Britain had neither the building 
capacity, nor sufficient technical expertise, nor the sustained pub-
lic investment capital to support the programme, and much went 
unfulfilled.94 A further problem followed the reduction of geriatric 
beds (based on a contestable ratio), which was made without proper 
reference to the capacity of social care in local government to provide 
complementary services. This was where the ‘bed-blocking’ phenom-
enon began, as the NHS vied with local authorities to shunt infirm 
patients, and their associated costs, across the imprecise health/
social care boundary.95 Here the problem was not state failure per se, 
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but rather Bevan’s decision to create bespoke administrative structures 
for the NHS, instead of situating hospitals within local government, 
where they would have sat alongside community care. 
Faith in statist system planning continued into the 1970s, when 
the problem of spatial inequity was finally tackled by the ‘RAWP’—a 
population-based formula for allocating funding to the regions and 
subsidiary districts. This was politically controversial for it meant 
moving resources away from the traditionally well-funded regions 
of London and the Home Counties to the provinces. The mid-1970s 
also saw a more concerted attempt to improve equity between dif-
ferent areas of the NHS, for the ‘Cinderella services’ of geriatrics and 
mental health had hitherto received disproportionately less funding 
than acute medicine. The programme budgeting initiative began an 
incremental adjustment towards those areas, again in response to a 
calculus of need. In both cases this represented successful, decisive 
action to overturn a stasis built into the system by history, and it 
did not emerge deus ex machina from state processes. It depended 
on conviction leadership by Labour politicians Barbara Castle and 
David Owen, and also on the emergence of experts able to frame 
and implement highly technical policy.96
From the 1980s a raft of policies was introduced that explicitly 
invoked state failure in their justification. The early Thatcher gov-
ernments sought to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness by 
introducing management techniques from the private sector, and by 
treating patients more as customers whose wishes and needs merit-
ed more attention. Notions of ‘provider capture’ were expressed by 
theoreticians of the new public management, though the political 
discourse was more focused on resolving unstable industrial relations 
and upping productivity. First came the principles of Rayner scruti-
nies—target setting, and holding regional heads to account—coupled 
with the Korner health informatics initiatives. Next was the Griffiths 
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Report, inaugurating the replacement of consensual decision-making 
by general management under a single leader. A related attempt to 
import a new cadre of managers from the business world was only 
partially successful.97
Then in 1991 came the ‘internal market’, and a more decisive step 
away from a vertically managed, statist hospital system. The idea was 
to create a hybrid structure, which retained state ownership and financ-
ing, but mimicked market dynamics. It did so by obliging hospitals 
to price and sell their services to purchasing bodies, at first mainly in 
the form of regional and local health authorities, but increasingly of 
locally clustered primary care providers. The New Labour government 
retained this model, though replaced the language of ‘purchasing’ 
with ‘commissioning’. This acknowledged the reality that there was 
little actual ‘market’ competition, because in most places purchasing 
was monopsonistic, and providing monopolistic. Gradually this was 
modified through ISTCs and what came to be called the ‘any qualified 
provider’ scheme, which encouraged commissioning from private sector 
bodies. Commerce was also to be the engine of capital improvement, 
with a ‘private finance initiative’ (PFI) now the norm for new building. 
This operated through government agreeing long-term contracts with 
private companies to build and manage hospitals, and resulted in a 
rapid expansion and renovation of the stock in the Blair/Brown years. 
Has the performance of NHS hospitals under this policy regime 
borne out the driving assumptions of state failure and market strengths? 
The evidence is mixed. The new public management reforms of the 
1980s did not prevent a growing public sense of crisis (arguably driven 
by underfunding) that in turn propelled the late Thatcher govern-
ment towards more radical change.98 Nor did early evaluations of the 
internal market show strong evidence of greater productivity. Part of 
the problem was that commissioning was complex and difficult, with 
the advantages of price information lying on the providers’ side; also, 
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its total cost within the system was opaque, rendering a historical cost/
benefit appraisal impossible.99 Considerable criticism has also been di-
rected against PFI, which locked taxpayers into some costly and disad-
vantageous contracts, just as innovative approaches were moving care 
out of hospitals. As for patient satisfaction, public opinion data shows 
that this has moved closely in step with funding levels, not structural 
reform, rising significantly during the Blair years as Labour increased 
inputs.100 All that said though, commissioning has become settled pol-
icy, and medical professionals generally approve the empowerment 
of primary care on the one hand, and the greater cost-consciousness 
of hospitals on the other. 
It should also be noted that alongside this incorporation of market 
dynamics has been a strengthening of the state’s armoury of control 
over doctors. The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) was 
established in 1997 to approve drugs and therapies, constraining liberty 
of prescription and treatment.101 This was accompanied by Clinical 
Framework Guidelines, which sought to standardise activities accord-
ing to best practice. The use of targets and published league tables 
of hospital activity was the state’s effort to incentivise improvement 
through ‘naming and shaming’; the initial use of this strategy in Eng-
land seemed to be delivering results, but later research suggested no 
sustained effect.102 Similarly, hospitals now had to accept the publication 
of ‘patient reported outcome measures’, which revealed success rates of 
different procedures. Finally, although the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act attempted to remove the last vestiges of hierarchical administration, 
this quickly proved unsuccessful. The aim was to abolish regional au-
thorities, so that the hospital trusts and ‘clinical commissioning groups’ 
would become free agents, operating mostly autonomously, with only 
light touch regulation from the central state.103 Yet almost immediately 
regional authorities had to be reinvented as Structural Transformation 
Plan areas.104 Integrated planning, it transpired, was necessary after all. 
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In sum, although state failure was much invoked in recent years, 
the evidence for its existence is not compelling. Moreover, administrative 
and political preference led the British to retain a statist system, but 
seek to improve it by making it more responsive to price and demand. 
Again, it is not very clear whether these strategies have really achieved 
their goal. In 2010, as New Labour faltered, NHS indicators of pro-
ductivity, waiting times and satisfaction were all extremely positive.105 
However, it remains perfectly plausible that this is explained by the 
sustained funding increases of 2000-2010, rather than by the internal 
market model of the Blair/Brown years.
Conclusion
The main focus of this discussion has been the changing bal-
ance of the public, private and voluntary sectors in the history of the 
British hospital. It has interrogated a conceptual model drawn from 
the welfare economics literature which proposed that each sector has 
certain attributes. The hypothesis was that in the medical field, there 
are some things that the private hospital can do well, but other things 
it does badly, and so too for the voluntary and the public hospital. 
To explain change then, we might confirm empirically the existence of 
these attributes, then look for evidence of shifts in opinion about their 
relative desirability.
In applying this model to the long-run pattern of change it does 
seem to offer some helpful insight, at least based on the British case. 
For example, there was the historic marginality of the private hospi-
tal, initially important in mental health care, but quickly superseded, 
and retaining only a small share of general hospital activity, including 
under the NHS, when it served wealthier individuals seeking greater 
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comfort or speedier attention. Instead, the state and voluntary sectors 
were always dominant in hospital provision, because some form of 
collective arrangement was needed to regulate financing, above and 
beyond an individual’s capacity to pay fees. The state’s importance was 
in marshalling resources for marginal groups that sickness had cast 
outside the labour market, and whose distress needed to be managed, 
for reasons of humanity and social stability. The voluntary hospital 
emerged to provide care for sick people within the labour market, 
and was less discriminatory.
However, the welfare economics framework did not seem suffi-
cient to explain moments of significant political transition, other than 
as general context. Instead, to reach a satisfactory account of change 
was to acknowledge more complex patterns of causation, in which so-
cial and political history mattered as well as economic. This raises the 
question of whether the positivist claims on which the model draws 
are valid. Instead perhaps its assumptions about inherent attributes are 
chimera—either descriptions of transitory phenomena, or normative 
judgments? International comparison should provide further insight 
into this question, and hence into whether this way of conceptualising 
the hospital sectors is useful for understanding historical change.
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Chapter 6
The American Hospital:  
Charity, Public Service, or Profit Centre?
Beatrix Hoffman 
(Northern Illinois University)
The United States has the most expensive health system in the 
world, costing over 17% of the country’s gross national product. 
Of the nation’s total health costs, slightly less than half is paid through 
the public sector (especially the programmes Medicare and Medicaid), 
and slightly more than half through the private sector (especially 
private insurance companies). The largest portion of health spending 
(33%) goes to hospitals, about 80% of which are designated non-prof-
it. U.S. hospitals receive 60% of their income from taxpayer funds, 
and have an average profit margin of 8%. Despite its massive health 
expenditure, 27 million people in the U.S. have no health insurance.1
This brief statistical overview highlights some of the ma-
jor paradoxes of the American health care and hospital systems. 
As Rosemary Stevens writes in her unsurpassed study In Sickness and 
in Wealth, ‘[t]he essential dilemma for American hospitals is that they 
are both public and private.’2 The vast majority of hospitals are pri-
vately owned and operated, but receive a large part of their revenues 
from public spending. In addition, hospitals work both to serve the 
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public, and to generate profits. The complex funding mechanisms 
and contradictory missions of U.S. hospitals have resulted in high 
costs and serious obstacles to universal access. 
This chapter examines one particular aspect of the paradox: U.S. 
hospitals’ obligations to serve those who cannot pay. While hospitals’ 
commitment to the poor has changed dramatically since the nation’s 
founding, these institutions are still expected to provide some un-
compensated care, or ‘charity’, for the many Americans who fall 
through the system’s gaping holes. The paradox has only intensified 
as hospitals partially transformed from charities to profit centres, and 
as funding sources moved from voluntary donations to patient fees 
and public and private insurance. After briefly tracing the history of 
these transformations, this chapter will focus on the period since 1970 
to examine how the public, media, and government have responded 
to the tension between hospitals’ profit-making and charity-giving 
roles. The failure of the United States to adopt universal coverage has 
led to the continuing practice of channeling public funds to private 
institutions that provide what is still called ‘charity care.’
The Hospital Paradox
Hospitals in the United States fall into three general categories: 
voluntary (now called non-profit), public, and for-profit. The first 
voluntary hospitals, based on the British model of private ‘non-prof-
it institutions funded by philanthropy or patients’ contributions’,3 
opened in Philadelphia and New York in the two decades before the 
American Revolution. Public institutions run by local governments also 
have a long history in the U.S., including almshouses or poorhouses 
(which sometimes served a health care function), municipal and county 
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hospitals, and state insane asylums. The federal (national) government 
funded marine hospitals for the care of sick and disabled sailors and, 
by the twentieth century, a system of hospitals for veterans. A third 
category, proprietary or for-profit hospitals, emerged in the late nine-
teenth century. Until the 1970s, most proprietary hospitals were small, 
and owned by physicians.4
But these categories do not capture the complex and shifting mix-
tures of funding sources and patient populations that characterise 
most hospitals in the U.S. The voluntary hospital, especially, has been 
a tangle of contradictions. Founded to provide free care to the indigent 
poor, by the late nineteenth century most had also begun accepting 
paying patients (in part to fund their charity services). And, although 
heavily dependent on individual donations, voluntary hospitals were 
never entirely private; state and local government contributions to 
these types of hospitals were common throughout the 1800s. Private 
charity coexisted with traditions of local government responsibility for 
paupers or the indigent that dated back to the Elizabethan Poor Law.5
Despite this long tradition of public support, voluntary hospitals 
vigorously asserted their autonomy from government interference, 
particularly their right to choose which patients to accept. This was 
especially true in the case of racial segregation: the widespread refusal 
of voluntary hospitals to accept patients of colour led to the establish-
ment of separate institutions, owned and run by African Americans, 
by the late nineteenth century.6 The ideology of voluntarism also played 
a powerful role in the defeat of proposals for compulsory health 
insurance legislation in the 1910s, when it was invoked by hospitals, 
physicians, and business leaders alike, who all insisted that government 
intervention would erode individual choice in medical care.7
Hospitals’ mixing of public and private intensified during the 
Great Depression, when private voluntary hospitals insisted that they 
deserved increased funding from the government to meet the heavy 
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demand from patients who could not pay. Some threatened to close their 
doors if state subsidies were not forthcoming. In 1934, the American 
Hospital Association declared that ‘local government funds should be 
used to pay for service in voluntary hospitals’ because ‘the care of the 
indigent sick is the fundamental responsibility of government bodies.’ 
Government responded, and by 1935, the amount received by U.S. 
voluntary hospitals from state and local tax funds had surpassed their 
receipts from private charitable giving. But the increase in government 
funds did not disturb the voluntary hospitals’ private orientation, and 
indeed inspired them to reassert it. As one administrator said, hospitals 
should ‘welcome governmental assistance to aid us in rendering help, 
but never permit Government to control us.’8
This blend of public funding and private control would find 
its greatest expression in the post-war federal hospital construction 
programme known as Hill-Burton, which emerged out of fight for 
national health insurance led by President Harry S. Truman from 
1945 to 1950. Conservatives in Congress sought to forestall a na-
tional programme by supporting only one part of the proposal, 
hospital construction, that would expand access but fall far short of 
universal coverage. The Hill-Burton Act aimed to use federal, state, 
and local funds to build new hospitals in the 40% of U.S. counties that 
lacked them. By the end of the twentieth century, Hill-Burton would 
help finance 6,800 hospitals, health centres, and nursing homes in 
4,000 communities around the country. Although the post-war hospi-
tal system was built with government dollars, Hill-Burton preserved 
hospitals’ managerial autonomy by law, and even allowed Southern 
hospitals to continue the practice of Jim Crow racial segregation until 
the mid-1960s.9
Since Truman’s national health insurance proposal was defeat-
ed, hospital construction was not accompanied by any provision for 
people to pay for care in the new hospitals. Hospitals themselves 
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had already invented the Blue Cross system of service benefits for 
hospital care, at the beginning of the Great Depression. Throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s, private health insurance, including Blue Cross, 
Blue Shield for physicians’ fees in the hospital, and commercial 
indemnity insurance, paid for a large and growing portion of care 
in hospitals (and inarguably helped encourage overuse of hospitals 
and subsequent inflation of hospital costs).10 Labour unions, which 
had previously supported national insurance, in the 1950s decided to 
focus on obtaining Blue Cross or commercial hospitalisation coverage 
for their members through collective bargaining. This shift, alongside 
federal regulations that gave favorable tax status to employer-pro-
vided insurance, unintentionally created the distinctive U.S. system 
of health insurance tied to employment.11
But private health insurance left out large portions of the popu-
lation: the poor, workers in jobs without benefits, and especially the 
elderly. Hospital and insurance officials warned that if a way was not 
found to cover these vulnerable groups, the government would have 
to step in. Their predictions came true when Medicare (social insur-
ance coverage for people age 65 and over) and Medicaid (state-federal 
coverage for the poor) were approved by Congress in 1965 as part 
of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great Society’.12
While bringing health coverage to millions for the first time, 
Medicare also proved to be a financial windfall for hospitals. Thanks 
to extensive lobbying by the medical profession and hospital industry, 
the legislation expressly forbade any regulation of physicians’ fees 
or hospital costs. Hospitals would charge Medicare ‘retrospectively’ 
(after services were delivered) for what hospitals themselves deemed 
‘reasonable costs’, plus an additional 2% (known as ‘cost plus’). 
In the decade following Medicare’s passage, the average cost per 
patient per day more than doubled, and hospitals’ total assets rose 
from $16.4 billion to $47.3 billion. Alongside the growing costs of 
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medical care in general (due to new technologies and treatments, 
higher labour costs, and overall inflation), Medicare payments 
to doctors and hospitals helped drive the rise in national health 
expenditures from $198 per capita in 1965 to $336 by 1970.13
The American Medical Association had hired actor Ronald Rea-
gan in 1961 to decry the Medicare proposal as a herald of socialism.14 
But, as Rosemary Stevens has explained, Medicare’s massive infusion of 
government funding had the ironic effect of making hospitals behave 
even more like private businesses. ‘Market-oriented behavior,’ Stevens 
writes, ‘was a rational response by hospitals to the structures and incen-
tives built into Medicare’ that allowed hospitals to bill for whatever and 
how much they wished. One result of Medicare’s ‘golden river of money’ 
was to ‘bring hospitals into prominence as enterprises motivated by 
organizational self-interest, by the excitement of the game, by greed.’15
Medicare’s largesse also encouraged for-profit hospitals to enter 
the game. To the nation’s small sector of physician-owned proprietary 
hospitals were added new, massive investor-owned hospital chains, 
which appeared for the first time in the late 1960s directly as a result 
of Medicare’s willingness to reimburse at cost plus— ‘Essentially, the 
federal government gave hospitals a blank check’, as business writers 
Sandy Lutz and E. Preston Gee put it. Copying the business model of 
successful hotel and fast-food chains, a new investor-owned hospital 
sector grew quickly. By 1971, the for-profit Hospital Corporation of 
America (later known as Columbia/HCA) owned 23 hospitals, and 
competed with 37 other investor-owned health care conglomerates.16
In 1980, Arnold Relman, editor of the influential New England 
Journal of Medicine, warned of a new ‘medical industrial complex’, 
‘a large and growing network of private corporations engaged in the 
business of supplying health-care services to patients for a profit.’ 
Relman saw dangers in the inherent contradictions between health 
care as a market product and as a public good. He argued that 
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corporate health care was at odds with the goals of cost control 
and improved health outcomes, because profit-making providers 
had no incentive to reduce utilization or to treat uninsured or very 
sick patients. Finally, the medical-industrial complex (as President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower had earlier cautioned of the military-indus-
trial complex) could exercise ‘unwarranted influence’ in politics, 
and especially might use its new power to block regulation and 
comprehensive reform.17
Relman was certainly correct that for-profit providers would build 
powerful lobbying organizations and hold considerable influence over 
health politics.18 But in contrasting corporate hospital chains with 
a non-profit sector that served as the bastion of public service 
and patient-oriented care, Relman’s picture of the medical-indus-
trial complex missed an even more momentous transformation: 
non-profit hospitals were rapidly adopting the practices of their 
for-profit competitors.19
Medicare’s funding structure, as noted earlier, had already 
encouraged non-profits to seek ways to maximise reimbursements. 
As large corporate chains began to compete for patients and Medicare 
dollars, non-profit hospitals joined the cutthroat business game of 
the 1980s. Policy scholar Bradford R. Gray has noted that non-profits 
increasingly behaved more like for-profits throughout the decade, 
including moving into activities previously anathema to the charity 
sector like advertising and marketing, borrowing to fund capital 
improvements, subcontracting services, and merging and acquir-
ing other hospitals. ‘Business terminology and business thinking 
have pervaded the non-profit hospital world’, Gray concluded in 
his 1991 study.20
One result of this increasing business orientation was a shift in 
hospitals’ rhetoric about their role in the community. For example, 
Children’s Memorial Hospital, a longstanding charitable institution 
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in Chicago, issued a new mission statement in 1980 intended to 
‘bring Children’s into the reality of the eighties.’ Replacing its 1886 
statement that Children’s was ‘dedicated exclusively to the free 
care and treatment of children from three to thirteen years of age’, 
the reworded mission promised ‘[t]o provide infants and children 
the maximum quantity and quality of comprehensive health care 
within the available resources of the hospital.’21
Health writer Elisabeth Rosenthal describes a similar change 
of language in her description of a non-profit Catholic hospital’s 
‘journey from charity to profit.’ In the 1980s, Providence Hospital in 
Portland, Oregon altered its mission statement to include ‘stewardship’ 
of resources alongside more traditional religious hospital notions 
of justice and compassion. The Catholic nuns who ran Providence 
went to school for business degrees, increased the size of administra-
tion, and hired professional ‘coders’ to maximise Medicare billings. 
The hospital used borrowing and profits to invest heavily in 
capital ‘improvements’, including a lobby that welcomed patients 
with ‘marble columns’, ‘a fountain with jumping salmon’, and ‘ex-
pensive art’. In 2013 Providence’s chief executive officer was paid 
$3.5 million a year.22
In that same year, 7 of the 10 most profitable hospitals in the U.S. 
were ‘non-profit’.23 What, then, is the distinction between for-profit 
and non-profit hospitals? How have the majority (around 80%) 
of hospitals remained officially ‘non-profit’,24 even as their prof-
it-seeking behaviors vastly increased? In order to retain the de-
sirable legal designation of tax-exempt charitable organizations, 
non-profit hospitals have had to meet certain requirements, known 
variously as ‘charity care’, ‘community service’, ‘community benefit’, 
and ‘uncompensated care’ obligations. While rooted in hospitals’ 
charity origins, these requirements and their definitions have changed 
significantly over time. 
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Caring for the Poor: From Charitable Mission  
to Regulatory Requirement
‘Charity’ meant two somewhat different things in early U.S. hospitals. 
Hospitals themselves sought charitable gifts from wealthy donors and 
the general public to maintain buildings, pay staff, and establish endow-
ments. At the same time, voluntary non-profit hospitals existed to provide 
charity to the deserving poor. Pennsylvania Hospital was founded in 
1757 ‘for the relief of the sick and miserable’, and its seal depicted the 
story of the Good Samaritan.25 This dual charitable tradition—as receiver 
and giver of charity—continued even as voluntary hospitals increasingly 
admitted paying patients starting in the late nineteenth century.26
The definition of a charity hospital has never been fixed. For the 
nineteenth and good part of the twentieth century, hospital charitable 
status was based on a vague notion of ‘public benefit’. As Rosemary 
Stevens describes it, hospitals ‘did not have to offer services necessarily, 
or even primarily, to serve the poor… It was assumed, rather, that the act 
of benevolence itself…should be recognized’ by charitable exemption.27 
In 1956 the Internal Revenue Service issued more specific standards for 
charitable hospitals, requiring them to provide ‘free or reduced-care to 
patients unable to pay’, but only within the hospital’s financial ability. 
A little over a decade later, in 1969, the IRS eliminated this ‘charity care 
standard’ altogether, and issued a new ‘community benefit standard’ 
that allowed hospitals offering services to the community, such as an 
emergency room, to receive the charity designation even if they did not 
provide free care.28 This change came in response to lobbying by the 
American Hospital Association, which had ‘pushed hard for a Congres-
sional amendment to the tax laws that would give hospitals tax exempt 
status’ without requiring that they give free care to the poor. The Senate 
defeated the amendment, but it was promulgated as an IRS regulation 
instead, not requiring Congressional approval.29
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Earlier, the Hill-Burton Act had created a requirement that hospitals 
must provide a ‘reasonable volume of services’ to ‘persons unable to pay 
therefore’ in order to be eligible for federal hospital construction funds. 
These conditions, which became known as the ‘uncompensated care’ and 
‘community service’ clauses of Hill-Burton, were a nod to congressional 
advocates of universal access, but at the same time preserved hospitals’ 
traditional autonomy in choosing to provide free care to those who could 
not pay. But the Hill-Burton Act offered no mechanism to enforce these 
requirements, and they went virtually ignored for two decades. 
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid, alongside the surging 
movement for racial equality in the 1960s, led to new demands that 
hospitals actually meet their charity care and community service ob-
ligations. The struggle to racially integrate American hospitals had 
proceeded later but more swiftly than school desegregation. In 1963, 
a federal court ruling (Simkins v. Cone) declared that the Hill-Burton Act’s 
funding of segregated hospitals violated the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection.30 The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 banned federal funding for entities that practiced discrimination, 
and but it was Medicare in 1965 that finally forced hospitals to stop 
blatant racial segregation, since hospitals found to be discriminating 
would be denied the new Medicare funds.31
Civil rights laws, however, focused entirely on de jure racial 
discrimination and did not attempt to address the poverty that dispro-
portionately affected African Americans. Anti-poverty advocates saw 
greater potential in the federal-state Medicaid programme, created in 
1965 alongside Medicare. Medicaid was intended to provide compre-
hensive health coverage to the poorest of the poor—those who were 
already receiving welfare (public assistance), particularly single mothers 
with small children. But Medicaid fell far short of universalism in two 
ways. First, states could decide their own eligibility requirements, and 
these requirements could be so stringent as to exclude many low-in-
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come people. Medicaid therefore did not eliminate the need for charity 
or indigent care, and in fact led to a new definition of ‘indigent’ as a 
patient too poor to pay for medical care, but ineligible for Medicaid. 
Second, physicians and hospitals were not required to accept patients 
with Medicaid (neither were they required to accept Medicare patients, 
but Medicaid reimbursement was far lower).32 Because the poorest were 
in so many areas of the country disproportionately women of colour, 
hospitals’ ability to refuse Medicaid patients in effect allowed them to 
continue to practice racial and economic discrimination.
In 1970, a landmark lawsuit in New Orleans, Louisiana challenged 
hospitals’ refusal of low-income people. Crusading civil rights attor-
neys brought the suit, Cook v. Ocshner, as a class action on behalf of a 
group of poor African-American women who had been turned away 
from New Orleans hospitals, either because they could not pay a cash 
fee or because they were Medicaid recipients. The suit targeted ten 
hospitals that had received a total of $18 million in Hill-Burton funds. 
The Louisiana district court ruled that the hospitals’ policy of ‘sparingly 
admitting or refusing Medicaid patients clearly discriminated against 
a very substantial segment of the public and violated the ‘community 
service’ obligation under the [Hill-Burton] Act.’33
In response to Cook v. Ochsner, the federal government created 
new regulations in 1972 requiring Hill-Burton hospitals to devote 
three per cent of their operating costs to uncompensated care (the 
original proposal was for five per cent) and to open their doors to 
patients with Medicaid coverage. But would hospitals comply? Le-
gal aid attorneys predicted that ‘[c]onsumers will undoubtedly still 
have to take an active role in enforcing the [free care and community 
service] requirement… after all[,] the requirement has been around 
for years, but the major enforcement activity came only after several 
lawsuits by poor consumers.’34
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Holding Hospitals Accountable:  
Citizen and Government Action
Cook v. Ochsner was just the beginning of a surge of consum-
er and civil rights activism directed toward hospitals in the 1970s. 
The next section of this chapter discusses how activist groups and 
state and local governments responded to the growing tension be-
tween hospitals’ public-service and profit-making roles by insisting 
that hospitals fulfill their obligations to provide some care to the 
poor. As Medicare, Medicaid, and Hill-Burton seemingly increased 
hospitals’ accountability to the public and to the taxpayer, the rise of 
profit-seeking by hospitals (both non-profit and for-profit) brought 
these longstanding contradictions into even sharper relief, and new 
types of activism emerged in response. 
Social movements—struggles for change ‘from below’—have 
played a critical role in the United States health system. The civil 
rights insurgency of the 1950s and 1960s that led to sweeping legal 
and political changes also spurred reforms like Medicare and Med-
icaid, which were intended in part to bring the benefits of medical 
progress to the poor, elderly, and minority groups on a basis of equality. 
Medicare and Medicaid raised expectations that hospitals would play 
a role in addressing racial and economic injustices. These expectations 
led to citizen action that focused on hospitals’ obligations to low-in-
come Americans. In 1973 the Health Policy Advisory Committee 
(Health/PAC), a New Left group dedicated to health care justice, 
called on advocates for the poor to ‘attack… private hospitals when 
they take public money but leave behind the public responsibility 
to care for everyone.’35
Social activism directed towards hospitals also surged in the late 
1960s and 1970s because of a brief period of institutional support from 
a government agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), 
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which had begun providing legal services to anti-poverty organizations 
as part of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty.36 OEO attorneys worked 
with activists from the emerging welfare rights organizations of the 
early 1970s to bring suits against hospitals that discriminated against 
the poor. This was the approach that had led to court victories in 
the Cook v. Ochsner case. 
While Cook invoked Hill-Burton to demand that hospitals treat 
Medicaid and low-income patients, another legal strategy pointed to 
non-profit hospitals’ tax-exempt status. In a 1971 case, OEO attorneys 
and citizens’ groups in Kentucky filed a lawsuit not against individ-
ual hospitals, but against the departments of Treasury and Internal 
Revenue in Washington, D.C., ‘for illegally granting tax exempt status 
as ‘charitable’ institutions to hospitals which refuse to treat people 
who can’t pay.’ The citizens groups involved in the suit, ranging from 
welfare rights and tenants’ organizations to the Association of Disa-
bled Miners and Widows, alleged that a woman died giving birth at 
home after the tax-exempt Prestonburg General Hospital ‘refused to 
admit her without a $259 deposit and refused to accept a check for 
that deposit… The same hospital refused to treat a 5-year-old boy’s 
broken leg because the parents had no money.’37 By filing suit against 
the government rather than specific hospitals, though, the plaintiffs 
overreached, at least according to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled 
they had no standing to sue.38 Later attempts to use charity tax status 
to demand care for the poor would focus primarily on individual 
hospitals (see below). 
Activists also demanded strong enforcement of the new 1972 
Hill-Burton uncompensated care and community service obligations. 
In a speech to hospital leaders, Richard H. Mapp of the Urban League, 
a prominent civil rights group, called the new regulations ‘a minimum 
effort, but it was nonetheless a welcomed effort after a quarter-century 
of inaction.’ Mapp attacked the hospital lobby’s undue influence in 
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Washington, demanding that lawmakers ‘giv[e] as much consideration 
to the needs and concerns of the poor as is given the hospitals and 
powerful medical groups who often place their own welfare above 
the welfare of those less fortunate than they.’39
But hospitals continued to find ways to evade free care require-
ments. In 1975 an investigation of Hill-Burton hospitals in 11 Southern 
states found virtually no enforcement and little provision of free care, 
concluding that ‘it is clear that the [Hill-Burton charity care] regulations 
are little more than empty words…’40 Consumer activists and advocates 
for the poor continued to press for stronger regulations and launched 
campaigns to inform patients of their rights to demand free care from 
hospitals. The community group Alabama Coalition Against Hunger 
in 1980 distributed 11,000 wallet cards to inform consumers of the 
Hill-Burton free care regulations. According to organisers, ‘Our basic 
goal…was to make Hill-Burton a household word.’41
But Hill-Burton activists had only partial success. In 1978, 73% of 
hospitals in California, for example, failed to meet the free care regu-
lations. By 1981 that number had decreased, but not by much: 45% of 
hospitals in the state were still out of compliance, due to ‘loopholes, 
sloppiness and even outright lying’, according to health advocates. 
When a ‘flood of groups’ including civil rights, senior citizens, and 
feminist health organizations testified for stronger enforcement, ‘a minor 
furor’ ensued when it was revealed that ‘San Jose’s O’Connor Hospital 
had no knowledge it was a Hill-Burton facility, despite its receipt of 
$1.6 million in Hill-Burton funds.’42 That a hospital itself was unaware 
of its obligations and its funding source, despite activists’ attempt to 
make Hill-Burton a ‘household word’, points to the daunting complexity 
of U.S. hospital financing and its byzantine regulatory regime—obstacles 
not only to enforcement, but to basic public understandings of how 
hospitals function, and corresponding difficulties for social movements 
to effect change.43
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In the budget-cutting frenzy of the 1980s, the Reagan administration 
reduced Medicaid reimbursements so severely that hospitals drastically 
increased ‘patient dumping’, the practice of transferring uninsured or 
Medicaid patients from private to public hospitals. In 1984 the city of 
Chicago experienced a 500% increase in such transfers, from less than 
100 to 600-700 a month.44 Dumping became so widespread that in 
1986 Congress created the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA), requiring hospitals to examine and stabilise all 
patients who arrived at the emergency room. While EMTALA reduced 
but did not completely end the practice of patient dumping, the law 
cemented the emergency room’s role as the only place in the U.S. health 
care system where access is legally required. EMTALA did not create 
a new obligation to provide free care; it only requires hospitals to wait 
to bill patients until after they are stabilised. Since it also tended to in-
crease costs by encouraging expensive emergency room visits, EMTALA 
was not seen as a victory by health justice advocates.45
In the 1980s and 1990s, hospital activists confronted the growing 
power of the for-profit sector as private corporations like Columbia/
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) acquired hospital systems 
throughout the country. In Houston, Texas, for example, for-profit 
giant Humana operated three hospitals, eight clinics, and the group 
health insurance plan and HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) 
that financed patient care in all its facilities. This health-care consoli-
dation, reminiscent of the age of Rockefeller, came under criticism by 
local physicians (and the Health/PAC advocacy organization, which 
referred to the situation as ‘Humana-izing Health Care’). In response, 
Humana agreed to lease out management of the clinics, but retained 
control over its hospitals and health insurance plans.46
Advocates feared that the growing power of for-profit hos-
pital corporations would lead to further abrogation of hospitals’ 
responsibilities to the poor. In Kentucky, Humana’s corporate home 
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state, the firm owned seven hospitals but refused to pay into a state 
‘Fair Share’ fund to ‘spread the burden of caring for the uninsured.’ 
Humana insisted that it contributed to care of the poor ‘by paying 
taxes on the money it makes, and by treating indigents at [Lou-
isville’s] University Hospital.’ Indeed, Humana paid the state $6 
million annually to rent the formerly non-profit University Hospital. 
But a newspaper investigation found that almost the entire $6 million 
actually went right back to Humana in the form of state payments 
for indigent care. Humana Chairman David A. Jones defended his 
company’s practices, stating that ‘[i]ndigent care is a societal prob-
lem that must be solved by government, not the hospital industry.’ 
The Louisville Courier-Journal pointed out that Humana earned $193 
million in profits in 1984 and paid Jones $18.1 million, making him 
the second-highest paid executive in the country.47
Humana would eventually sell its hospitals and move into the 
more lucrative health insurance business, but its rival Columbia/
HCA soon took its place as the for-profit nemesis of the consum-
er movement. By the mid-90s Columbia/HCA owned 350 hospi-
tals throughout the country and took in $20 billion in revenues. 
As the chain continued to aggressively pursue new acquisitions, 
some communities began to push back. Rhode Island’s attorney 
general cancelled Columbia/HCA’s attempted 1997 purchase of 
a non-profit hospital after protests by senior citizens and nurses’ 
organizations and an investigation by state representative Patrick J. 
Kennedy (son of Edward Kennedy and nephew of JFK).48
When advocates failed to prevent for-profit acquisitions, they 
demanded promises of continued charity obligations from the new 
owners. In the late 1990s HCA/Columbia acquired two major nonprofit 
hospitals in San Jose, California and proposed merging them. Consumer 
groups sought a commitment to ‘more free medical care for San Jose 
residents as part of the hospital transfer.’49 When two for-profit giants 
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(Vanguard and Tenet) vied to purchase non-profit Allegheny Health 
Network’s bankrupt chain of Philadelphia hospitals in 1998, protesters 
under the banner of ‘Coalition for Patients Not Profits’ declared ‘We 
must send a loud and clear message to the new owner of Allegheny that 
we intend to protect our indigent poor.’ The Coalition, which included 
senior citizens, welfare rights, and provider groups, demanded that 
the new owners not close hospitals or reduce service and ‘maintain an 
obligation to provide care for the indigent.’50
Absent Hill-Burton funding and tax exemptions, for-profit 
hospitals had no official or enforceable requirements to provide care 
to the uninsured (except for emergency care). When for-profits entered 
hospital markets, activists and local governments tried to extract guar-
antees of commitment to the poor via ad hoc agreements and simple 
promises. Such arrangements were even more difficult to enforce than 
the anemic Hill-Burton and IRS requirements. As with non-profits, 
some for-profit hospitals provided a notable amount of free care, some 
(like Humana) very little (exact amount are impossible to measure 
due to, of course, little to no enforcement and scattershot reporting 
requirements).51 In the new millennium, debates over the for-profit 
sector’s contribution to charity care faded as public attention turned 
to new scandals. In 2000, Columbia/HCA paid $95 million to settle 
multiple accusations of fraud, which included massively overbilling 
Medicare and providing financial rewards to physicians who referred 
patients to HCA hospitals. Leaders of HealthSouth Corporation, which 
owned rehabilitation hospitals and clinics throughout the U.S. South, 
actually went to prison in 2006 for accounting fraud and bribery.52
Despite their aggressive acquisitions and high-profile antics, 
for-profit hospitals did not come to dominate the U.S. health system. 
After many selloffs, and with some big players (such as Humana) 
abandoning the industry altogether, today for-profits constitute only 
about 25% of all community hospitals.53 The tension between hospitals’ 
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charity and profit missions would reach a boiling point not in the 
for-profit sector, but the non-profit, as the revenue-maximizing be-
havior of an esteemed academic medical centre led to a public outcry. 
The scandal involved the Yale-New Haven Medical System in 
Connecticut, which included Yale University’s storied hospital and 
medical college as well as other non-profit hospitals around the state. 
In the 1990s, Yale-New Haven adopted new, aggressive collections tac-
tics to recoup money owed by former patients. These practices became 
national news when the Wall Street Journal reported the story of a 77-
year old New Haven man who still owed the hospital tens of thousands 
of dollars for his late wife’s cancer treatment. Yale-New Haven ‘sued 
him, put a lien on his house and seized most of his bank account.’54 The 
hospital system took uninsured former patients to court, garnished up 
to 25% of their paychecks, and even forced them to foreclose on their 
homes. Connecticut labour unions and anti-poverty advocates who 
publicised these stories emphasised how Yale-New Haven’s harsh 
tactics stood in sharp relief against its status as ‘a non-profit, charitable 
teaching hospital…the largest, most prestigious hospital in the state and 
the largest ‘safety-net’ provider of healthcare to the poor and uninsured 
in the city of New Haven.’55
The publicity led to protests that were ‘long, loud, and visible.’ 
A health care workers union erected a large billboard, that could be seen 
from the main hospital’s windows, containing only the word ‘SHAME.’ 
The state attorney general and lawmakers stepped in, and soon the 
hospital system changed its billing practices and, in 2005, replaced 
its entire leadership. Today, Yale-New Haven has become a model of 
cooperation with the local community, including providing funding 
for clinics and donating land for low-income housing.56
But the lessons of Yale’s scandal did not change much behavior 
in the non-profit hospital sector. Throughout the 2000s, non-profits’ 
profit-seeking, charity-minimizing actions continued to elicit shock 
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from the public, media, and local politicians. For example, a 2005 inves-
tigation by the Salt Lake Tribune found that the Intermountain Hospital 
Corporation (IHC), which operated 19 hospitals and numerous clinics 
in the state of Utah, filed 723 debt-collection lawsuits in a single year. 
Intermountain, which included the University of Utah hospital, was a 
fully non-profit chain. ‘Charities shouldn’t sue people’, health activist 
Steven DeVore told the Tribune. DeVore lobbied unsuccessfully for state 
legislators to revoke IHC’s tax-exempt status.57
To counter arguments like DeVore’s, non-profits frequently, 
and ironically, justified their aggressive billing practices by invoking 
their status as charity institutions. They had to pursue every possible 
dollar to cover the costs of free care, they argued.‘[W]e provide a lot 
of charity, and do a lot of good in the community’, an Ohio hospital 
executive told National Public Radio. In order to provide that charity, 
‘we have to collect payment from those who can afford to pay us.’58
The non-charitable behaviors of non-profit hospitals brought further 
attention to the question of tax exemption. In the most well-known ex-
ample, tax officials in Champaign, Illinois revoked the tax-exempt status 
of Provena Hospital in 2003 for failing to provide sufficient charity care. 
Provena was a Catholic hospital, but its $800,000 annual expenditure 
on ‘charitable activities’ was less than its $1.1 million savings in local 
property taxes. Even though neither federal nor Illinois law specified 
how much charity care or community benefit non-profits were required 
to provide to maintain their status, the state Supreme Court agreed 
that Provena no longer qualified as a charity. The Illinois Hospital 
Association, the state lobbying group for the hospitals, objected to the 
decision on the grounds that ‘Imposing new tax burdens on a hospital 
could force it to reduce services and increase health care costs.’59
The growing attention to hospitals’ behavior from activists, 
media, and state governments was not welcomed, but could no longer 
be ignored. What one reporter called the ‘uninsured billing/charity-care 
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tsunami’ (meaning the flood of bad publicity for hospitals) was leading 
to a moment of reckoning. ‘There is no question’, the industry journal 
Modern Healthcare admitted in 2004, ‘that a lack of clarity of mission 
and poor reporting by many in the industry invited this deluge of 
scrutiny…Some hospitals and systems really do act like for-profits, 
and they threaten to damage the many providers with a patient-first 
mentality.’60 More unwelcome publicity arrived in the form of a series 
of class action lawsuits brought by high-profile anti-tobacco attorney 
Richard Scruggs against twelve hospital systems across the country. 
The suits alleged that the hospitals ‘failed to conduct [themselves] as the 
charitable entit[ies they] purport to be’, that they provided insufficient 
care to the poor and uninsured, and that they ‘charged unreasonable and 
excessive rates for medical care’ and engaged in ‘aggressive, abusive 
and humiliating collections practices.’ The Wall Street Journal noted that 
‘The suits are coming at a difficult juncture for the hospital industry, 
whose practices toward the uninsured are under scrutiny.’61
Scruggs’s class action lawsuits failed; judges ruled that only the 
government, not private individuals in court actions, could enforce 
the tax code against hospitals.62 Still, the industry had been put on the 
defensive. If hospitals did not take steps to show they were deserving 
of their tax exemptions, Modern Healthcare warned, government would 
step in.63
This prediction came true in 2006 when a Congressional sub-
committee began investigating non-profit hospital practices, and the 
New York Times reported that Congress ‘will set standards for the industry 
if it does not do so itself.’64 Iowa Senator Charles Grassley, a longtime 
critic of the hospital industry, was angered that hospitals ‘continu[ed] 
to act uncharitably’; not only did they fail to provide significant char-
ity care, but they also paid excessively high salaries to executives, 
and used their profits to move out of poor areas and build new hospitals 
in wealthier suburbs. Grassley wanted to impose minimum requirements 
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for uncompensated care, and to fine hospitals that did not comply.65 
He would soon have an opportunity to bring his proposals to fruition, 
as Congress enacted, and Barack Obama signed into law, the most 
sweeping changes to the health system since Medicare and Medicaid.
 
The Affordable Care Act and the Fate of Charity Care
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, the most far-reaching health reform since Medicare. The legislation, 
which became known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or Obamacare, 
represented a retreat from the goal of universal coverage that health re-
formers had sought for decades. Instead, the ACA attempted to expand 
health coverage incrementally, by expanding Medicaid and creating a 
system of subsidised private insurance plans.66 Since the Supreme Court 
in 2012 made Medicaid expansion voluntary on the part of the states, 
the ACA ended up covering even fewer people than expected. Although 
Obamacare has extended health protection to around 20 million people, 
over 25 million Americans remained uninsured at the end of 2018.67 
The need for ‘indigent care’ is far from over. 
The drafters of the ACA assumed that charity care by hospitals 
needed to continue, but that it would be balanced out by new benefits to 
hospitals. They argued that hospitals that treated large numbers of unin-
sured people would receive a vast increase in reimbursements from the 
coverage expansions. In exchange for the projected billions of dollars in 
new patient revenues (and to help fund the new system), the ACA would 
implement cuts to Medicare reimbursements and subsidies, and require 
greater safety and quality accountability from hospitals. As one medical 
journal put it, the ACA ‘both giveth to and taketh away from hospitals.’68
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This was also true in the case of charity care. The ACA, espe-
cially through the Medicaid expansion, explicitly intended to reduce 
the volume of uncompensated care hospitals were expected to carry. 
But non-profit hospitals also faced stronger reporting requirements to 
maintain their charitable tax status. The ACA requires hospitals to file 
new reports with the IRS enumerating ‘how much money-losing care 
they dispense—and how they calculate that number. They also have to 
list and value what they’ve done gratis to better their communities.’69 
Other provisions reflected Sen. Grassley’s and patient advocates’ earlier 
criticisms of non-profit hospital practices by banning non-profit hospi-
tals from taking ‘extreme collections actions’ and charging higher rates 
to uninsured patients.70
Rather than heralding a new era in hospital accountability, 
the ACA charity care rules are more a case of things remaining the same. 
They set requirements for reporting, but not a requirement for actual 
amounts of charity care required. Hospitals can still define charity care 
as they wish, reporting a wide variety of activities as ‘uncompensated 
care.’ And they can even opt out of free care completely by paying a 
$50,000 fine—a tiny portion of hospital revenues. At least one hospital 
has in fact lost its tax exempt status since implementation of the ACA, 
but the new charity care mandates are, according to a trade newsletter, 
‘perhaps too vague to be effective.’71
It’s not surprising that the Affordable Care Act reflects the con-
tradictory and ambivalent roles of hospitals in the U.S. health system. 
Its attempt to reinforce hospitals’ commitment to uncompensated 
care seemingly contradicts the ACA’s overall goal of reducing the 
need for uncompensated care altogether. Following the Act’s im-
plementation in 2004, the amount of uncompensated care provid-
ed by hospitals did indeed decline, from a peak of $46.4 billion in 
2013to $42.8 billion in 2014, and to $35.7 billion in 2015.72 In states 
that did expand Medicaid, hospitals experienced significant reduc-
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tions in charity care. At Seattle’s Harborview Medical Center, for ex-
ample, the proportion of uninsured patients fell from 12% in 2013 
to an ‘unprecedented’ low of 2% in 2014.73
But as the Affordable Care Act faced both judicial challenge 
and repeated attempts at repeal by a Republican-majority Congress, 
it became clear that the need for uncompensated care would continue 
and perhaps even rise. The greatest blow to the ACA’s success has 
been the Supreme Court 2012 ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius that upheld 
the Act but struck down its requirement that all states expand their 
Medicaid programmes for the poor. As of January 2019, 14 conserva-
tive-run states have refused the federal government’s offer of billions 
of dollars in Medicaid subsidies to cover low-income working peo-
ple. Only those states that accepted Medicaid expansion have seen 
a significant drop in the demand for charity care. 
In addition, many of the newly-insured under the ACA have pur-
chased the lowest-cost subsidised plans, which include extremely high 
cost-sharing in the form of deductibles and co-payments. By 2016, it was 
becoming evident that increasing numbers of patients with high-deduct-
ible policies were leading to more unpaid debts to hospitals.74 Finally, 
there continues to be millions of uninsured people. These shortfalls in 
coverage have led hospital organisations to ask for increased funding 
for uncompensated care. The trade journal Modern Healthcare called 
for ‘the next Congress [to] reconsider the assumption in the ACA that 
uncompensated care for the poor and uninsured would begin to fade 
away. As long as exchange enrollment lags and many states refuse to 
expand Medicaid, the nation’s safety net hospitals will need—and 
deserve—additional support.’75
In seeking more taxpayer funding even as they continue to be-
have like private businesses, hospitals are continuing a strategy that is 
over a century old. American hospitals, with their powerful lobbying 
organizations, have proven adept at having their cake and eating it 
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too—maximizing their profits while depending on significant subsidies 
from government. Despite its intentions, the Affordable Care Act has 
not disrupted the United States’s reliance on heavily subsidised private 
voluntarism to compensate for the nation’s refusal to adopt universal, 
comprehensive coverage. Like Medicare before it, the ACA preserved 
and reinforced the hospital’s dual role as both charity and profit centre, 
rather than a public service available on equal terms to all. 
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Chapter 7
The rise of hospital centrism in China,  




(London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine)
Introduction
China was once considered an international model for low cost rural 
primary health care. Its historical achievement in improving health at 
very low cost provided some of the strongest empirical evidence sup-
porting the World Health Organization’s 1978 Declaration on Primary 
Health Care.2 However, over recent decades the country has suffered 
from an over-concentration of high-quality resources in hospitals, 
despite efforts to strengthen primary care.3 In this essay we examine 
the reasons for this apparently contradictory situation.
Our focus is on the historical evolution of hospitals and prima-
ry care in China from the perspective of financing, drawing from a 
historical study covering the years 1835 to 2018. 1835 is the starting 
point, as it marked the founding of the first Western medical institu-
tion in China. As we have argued elsewhere, this was the inception of 
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a hospital-centric health system model.4 We end in 2018 in order to link 
the historical analysis to the contemporary situation, in which hospi-
tal-centrism remains. Two other milestones, 1949 and 1978, represent 
key intermediate points: in 1949, the new People’s Republic of China 
was founded, leading China towards rapid industrialization; and 1978 
marked the start of the systematic reform that shifted China’s economy 
away from command and control and towards the market.
We begin by showing that foreign actors, whose concern was 
not to achieve broad health service coverage, introduced the hospi-
tal-centric model. This model was unaffordable given China’s lack of 
industrialisation before 1949 and it remained partially unaffordable 
between 1949 and 1978. Hospitals in China had a high-cost orientation 
that was excessive for the rural population. Hence, when the country’s 
leaders attempted to extend health services to the whole population, 
they faced enormous challenges in finding sufficient financial resources, 
and repeatedly pushed towards a lower-cost model built around primary 
care. The result was a divided structure. As industrialisation rapidly 
progressed and fiscal space expanded after 1978, wider coverage became 
not only feasible but also politically important, particularly after 2002. 
However, efforts to reorient the health system towards primary care 
faced a complex set of challenges, which along with the policy choices 
made since 1978, affected primary care strengthening. 
Our conceptual approach draws particularly on two strands 
in the historiography of the welfare state, historical institutionalism 
and transnational diffusion. Much of the literature explaining the rise 
and development of welfare and health systems has been Western- 
focused, so we have approached it selectively to find a helpful lens to 
view the situation in China. The early structural-functionalist analysis 
treated welfare states as general processes arising from industriali-
sation, a response to market failures in the social realm. Others paid 
more attention to the interaction of social forces in the political arena. 
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The Marxist tradition emphasised class conflict and the concern of the 
labour movement to orient state power away from capitalist priorities. 
Pluralist approaches focused on other types of economic or professional 
vested interests, treating the democratic state as a neutral presence 
responding to external social actors.5 These interpretations, however, 
have been found inadequate to explain the timings and configurations 
of national welfare states in health and in general,6 and thus do not fit 
well our attention to the historical evolution of hospitals and primary 
care in China. 
Historical-institutionalists have instead focused on the state as an 
autonomous force. Some emphasise the agency of state bureaucrats as 
key actors with varied capacities, who are not just strictly executing 
the interests of certain social groups, or obediently answering the 
call of ideologies, but leading the development of policies.7 Others 
have focused on the ways in which constitutional arrangements for 
governing and law-making determine national trajectories.8 Does the 
political system, for example, allow interest groups to veto policies that 
run against their interests? Does it have mechanisms that favour the 
achievement of consensus-building, and so on? Others9 place particular 
emphasis on the theory of path dependence: ‘that what happened at an 
earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of 
events occurring at a later point in time’.10 The idea is there are decisive 
junctures that condition later events by creating new stakeholders and 
by setting in train policy feedbacks, related either to popular attitudes 
or to economic expectations, which then make change to another course 
more difficult. This framework has been fruitfully applied to China, to 
explain why retrenchment of government was weaker in urban than 
rural areas after 1978.11 
An alternative, recent, approach switches attention from nation-
al forces of change to the transnational, attending to ways in which 
diffusion between countries explains the various shapes of health 
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welfare and services.12 Lucas13 and Borowy14 also described the role 
of policy diffusion from central and eastern Europe mediated by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the League of Nations Health Organization 
in the development of the health system in China. Using ‘interactive 
diffusion’ as a theoretical lens, Hu Aiqun argued that China adopted the 
Soviet model of social welfare in the early 1950s both to imitate develop-
ment of a Soviet-style socialist economy and to demonstrate loyalty to 
the socialist club. Hu argued that the adoption of the Soviet model led 
to instability of the welfare system, which was significantly changed 
in the 1960s and 1970s.15
Our previous article argued for the importance of a range of fac-
tors in generating a path-dependent trajectory of hospital-centrism in 
China.16 Highlighting the role of financing, this chapter argues that the 
impact of industrialisation, historical-institutionalism and diffusion are 
all helpful in explaining the shaping of China’s current hospital-centric 
health system. 
Sources
These arguments are mainly built on four types of sources. First, 
books on general history of medicine in China such as The History of 
Chinese Medicine (Wong & Wu, 1936) and the works of other historians 
and social scientists who have studied history on more specific periods 
or topics provided a chronicle of medicine-related events and their 
historical contexts. Second, national and local official documentations 
of history, statistics and compiled policy documents, such as the China 
Health Yearbooks and provincial health gazettes from eastern, central and 
western China (Shandong, Jiangxi, Guangxi), were selected to comple-
ment the national yearbooks. Third, an extensive range of journals and 
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newspapers provided the perspectives of elite Western medicine doctors 
and other policy actors. Fourth, anthologies, biographies, memoirs 
and historical studies of important actors (such as Jin Baoshan, who 
was Director of the National Health Administration during the 1940s) 
were collected and analysed. Finally, although national archives are 
inaccessible for post-1949 periods, documents kept in the local archives 
of Beijing and Pinggu (a suburban district of Beijing and a rural county 
before 2001) were also searched and used.
In what follows, we work chronologically through the historical 
evolution of hospitals and primary care providers in China during 
the three periods from 1835 to 2018, and then wrap up with a discus-
sion of the key historical stages, a brief comparison between China, 
the United States and the United Kingdom, and the role of financing 
in the historical process.
The origin of divergence, 1835-1949
In the traditional Chinese medical world, medical services were 
mainly provided on an ambulatory basis. As we are going to show, the 
precursory model of hospitals was brought in from Western medicine. 
As Hu’s theory of interactive diffusion suggested, diffused institution-
al construction needs to respond to local context. During the period 
from 1835 and 1949, China went through a series of wars, revolutions 
and fragmentation, including the First Opium War (1839-1842) which 
opened its closed market, the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901) during which 
native Chinese rebelled against foreigners, the Xinhai Revolution (1911) 
which overthrew the imperial system, and the Warlord Era (1916-1928). 
Hospital-based Western medicine adapted to the historical reality in 
China upon its introduction and created a set of institutions that consol-
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idated step-by-step the model of hospitals in China over time. In 1928, 
the Nationalists unified the country and built a central government. The 
general peace was broken by the Japanese invasion in 1937, dragging 
the county deeply into the Second World War until 1945, the end of which 
was immediately followed by a major civil war, then the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949. For the years between 1928 and 
1949, we are also going to show how a model of medical development 
focusing on primary care was later introduced but was unable to shift 
the country’s health development fundamentally away from hospitals. 
The introduction of hospital-based Western medicine
The start of modern medicine in China is usually traced to the 
Canton Ophthalmic Hospital. This eye hospital was the first Western 
medicine institution (in Canton, now Guangzhou, Guangdong), and 
was opened by Peter Parker, a pioneer Christian medical missionary, 
in 1835. The narrow focus on eye problems was justified as they were 
among the most common illnesses amongst the Chinese,17 and effective 
treatment (i.e. surgery) was not available but could transform patients’ 
lives.18 The Canton Ophthalmic Hospital became a success and treated 
more than 900 patients in the first three months.19 Parker was also active 
in making known among his foreign sponsors the value of hospitals, 
and convinced newspaper reporters in England, for example, that his 
plan for hospitals not only advanced science, but also created good 
feelings between China and Western powers which facilitated greater 
engagement with the country.20 
This was important because the Canton Hospital was built amid grave 
tension between China and the Western powers on the eve of the First 
Opium War (1839-1842). Eye surgery was considered an effective way to 
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demonstrate the power of Christianity as well as the technical supremacy 
of Western civilisation. The hospital, and Parker himself, became an icon 
for Western engagement with China21 and prompted the establishment 
of the Medical Missionary Society in China,22 and the building of more 
hospitals in the country after the Opium War.23 Nevertheless, it was very 
limited in scale and services. The records of the Canton Hospital during 
its early years suggested patients were mainly using it for day surgery,24 
and it would also be difficult to establish conclusively the advantage of 
Western medicine, as it was not until the late nineteenth century when 
antisepsis and an anesthesia were developed for surgery.25 
The missionaries over time consolidated a particular model of the 
hospital in terms of service organisation and financing. They came to 
the view that hospitals should be the centre of medical missionary work 
since they enabled lengthy engagement with patients that facilitated 
religious preaching.26 The missionaries’ guidance also suggests that they 
valued generalist outpatient care based in hospitals as a way to engage 
a wider community of potential believers.27 The consensus around such 
hospital-centric model incorporating inpatient and general ambulatory 
care provided the justification for continuous missionary funding input. 
Furthermore, it allowed hospitals to develop using local sources of fund-
ing via substantial outpatient services, revenue from which supported 
seventy-four per cent of mission hospitals.28 This was a critical factor, 
as the rich would try to avoid hospitals. With the expansion of patients’ 
payment, the number of staff in hospitals was several times larger than 
those in dispensaries by the early 1900s.29
As mentioned above, the country was in chaos and fragmentation 
in the early 1900s. Progress in establishment of health services under 
the state was limited to either local initiatives or selected sectors (e.g. 
railways and customs). There was barely any national coordination 
of medical development by the government, and factions of Western 
medicine started to emerge because of the difference in training and 
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background between medical missionaries from the West (and their 
Chinese apprentices) and an increasing number of Chinese medical 
doctors trained in Japan who were returning to China.30 The latter had 
experienced the rapid development of modern medicine in Japan and 
started to open medical schools teaching Japanese-influenced modern 
medicine.38 Their emergence challenged the image of Western medicine 
and the dominance of medical missionaries, and medical missionaries 
started to worry about being ‘discredited in the eyes of the educated 
Chinese from a professional standpoint’.31 
Scientific medicine started to be reinforced within the medical mis-
sion. New sources of money emerged, first through an indemnity for 
missionary hospitals after the Boxer Rebellion, and then via the estab-
lishment of the China Medical Board by the Rockefeller Foundation.32 
Benefiting from the newly found resources, and stimulated by rapid 
medical development in Western countries and China’s engagement with 
Japan, medical professionals became increasingly assertive of professional 
values and started to demand modernisation of medicine through the 
building of modern hospitals and high-standard medical schools that 
could provide proper medical services and conditions for research. 
Balme wrote a report based on a large-scale survey of mission hospitals, 
exposing to their funders the poor quality of hospitals, which lacked 
both proper equipment and qualified staff.33The movement towards 
scientific medicine further consolidated the hospital-centric model by 
tying it firmly to medical professionalisation.
A report by the China Medical Commission,34 noted that mission 
hospitals had most of their non-staff expenditures covered by local 
sources by 1914. This demonstrated the financial viability of hospitals 
and was an important factor contributing to the decision to strengthen 
mission hospitals. The locations of institutions receiving aid from the 
China Medical Board were thus concentrated mainly in coastal and 
large cities in alignment with existing missionary medical schools.35 
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In the face of financial difficulty during the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
Hume, a medical school leader, pushed for the admission of private 
paying patients.36The high cost of hospitals no doubt contributed to the 
concentration of medical schools and hospitals in large cities. Over time, 
local resources became critical in hospital financing.37
From hospitals to health organisations
A milestone event in extending health services to the mass pop-
ulation occurred with the establishment of the first central health 
ministry in 1928, when the Nationalist regime unified the country. 
The founding of the Ministry of Health triggered discussion of ‘state 
medicine’. The idea of state medicine was inspired by the development 
of social welfare in Western Europe and Soviet Union,38 but more 
importantly the emergence of community-based social medicine in 
eastern Europe.39 Meanwhile, domestic experimentation with various 
projects of rural community health care was crucial in forging the 
agenda of state medicine.40
Among the various local experiments, the work of Zhiqian Chen 
(also known as C.C. Chen) in Ding County, an ordinary poor agricul-
tural county, was the most influential and was directly incorporated in 
a nation-wide blueprint.41 In 1932, Chen took charge of Ding County’s 
Department of Rural Health of the Mass Education Movement—an 
influential rural reconstruction program. Chen conducted a simple 
economic evaluation of feasible public health interventions that 
could address the most pressing disease burden of rural populations. 
He soon realised the limitation of fiscal space—villagers spent only 
30 cents (the currency unit was silver dollar—which was a coin made 
from Mexican silver) on average (based on an earlier survey in Ding 
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County) on traditional medicine.42 Chen designed the rural health 
programme to address the villagers’ primary health problems, which 
were mainly infectious diseases, like smallpox, trachoma, dysentery, 
tetanus, and typhoid. He found that to address these most pressing 
needs it was neither feasible nor necessary to rely solely on doctors 
and nurses.43
The model Chen developed was a county-wide multi-tier health 
organisation approach involving facilities responsible for differ-
ent levels of care, costing only 9.08 cents annually per capita—less 
than a third of villagers’ annual health expenditure.44 The health 
organisations included, from the bottom to the top: village health 
workers (with 10 days of training and continuous supervision), 
who provided most of the services for each village (about 1,000 
people) and cost only 1.65 cents annually per capita; sub-district 
health stations (staffed by ‘general practitioner[s] for public health’), 
which provided technical supervision to village health workers and 
outpatient services for conditions beyond their competence for all 
sub-district population (about 30,000 people), and cost 3.23 cents; 
and a county health centre, which provided comprehensive leader-
ship of county-wide health affairs, and supervision and support for 
village and sub-district health centres, and which was incorporated 
with a hospital of 30-45 beds, and cost 4.2 cents.45 There were two key 
aspects of the cost-effectiveness of the model: on the one hand were 
the short-term trained local village health workers, who in total cost 
less than 20% of overall budget. Running each village health station 
(including remuneration and the cost of drugs, vaccines and other 
basic supplies) cost only 1% of the budget for a subdistrict health 
station and only 1/2000 of the budget for a district health centre 
(including a hospital of 45 beds). The village health stations provid-
ed day-to-day management of health of the villagers. On the other 
hand, the village health workers were reinforced by the sub-district 
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and county health facilities as they formed a multi-tiered referral 
system. The Ding County Model therefore represented an effort to 
develop not only a model of primary care providers suitable to rural 
conditions, but also new roles for hospitals and doctors.
The multi-tier model of Ding County proved impossible to scale 
up. In 1935, China had only 0.01 Western medical doctors per thou-
sand population as compared to 0.34 per thousand in Yugoslavia, the 
other classic example of interwar rural social medicine. Furthermore, 
almost all Western medical doctors ‘followed the money’ and prac-
ticed in large cities.46 Because of limited resources and government 
commitment, it was not until the 1940s that the central government 
started to scale-up state medicine programs and recruit state medi-
cal doctors,47 while efforts to mobilise private practitioners for state 
medicine were generally unsuccessful.48 Some county health centres 
tended to focus on hospital-based curative care for neighboring 
residents only, rather than supporting the sub-district and village 
health providers.49 
After this unsuccessful attempt to shift doctors towards primary 
care, training of state doctors in the 1940s shifted towards public 
health. A revised state medicine model, more narrowly focused on 
prevention than the Ding County experiment, was extended in inland 
provinces, along with the retreat of the Nationalist regime, during 
the Second World War.50 This orientation towards prevention was 
problematic given the lack of support from hospitals and professional 
doctors. Some found that such doctors were not competent enough 
to provide curative services and were therefore unable to win the 
patient trust needed to deliver public health services.51
The period from 1835 to 1949 therefore saw two separate models 
of health service delivery. Primary care providers and hospitals had 
their own pattern of service organisation and financing respectively 
(see Table 7.1). While the model for hospitals was based on medical 
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school-affiliated hospitals transplanted from the West, the primary 
care model was represented by rural health programmes under the 
state, influenced by social medicine ideas emerging in central and 
eastern Europe. The separation of the two models was marked by 
the failed attempt to scale up a multi-tier design of health services 
based on the Ding County experiment in the early 1930s. Reorienting 
the hospitals towards primary care strengthening failed due to the 
weak financial and regulatory power of the state medicine reformers, 
particularly given the separate funding bases of the two models.
Table 7.1: Financial sources of hospitals and  
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From 1949 to 1978, the Communist government took strong con-
trol of health services, recognising them as a major social project in 
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developed in urban areas, the rural economy was developed based on 
collective agriculture. A two-tier economic and social welfare system 
was formed, where urbanites enjoyed substantially more benefits than 
their rural counterparts.52 This structural reality affected the evolution 
of hospitals and primary care providers from 1949 to 1978. The early 
split in trajectories developed further. The 1950s was marked with 
a diffusion of Soviet model of health services, which further changed 
the balance of care and tilted it towards urban hospitals. The efforts to 
shift services towards primary care took place most evidently in rural 
areas and became embedded in the rural socio-economy. 
Adapting the Soviet model of health services
In the years after 1949, leaders of the newly founded People’s 
Republic of China decided to organise its urban health sector following 
the Soviet model of health service organisation, as part of a wider effort 
to adopt Soviet experiences of national development.53 Two major urban 
insurance schemes, namely the Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS, covering 
formal industrial employees) and the Government Insurance Scheme 
(GIS, covering governmental and para-governmental employees and 
students) were established in 1951 and 1952 respectively, drawing on 
Soviet model.54 Due to scant financial resources, only enterprises with 
100 or more employees were covered by LIS.55 While the LIS was funded 
by premiums collected from factories, the GIS was budgeted along with 
other government health expenditure.56 The Nationalist government 
hospitals and mission hospitals started to be nationalised, enhanced, 
and the distribution of health care service became more evenly spread.57 
The Soviet model of shorter medical education with earlier specialisa-
tion was also adopted, while medical schools were reformed, created 
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and redistributed across the country.58 19,770 students were enrolled at 
medical schools in 1951, dwarfing the accumulated number of medical 
graduates over the previous seven decades.59 Thus the development of 
urban hospital financing (urban insurance schemes and out-of-pocket 
payments of urban patients) extended the pre-1949 medical school-
based model of hospitals by adopting the Soviet system. 
Hospital care soon became unaffordable for the new socialist state, 
as deficits in the insurance schemes emerged shortly after their estab-
lishment. GIS and LIS spending quickly surpassed the growth rate of 
the overall economy.60 Growing hospital deficits were reported across 
the country.61 For example, insurance scheme-affiliated institutions of 
the Shandong Provincial Government had increasing deficits in the GIS 
from 18% of fund budget in 1954, 33% in 1955 and 42% in 1956.100 With 
weak administrative capacity, the excessive use of services and medicines 
covered by the insurance funds was widely reported.62
The Ministry of Health (MOH) and local health agencies responded 
with attempts to bring down the cost. First, a Soviet-style referral sys-
tem called ‘sectional health care’ (diduan yiliao) was introduced to facili-
tate the coordination of care across hospitals and primary care facilities. 
In essence, this was another attempt to build a multi-tier referral system, 
this time where the primary care facilities functioned as the gatekeepers 
and higher-level facilities provided care to referred patients. However, 
the municipal health agency in Beijing reported that patients did not trust 
primary care facilities and patients still preferred to go to ‘large hospitals’.63 
Second, hospitals were required to expand less costly services, including 
outpatient care and prevention.64 The MOH required hospitals to function 
as centres for preventive services, although this was a political requirement 
not followed by corresponding financial reward.65
Third, the government also reinforced subsidy for hospitals with 
two other initiatives. Salaries of hospital staff were no longer to be re-
covered from service revenue but fully budgeted and covered by the 
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government.66 Also, the difference between wholesale and retail prices of 
pharmaceuticals was to be used to subsidise hospitals so that hospitals 
could ‘purchase [pharmaceuticals] at the wholesale prices and sell at 
retail prices to patients’.67 The principle of service price reduction was 
‘less reduction for outpatient care, more reduction for inpatient care; 
less reduction for ordinary medical services, more reduction for surgeries, 
in order to reflect the spirit of less reduction for minor conditions and 
more reduction for serious conditions’.68 Therefore, outpatient user fees 
and pharmaceutical sales became further institutionalised as important 
ways to subsidise hospital services.
None of these efforts were enough to reduce the expenditure on LIS 
and GIS. Over time, the risk pool for LIS collapsed and the scheme became 
solely based on individual enterprises.69 The ‘wasteful’ use of fund-cov-
ered services and medicines was considered a constant problem facing 
GIS—the fund was eventually separated from the overall health budget 
in 1980.70 Industrial health service providers continuously expanded in 
numbers of facilities, except during the recession after the Great Leap 
Forward.71 As a result, it was never really likely that coverage under 
the two schemes would be extended to cover rural health services.
Rural health services and cooperative medicine
In rural areas, a different kind of state medical planning was 
introduced. This included the restoration and construction of county 
health centres and sub-district health stations, training village health 
workers as well as the retraining of midwives to provide modern mid-
wifery.72 The government allowed the continuation of private practice 
and group practices (essentially fee-for-service).73 In return, health 
committees and associations of private practitioners were organised 
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locally below the level of the county to ensure they carried out epi-
demic prevention and control, as well as maternal and child health 
work, under the supervision of local health centres and stations.74 
The government made it clear that the main concern for rural areas 
was prevention.75 This focus was considered reasonable as prevention 
was more challenging in rural areas due to such problems as illiteracy, 
superstition and poor transportation.76
The issue of providing curative care to the rural population soon 
emerged. During the late 1950s, agricultural collectivisation started 
to develop rapidly in rural China, providing both political justifica-
tion and a collective financial base to develop medical risk pooling. 
The first Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) was established in 1955.77 
Then a nationwide campaign was organised to promote CMS during 
the Great Leap Forward movement, but the scheme then collapsed 
following the fall of the movement.78 Group practices (mainly union 
clinics) were made public and became the commune health centres, 
and later township health centres as communes were transformed 
into townships. The MOH, under tight fiscal constraints, was gen-
erally cautious in extending financial coverage for curative care in 
rural areas and repeatedly argued that grassroots health facilities 
should be allowed to charge user fees and not hastily become public 
providers of free care (see Table 7.2). Although the MOH tended to 
emphasise the role of county hospitals (the medical arm of the county 
health centres that became independent), the government eventually 
provided a 60% subsidy for the commune/township health cen-
tres. Meanwhile, the county health bureaux assumed responsibility 
for their administration.79
The lack of health care benefits for the rural population became 
unacceptable to Chairman Mao, who launched a reprimand condemn-
ing the MOH for neglecting rural health care and called for a shift of 
focus to the countryside on 26 June 1965. Two years after the start of the 
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Cultural Revolution in 1966, Mao openly endorsed the CMS and ‘barefoot 
doctors’. This quickly led to scaling up of the CMS nationwide and its 
continuance until the late 1970s.80 The CMS was mainly based on funds 
extracted from collective agriculture.81 The barefoot doctors were peas-
ants who completed a very brief training in medicine and undertook 
primary health care services at the village level, while still participating 
in collective agricultural work and earning work-points for their medical 
activities as members of the community.82 Urban doctors were sent to 
county hospitals and commune health centres in large numbers, provid-
ing training for rural barefoot doctors. For example, in the two years of 
1969 and 1970, 30% of total medical staff in Beijing were sent to settle in 
rural or remote areas.83
Just like the LIS and GIS, the CMS faced constant challenges of deficit, 
despite the fact that government lowered the prices of hospital services.84 
Sources from the Pinggu County Archive show that in 1972, 51.03% of 
cooperative medical stations were in deficit.85 In 1974, the central govern-
ment directly provided subsidy for the CMS.86 However, still more than 
a third of cooperative medical stations were almost bankrupt by 1978.87 
With scant and unstable revenue from agricultural yield, a political cam-
paign was launched to reconstruct the value of local resources—such as 
replacing Western pharmaceuticals by Chinese herbal medicine locally 
produced by agricultural collectives. For instance, the CMS in Pinggu 
County built 67 native pharmacies during the early 1970s,88 and patients 
were encouraged to use these herbal medicines.89
The CMS thus relied on collective funds to subsidise pharmaceuticals 
and referral to hospital, collective work to subsidise production of local 
herbal medicines, and collective agriculture (where health service was 
just one component of labour) to finance the barefoot doctors. Although 
the rural health services were supported by staff from the urban areas, 
these doctors’ participation was not institutionalised financially or organ-
isationally. Therefore, although the rural health services in the late 1960s 
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and 1970s had a multi-tier structure, the linkages between the hospitals 
and primary care facilities were very weak and highly dependent on the 
social circumstances of the Cultural Revolution. 
As the MOH had weak control of local health facilities, staff with 
little training were also recruited into the township health centres.90 
Medical education was also reformed so that medical schools stopped 
producing university-degree graduates and instead produced graduates 
with only three-years training, who were later found to be poorly skilled.91 
These policies were not only to prove unsustainable but also created 
serious challenges for the future. Rather than consolidating primary care 
as a professional equivalent to hospital care, they generated a cohort of 
primary care doctors below the standard needed to lead primary care.
Overall, a fragmented financing structure emerged in China’s 
health system, which both shaped and was shaped by the service-de-
livering facilities from 1949 to 1978. The Soviet model provided the 
initial framework of health financing and delivery. However, the model 
was too expensive for China, and therefore did not expand widely to 
cover peasants. When the government tried to reform the system and 
shift focus to rural areas, the highly constrained fiscal space of rural 
areas led to the development of rural primary care that was weakly 
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Sources: 
a. Ministry of Health, ‘Directive on Strengthening Leadership of Grassroot Health 
Organisations’, in Collection of Rural Health Policy Documents (1951-2000), ed. by Keling 
Liu Changming Li, Zhaoyang Zhang, Chunlei Nie, Wei Fu, Hongming Zhu, Bin Wang 
(Department Grassroot Health and Maternal and Child Health, Ministry of Health, 1957).
b. ———, ‘Opinions on Several Issues Regarding Health Work in People’s Communes 
(Guanyu Renmin Gongshe Weisheng Gongzuo Jige Wenti De Yijian) (in Chinese)’, (1959).
c. ———, ‘Report on the National Rural Health Field Conference in Qishan, Shanxi 
(Guanyu Quanguo Nongcun Weisheng Gongzuo Shanxi Qishan Xianchagn Huiyi Qingkuang 
De Baogao) (in Chinese)’, (1960).
d. ———, ‘Opinions on Improving Several Issues Related to Hospital Work (Guanyu 
Gaijin Yiyuan Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti De Yijian) (in Chinese)’, (1962).
e. ———, ‘Report on Putting the Stress of Health Work in Rural Areas (Guanyu Ba Weisheng 
Gongzuo Zhongdian Fangdao Nongcun De Baogao) (in Chinese)’, (1965).
f. Ministry of Health, op. cit. (note 86).
Policy
‘union clinics [group practices of mainly private practitioners] 
emerged from the people… are health welfare institutions 
with socialist nature, the state should not take them over’a
‘for the medical expenditures of the people… it is best 
to mainly rely on individual payment, with appropriate 
subsidy from the state and communes’ b
‘doctors’ group practices are the most numerous and 
the most problematic, and should gradually move 
towards commune/brigade ownership’ e
‘the policy of ‘commune sponsorship with public aid’ applies 
for collectively-sponsored commune health centres’ f
‘the main form of rural grassroots health organizations should  
be doctor-owned group practices for a very long period of time’d








Table 7.2: Policy statements on ownership of and  
financial responsibility for primary care facilities
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Reform and re-reform (1978-2018)
The period between 1978 and 2018 saw rapid and stable growth of 
the Chinese economy. China’s industrialisation reached a new height 
and it became one of the world’s leading manufacturing powers. This 
period saw a U-turn in public share (represented by government finance 
and social input—predominantly social health insurance in Figure 1) in 
overall health financing, which declined continuously for two decades 
before rising in the latter one and a half decades. Introduction of mar-
ket-based financing mechanisms brought direct competition between 
hospitals and primary care providers and exposed the weakness of the 
latter. The links that connected the hospitals and primary care providers 
were essentially broken. After 1978, pharmaceuticals and technologies 
became critical vehicles for hospitals’ revenue generation. Resources that 
became increasingly available due to the rise of the Chinese economy were 
absorbed primarily by hospitals, while the primary care sector struggled 
to secure a model of financing that allowed its sustainable development.
Figure 7.1: Composition of sources of total health  





















































Data source: National Health and Family Planning Commission, China Health and Family 
Planning Statistical Yearbook 2017 (Beijing: Beijing Union Medical University Press, 2017).
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Seeking revenue from market 
The post-1978 reform brought challenges and new opportunities 
for financing both hospitals and primary care facilities. The reform 
started with decollectivisation of agricultural production which led 
to the collapse of the collective agricultural system that financed the 
work of barefoot doctors. The CMS also collapsed, largely because 
of a backlash against the ideology to which the CMS was tied during 
the Cultural Revolution.92 Contemporary studies by researchers also 
highlighted the importance of local political leadership in determining 
CMS success.93 At the central level, the worry about heavy financial 
burden of peasants and the tense relationship between local gov-
ernment (township and village) and peasants made the government 
reluctant to push harder for the resurrection of CMS in the 1990s.94 
Local governments were responsible for public expenditure on lo-
cal health facilities, but they were predominantly concerned with 
economic growth and cut down on their health spending.95 Urban 
enterprise-based welfare also encountered difficulties: as a result of 
the reform of state-owned enterprises during the post-1978 economic 
reform, businesses had to bear the consequences of economic losses. 
The state-owned enterprises were allowed to be privatised or closed, 
leading to the laying-off of many workers, who thus lost their enti-
tlement to health benefits.96 
The government was committed to the maintenance and mod-
ernisation of health facilities,97 which required additional resources. 
As government financial input and insurance fund payments continued 
to drop as a percentage of overall health expenditures (see Figure 7.1), 
a main concern of policymakers was the financial deficits of health 
facilities, particularly urban hospitals which faced expanding demand.98 
The two issues were seen as related, as the lack of incentive due to poor 
cost recovery was considered a contributor to low service provision. 
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The central government and the MOH used two main approaches 
to seek additional revenue for health facilities from the market.
First, the price schedule was reformed. Low charges for hospital 
services were the result of the 1960 policy of government subsidy to 
physician salaries, which was believed not to have been well imple-
mented: prices were reduced for both patients and insurance funds 
but not with a parallel increase in salary subsidy.99 With declining 
government share in health financing, this price system had to be 
changed. However, the simultaneous reduction of social health insur-
ance meant that increasing the price of medical services systematically 
would impose a heavy financial burden on those not covered by public 
health insurance.100 
The government adopted new policies to allow hospitals to in-
creasingly rely on private payment and revenue generated through 
expensive services. In 1981, the State Council approved a dual fee 
schedule, allowing hospitals to charge GIS and LIS patients at cost 
of services while keeping the prices for other urban residents and 
the rural population unchanged.101 In 1985, the government again 
allowed price increases for new equipment, new medical procedures, 
and newly built, renovated and expanded facilities, and reempha-
sised the need for separate fee schedules for insured and uninsured 
patients, while again avoiding general adjustment of prices.102 In 1996, 
the government further pushed for increased cross-subsidy from 
high technology services through higher charges which were then 
redistributed among the hospitals.103 Although the policy document 
admitted the problem of encouraging excessive sales of expensive 
pharmaceuticals, the policy makers did not remove pharmaceutical 
mark-up, knowing that there would be no alternative revenue source. 
Second, the State Council also implemented a management 
responsibility system for hospital economic operations.104 In effect, 
hospitals were supposed to cross-subsidise among their own services: 
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non-basic services could be provided with a profit margin, while basic 
services were to be provided below cost.105 The result was a rapid 
growth of pharmaceutical expenditures, which was particularly fast 
in inpatient services (see Figure 7.2). Official documents noted that 
hospitals borrowed heavily in order to purchase expensive equip-
ment,106 and regional quotas were exceeded.107 Hospital debt increased 
much faster than assets and revenues.108
Figure 7.2: Pharmaceutical expenditures on  
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The commercialisation of the hospitals was accompanied by the 
decline of the publicly-funded primary care sector, which had never 
been strongly embedded. Barefoot doctors had to rely on user fees paid 
by the peasants. The number of barefoot doctors started to decline, 
as their main source of revenue shifted to drug sales,109 and many left the 
ranks. About half of the 1.2 million that remained passed a certification 
process and became village doctors, while the other half became village 
health workers.110 In 1985, the term barefoot doctors ceased to be used.111 
The village doctors also tended then to neglect preventive services.112
The township health centres struggled to retain doctors, as their 
weak revenue basis was exposed when central financial subsidy and 
dispatch of urban doctors dwindled. The withdrawal of ‘sent-down’ 
hospital doctors became a common phenomenon. Local reports sug-
gested that the conscripted doctors almost completely left township 
health centres: for example in the early 1980s, 166 technical ‘backbones’ 
(most of whom had been sent down from urban hospitals) left the 
health services of Pinggu, Beijing, destroying its technical capacity.113 
In a township health centre in Liaoning, only one out of 11 specialised 
secondary school graduates sent to work there from 1962 remained 
working there in 1982, while more than two thirds of its staff were 
temporary.114 Some of the local health administrators said the rural 
health professionals were being ‘eradicated’.115 Those who exited 
tended to be the more qualified professionals. Financial concerns were 
critical drivers of the exodus of doctors, along with other non-financial 
issues such as lack of career prospects.116
The inheritance of unqualified, even semi-illiterate workers from 
the Cultural Revolution period up until the early 1980s, and the re-
tirement of doctors trained before 1949, meant that many township 
health centres were far from ready to compete in the market. The only 
exception were those who had been able to develop specialties.117 
In other words, there was no sustainable financial model or fiscal 
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space for primary care. Fee for service payment further undermined 
the development of general practice, as the focus of primary care 
providers shifted towards curative care with neglect of prevention. 
Towards universal health coverage 
Around the turn of the century, China’s poor health risk-pooling 
was exposed by the WHO World Health Report 2000, prompting a more 
assertive approach by the state towards population coverage and access.118 
In 1998, the LIS had been restructured as an urban insurance scheme for 
employees. In 2002 and 2005, two other extensive social health insurance 
schemes were established and started expanding. The three schemes and 
GIS eventually covered the whole population. The government started 
to invest in public health services on both demand- and supply-sides. 
In 2009 (a few years after the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2002) the government launched a reform to provide 
basic universal health coverage. The increase in government and social 
(i.e. premium collected from employers and employees) financing was 
conspicuous (see Figure 1).
What did this mean for hospitals, primary care, and the balance 
between them? The three social health insurance schemes expanded 
in population coverage and fundraising, leading to a decline in out-of-
pocket payments as a share of total health expenditure from 60% in 2001 
to 37.5% in 2009 and further to 28.8% in 2016 (see Figure 1).119 Besides 
the expansion of insurance, the reform in the early 2000s covered four 
other main areas: essential medicines, essential public health services, 
service delivery (focusing on primary care), and public hospitals.120 
All of the reforms included a financing element. The essential medi-
cines policy required zero-price mark-up in pharmaceutical dispensing 
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and replaced it with a set fee for each consultation, which removed the 
strong incentive to generate income through prescribing excessively. 
The essential public health services programme had a new benefit package 
and designated capitation-based funding. The service delivery reform 
replaced previous revenue-based salaries with a rigid but generally low 
salary, which seem ineffective in incentivising medical services. While 
these reform policies were launched in primary care facilities short-
ly after the 2009 health system reform, it took more than a decade to 
remove the drug mark-up in public hospitals.121 The payment for hospital 
services was still primarily fee-for-service and reform for hospitals and 
hospital-based physicians were also patchy and mainly local. Hospitals’ 
incentive to pursue revenue generation remained unchanged. This drove 
rapid accumulation of resources in hospitals, reinforcing the financial 
disadvantage of primary care.
With the essential public health services programme, primary care 
facilities started to receive a capitation-based budget for providing 
a package of essential public health services, separate from the social 
health insurance schemes which covered inpatient and outpatient ser-
vices. There was some evidence that low salary and rigid policy targets 
related to non-clinical service procedures were demotivating for providers, 
nor did the reform resonate with patient’s preferences for care.122 The visits 
to primary care providers as a proportion of overall visits continued to 
decline. From 2004 to 2016, the number of visits to primary care facilities 
increased from 2.58 billion to 4.37 billion, a 69 % increase, while visits 
to hospitals increased from 1.3 billion to 3.27 billion or by 152%.123
As a result of the asymmetric timing of reforms, from 2009 hospitals 
grew ever more dominant in health financing (see Figure 7.3). By contrast, 
township health centres as well as primary care facilities overall experi-
enced much slower increase in revenue. One particular phenomenon was 
the rise of county hospitals. County hospitals received support from the 
government because they were recognised as the local centre to provide 
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technical leadership for the rural multi-tiered health services. Indeed, 
the years after 2009 saw the rapid catching up of county hospitals with 
urban hospitals (see Figure 7.3). Among all hospitals, those with more 
than 800 beds grew the fastest, from 180 in 2002 to 1,602 in 2016 or by 
8.9 times, compared to 1.6 times growth of all other hospitals; specialist 
hospitals also grew faster than general hospitals.124 Larger hospitals 
also provided an increasingly large share of overall hospital beds—the 
proportion of total beds in hospitals with more than 500 beds increased 
from 41% in 2002 to 52% in 2016 (see Figure 7.4). The particularly rapid 
development of large hospitals and specialised hospitals suggests that 
the current model rewards increased specialisation of clinical services.
Figure 7.3: Health expenditures by types of facility  
(adjusted to 1990 price level)
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from data from the China National Health Development Research 
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Figure 7.4a: Number hospitals classified by size  
(number of beds) (2002 and 2016)
Sources: Authors’ calculation from data from:
———, op. cit. (note 160).
National Health and Family Planning Commission, China Health and Family Planning 
Statistical Yearbook 2017 (Beijing: Beijing Union Medical University Press, 2017).
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Figure 7.4b: Estimated proportion of beds in hospitals classified by 
size (number of beds) (2002 and 2016)
Sources: Authors’ calculation from data from:
———, op. cit. (note 160).
National Health and Family Planning Commission, China Health and Family Planning 
Statistical Yearbook 2017 (Beijing: Beijing Union Medical University Press, 2017).
Note: As the yearbooks cited here only reported average number of beds in each size category 
(e.g. hospitals with 100-199 beds), we estimated proportion of beds in hospitals classified by 
size. Number of beds of hospitals with fewer than 800 beds were calculated using the number of 
hospitals multiplied by the mid-point of the range of number of beds in each category shown in 
the figure. Number of beds of hospitals with more than 800 beds were calculated using the total 
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Discussion
We have surveyed the historical evolution of financing for hospitals 
and primary care facilities in China from 1835 to 1949. Here we sum-
marise the key historical stages and discuss the role of financing in the 
historical evolution of the balance between hospital and primary care.
Summary of key historical stages
Fiscal space in China before 1949 was extremely limited, inhib-
iting the growth of a public hospital system. The period 1835-1928 
saw the rise of mission hospitals (incorporating substantial ambula-
tory care) as the dominant form of Western medicine supported by 
external funding sources and local revenue largely via outpatient care. 
From 1928 to 1949, a social medicine movement plotted a diverging 
trajectory of low-cost primary care. While the original plan was to 
reposition hospitals and doctors so as to strengthen primary health 
services provided mainly by lay health workers, the limited fiscal and 
regulatory capacity led to separation of hospitals from primary care 
facilities focused primarily on public health services. While the model 
of the medical-school-affiliated hospital was diffused directly from the 
West, the primary care model after 1928 was also heavily influenced by 
international practice, despite substantial local adaptation.
In the 1950s, hospitals were reinforced through the development 
of urban medical insurance schemes based on Soviet practice as well 
as fees from private paying urbanites. Specialist-oriented educational 
reform combined with an expansion of hospital-based ambulatory care 
further undermined the potential for primary care financing to develop 
based on general practice. The model was too expensive for the young 
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and mainly agricultural country, leaving the majority population—the 
peasants—without coverage. The pre-1949 model of focusing on public 
health services within primary health care was initially adopted during 
the early 1950s. Then it became unacceptable that the rural population 
could not enjoy health risk pooling like urban dwellers. Primary care 
was implemented nation-wide with central subsidy and mobilisation 
of professionals from hospitals in support, through training, sustained 
clinical guidance and even staffing. However, it remained constrained 
as local health providers still relied on meagre and unstable agricultural 
revenues during the late 1960s and the 1970s.
After 1978, market-based financing reforms introduced direct 
competition between hospitals and primary care providers, which 
exposed the weakness of the latter. Pharmaceuticals and technologies 
became critical vehicles for hospitals’ revenue generation. Primary care 
suffered from chronic funding shortages. The post-2002 expansion of 
social health insurance schemes for urban and rural residents chan-
neled funds disproportionately to hospitals. The much longer delay 
in reforming financing in hospitals as compared to primary care also 
suggested a stronger resistance to change.
Health financing history and hospital centrism 
The effects of structural factors, diffusion and path dependent 
processes all seemed important in generating the historical institutions 
that underpin China’s contemporary hospital-centrism, which not only 
provided limited value of health services despite rapidly increasing 
cost, but also proved difficult to change. The theories can complement 
each other and provide a comprehensive explanation for the evolution 
of the balance of hospitals and primary care.
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Structural factors played an obvious role. For example, the over-
all lack of financial resources and the gap between urban and rural 
socio-economic development up to 1978 affected the shaping of primary 
care which aimed at extending health care coverage to the vast rural 
population. Separated, differentiated and tiered financing contributed 
to the divergent institutionalisation of hospitals and primary care fa-
cilities over the long term. 
Policy diffusion was also important. The rise of Western medicine 
hospitals in China involved the adoption of an American model of 
academic hospitals by philanthropists and a Soviet model supported 
by public health insurance. Apart from such bilateral diffusion, the 
later primary care movements were also affected by the transnational 
diffusion from the social medicine practiced in central and eastern 
Europe mediated by international organisations such as the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the League of Nations Health Organisation.
What we have demonstrated is that historical structural factors 
(such as the limited fiscal space due to lack of economic development) 
and diffused policy models (such as the establishment of Flexner-in-
spired elitist medical universities in China) were embedded in the his-
torical institutions that affected later periods, even when the structural 
factors were modified and the diffused model became outdated. As 
in China, primary care strengthening has been a late comer in many 
low- and middle-income countries, which face the similar challenge of 
hospital-centrism based on models diffused from developed countries. 
The 1930s and 1960s marked two important periods when the two-model 
system of diverging hospitals and primary care facilities was formed. 
The relative success in the latter period relied heavily on the ability of 
government to mobilise professionals from hospitals to support primary 
care through training, sustained clinical guidance and referral. This 
was however unsustainable and undermined by the reform after 1978, 
as hospitals needed to generate revenue in competition with primary 
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care providers. Although reforms could relatively quickly increase 
public financial input, their effects might also be circumscribed by the 
long-term shaping effects of earlier financing policies. Thus, historical 
institutionalism is helpful to explain why it was so hard to create a 
primary-care-centric health system in all three periods (1835-1949, 
1949-1978 and 1978-2018).
This chapter has highlighted the role of historical fiscal space 
in shaping the development of the service model of health facilities. 
This is supported by previous historical work in wealthy countries. 
In the United States, the emergence of privately-paying patients con-
tributed to the specialisation of medical services and the rise of hos-
pitals over primary care facilities.125 In the United Kingdom, the early 
empanelment of doctors to provide general medical care, based on the 
National Health Insurance Act of 1911, provided a stronger institutional 
basis for primary care to consolidate financially and professionally.126 
Furthermore, we also hinted at the difficulty of transforming the complex 
financing system underpinning hospitals and primary care providers 
in China. The way health facilities were funded profoundly affected 
the positioning of service delivery. Revenue generation policies under 
tight fiscal constraints could create resistance to redirection of resources. 
This is illustrated by the long delay in adjusting price schedules and 
removing pharmaceutical mark-up in China in recent years.
Conclusion
A health system focusing on hospital care is associated with high 
cost as well as suboptimal health outcomes. As China experiences 
rapid population ageing and a sharp increase in a non-communica-
ble disease burden, the importance of a primary-care-centred health 
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system to provide continuous, coordinated and cost-effective services 
has become an imperative and has been well recognised by both the 
national government and key international agencies. Understanding 
the historical path that has led to the current uneven balance of care is 
important in framing our understanding of contemporary challenges 
facing primary care strengthening and developing solutions.
We have analysed the historical coevolution of primary care 
facilities and hospitals in China from 1835 to 2018, focusing on the role 
of financing in shaping the historical trajectories of hospital-centrism 
despite multiple waves of primary care strengthening. While hospitals 
consolidated their revenue-generation and service dominance over 
time, the late development of financing policies and fiscal space for 
primary care constrained its institutionalisation. As resources became 
increasingly abundant, they were increasingly allocated to hospitals 
while primary care continued to be poorly supported. For contempo-
rary policies, a key implication is that these historically conditioned 
methods of financing health care institutions need to be understood, 
so that the resourcing of hospitals and primary care providers can 
become better aligned in order to drive them to work together towards 
primary care strengthening.
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